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Abstract
This thesis contains three essays on behavioral responses to social insurance and taxation. The
rst chapter documents and analyzes an important and puzzling stylized fact about retirement
behavior: the large concentration of job exits at specic ages. In Germany, almost 30% of workers
retire precisely in the month when they reach one of three \statutory" retirement ages, although
there is often no incentive or even a disincentive to retire at these thresholds. To study what can
explain the concentration of retirements around statutory ages, I use novel administrative data
covering the universe of German retirees, and I take advantage of unique variation in retirement
incentives as well as in the location of statutory ages across individuals created by the German
pension system. Measuring retirement bunching responses to 644 dierent discontinuities in pension
benet proles, I rst document that nancial incentives alone fail to explain retirement patterns
in the data. Second, I show that there is a direct eect of \presenting" a threshold as a statutory
age, which is substantially larger than that of nancial incentives. Further evidence on mechanisms
suggests the framing of statutory ages as reference points for retirement as an explanation. A
number of alternative channels including rm responses are also discussed but they do not seem to
drive the results.
The second chapter analyzes bunching responses around reference points and argues that bunch-
ing methods are naturally suited to quantify reference-dependent preferences. Using a standard
labor supply model, the workhorse of the bunching literature, I rst show that dierent types of ref-
erence dependence all have a key prediction in common: They imply sharp bunching of the outcome
at the reference point. Observed bunching can be linked to underlying parameters, which moti-
vates both structural and reduced-form estimation methods to implement an empirical bunching
approach to reference dependence. Finally, I present two applications in the context of retirement
decisions. First, I nd signicant bunching responses at a type of \pure" reference point, namely
round retirement ages. Second, I complement the analysis from chapter 1 with structural estima-
tion and nd a quantitatively important role of reference dependence at statutory retirement ages.
Counterfactual simulations highlight that shifting statutory ages via pension reforms can be an
eective policy to increase actual retirement ages with a positive scal impact.
The third chapter turns to a topic from the realm of taxation. Modern systems of rm taxation
typically feature a combination of payroll, valued-added, and corporate income taxes. However,
they often exist alongside special presumptive tax regimes targeted at small and medium enterprises
(SME), such as a single turnover tax. This chapter uses novel administrative data from S~ao Paulo
(Brazil), including data on inter-rm trade, to shed light on the eects of such dual tax systems
on rm growth, market competition, and production decisions. First, we show that the rm
size distribution is distorted by the eligibility threshold for the presumptive tax system. Second,
ineligible (larger) rms are adversely aected by reductions in the tax and compliance burden
for SME. Third, we study the relationship between tax systems and production choices. The
presumptive tax mainly replaces a payroll tax and a value-added tax by a turnover tax in our
context. Accordingly, we nd that rms in the presumptive tax regime use relatively more labor
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input and source more of their intermediate input from other rms in the same regime. This leads
to partial segmentation of the trade network between rms in the two systems. We show that
heterogeneity in rm production choices drives part of these correlations, but there is also a causal
eect of tax regimes on input choices.
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Chapter 1
Reference Dependence in Retirement
Behavior: Evidence from German
Pension Discontinuities
1.1 Introduction
For many countries, population aging poses looming questions over the scal sustainability of
public pension systems. The average OECD country already spends 8% of GDP or 18% of total
public expenditure on pensions (OECD (2015)). The old-age dependency ratio, measuring the
number of individuals aged 65 and above relative to the working-age population, is projected to
rise from currently 27% to 49% by 2050. In addressing these issues, a widely shared policy goal
is to extend the working lives of the elderly population. Standard economic models prescribe the
design of appropriate nancial retirement incentives as a policy tool to inuence labor supply at
old age. However, existing studies nd small eects of nancial incentives on retirement behavior
(e.g. Manoli and Weber 2016a).
Much of the public debate on pension reform revolves around a dierent policy: statutory age
thresholds. Such thresholds are used by typical public pension systems to frame benet rules. They
may include an Early Retirement Age and a Normal Retirement Age, and they usually dene
retirement ages relative to which benets are calculated. What is the role of statutory ages for
retirement behavior? To provide motivational evidence, gure 1.1 shows that the distribution of
job exits of German workers is strongly concentrated around statutory ages. There are sharp spikes
in job exits at the main statutory ages 60, 63 and 65.1 In total, 29% of job exits at age 55 and
above occur precisely in the month when the worker reaches a statutory age.
The spikes in retirement at statutory ages are not only large, but also surprising from the point
of view of standard labor supply models. To preview this, consider the stylized lifetime budget
1Note that dierent statutory ages apply to workers depending on their birth cohort and characteristics such as
gender and contribution histories.
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constraint in gure 1.2. Most workers face a reduction in the marginal return to work, i.e. an
incentive to stop working, at ages 60 and 63, but a disincentive to retire at age 65. However,
large bunching occurs at all three age thresholds. Similarly, bunching at statutory ages in spite
of modest retirement incentives has been observed in other countries (e.g. Mastrobuoni 2009;
Behaghel and Blau 2012; Cribb et al. 2016). Yet, statutory ages play no direct role in standard
models of retirement, and what drives their prominent impact for retirement behavior has been a
long-standing question in the literature (Lumsdaine et al. 1996).
Having documented this puzzling stylized fact about retirement behavior, this chapter asks
what can explain the concentration of retirements around statutory ages. To address this question,
I estimate bunching responses at 644 benet discontinuities in the German public pension system,
using administrative data on the universe of retirees in the country. The analysis nds little impact
of nancial incentives, but a large direct eect of statutory age thresholds on retirement behavior.
Moreover, I show evidence suggesting that this \statutory age eect" is driven by the framing of
statutory ages as reference points for retirement. Based on these results, chapter 2 of this thesis
uses a model of retirement with reference-dependent decision utility for counterfactual simulations,
and demonstrates that shifting statutory ages can be an eective policy tool to inuence retirement
behavior with a positive scal impact.
As the empirical setting, the German public pension system provides three key advantages.
First, there is rich variation in nancial retirement incentives and in the location of statutory ages.
This creates more than 600 discontinuities in pension benets corresponding to kinks and notches
in lifetime budget constraints. The variation arises due to two sources: There are six pathways into
retirement entailing dierent benet proles, and a series of pension reforms provide additional
cohort-based variation at the monthly level. The second advantage is that some discontinuities are
presented as \statutory age thresholds", while others are \pure nancial incentives". Statutory
ages are linked to notions such as a \normal" retirement date, and pension benet adjustment
is presented as a loss or gain relative to a reference level dened at statutory ages. This feature
allows for joint estimation of responses to underlying nancial incentives and the direct impact
of presenting a threshold as a statutory age. In addition, discontinuities vary in the size of the
nancial incentive, their location, and the characteristics of aected workers, allowing to control
for heterogeneity along these dimensions. In total, there are 644 discontinuities over the sample
period, out of which 386 are linked to a statutory age. The large number of discontinuities provides
a unique opportunity to study what determines the magnitude of retirement responses.
The third advantage of the empirical setting is that high-quality administrative data is available
to exploit this ne-grained variation. The analysis is based on a novel data set provided by the
German State Pension Fund, covering the universe of workers who retired between 1992 and 2014.
The main sample contains around nine million individuals. The data includes a rich set of worker
characteristics related to earnings careers and pension eligibility, based on which monthly job exits
and individual lifetime budget constraints can be calculated.
I divide the analysis in this chapter into two parts. The rst part of the chapter uses bunching
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methods to estimate retirement responses at the 644 available benet discontinuities. Two main
results are established. First, nancial incentives alone fail to explain retirement patterns. There
are large responses at statutory ages even if there is a close to zero incentive or a disincentive to retire
at the discontinuity. Large dierences in bunching responses across types of discontinuities can also
not be explained by dierent nancial incentives. Second, presenting a threshold as a statutory age
matters directly for retirement behavior. At all types of statutory ages and irrespectively of kink
sizes, large additional bunching occurs compared to pure nancial incentive discontinuities.
These results emerge from two complementary approaches. In the rst approach, I focus on a
few \cases" of specic discontinuities that lend themselves to natural comparison. For instance,
the same group of workers is shown to respond much more to an Early Retirement Age kink than
to a pure nancial incentive notch, although the notch entails a larger nancial incentive to retire.
Moreover, workers respond more strongly to a Full Retirement Age kink than at a pure nancial
incentive kink of similar size occurring at the same retirement age in a similar pathway. In the
second approach, I use the full set of discontinuities to generalize the results. The average observed
elasticity of the retirement age w.r.t. the net-of-tax rate across all 386 statutory age kinks is 1.64.
Across the 258 pure nancial incentive discontinuities in the data, the average observed elasticity
is only 0.15, less than a tenth of the estimate at statutory ages.
I also propose a reduced-form strategy that combines bunching estimates in a regression to
jointly estimate the response to nancial incentives and \statutory age eects" across discontinu-
ities. The identication assumption is that responses to dierent types of discontinuities are driven
by the same underlying parameters. The estimated average net-of-tax elasticity of around 0.1 is
modest and statutory age eects are large and signicant. Results are robust to controlling for
a range of observables and xed eects. Moreover, I show that there is some heterogeneity in
responses, but the pattern of larger responses at statutory ages holds across all types of workers,
including quantiles of income, education, rm size and retirement ages. Furthermore, results from
the main estimation are robust to allowing for heterogeneous parameters along dierent dimensions.
The second part of this chapter explores mechanisms behind the reduced-form \statutory age
eect". I begin by showing evidence that the framing of statutory ages as reference points for
retirement provides a plausible mechanism. Exploiting a natural experiment where the frequency
of information letters sent to workers is drastically increased, I document that more workers retire
at a specic statutory age around which explanations in letters are framed. Additional information
in the letters intended to inform workers about benet calculation does not aect responses to
nancial incentives. Moreover, two patterns in the data speak against a mechanism purely driven
by a lack of information or mistakes. First, retiring at statutory ages is positively associated with
worker characteristics commonly used to proxy for nancial literacy, including education, economic
training and income. Second, the response to statutory ages is not diminished when a worker's stake
in the retirement decision, e.g. measured by the size of their pension wealth relative to earnings,
increases.
Firm responses are also discussed as a potential alternative mechanism. This may be a concern
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since some statutory ages can play a role in the termination of labor supply contracts. However,
I show that (i) self-employed workers and those in very small rms below the employment protec-
tion threshold also bunch at statutory ages, (ii) excluding those statutory ages where mandatory
retirement is possible does not change the remaining results, and (iii) a number of proxies for rm
incentives, including the fraction of workers in unlimited contracts and labor market tightness, are
only weakly related to statutory ages retirements.
This chapter relates to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the recent empirical
literature on retirement behavior. Brown (2013) and Manoli and Weber (2016a) investigate the
responsiveness of retirement to pure nancial incentives and nd very small elasticities. Those
papers come closest to this study in terms of the bunching methods used. On the other hand, here
are several studies of statutory age reforms that nd large eects on retirement behavior, including
in the U.S. (Mastrobuoni 2009), the U.K. (Cribb et al. 2016), Austria (Manoli and Weber 2016b)
and Switzerland (Staubli and Zweimuller 2013; Lalive and Staubli 2015). This chapter proposes
an explanation for these diverging results, where responses to statutory ages are exacerbated by
reference point eects. Moreover, some studies provide support for framing eects or reference
dependence around statutory ages. In particular, the argument by Behaghel and Blau (2012) that
workers are loss averse relative to the Full Retirement Age is closely related to this chapter. Brown
et al. (2013) and Merkle et al. (2017) nd experimental evidence of framing eects around statutory
ages. Shoven et al. (2017) present survey evidence indicating that retiring at statutory ages may
be perceived as a social norm.
Second, this chapter contributes to the bunching literature reviewed by Kleven (2016). Initially,
the bunching method was used to estimate a price elasticity at a budget set discontinuity (Saez 2010;
Chetty et al. 2011), but recent studies have moved towards using additional bunching moments to
estimate additional parameters. For instance, Kleven and Waseem (2013) estimate elasticities and
the share of individuals subject to frictions at notches. Gelber et al. (2017) develop a dierence-in-
bunching approach to estimate an elasticity and an adjustment cost parameter. The present setting
with more than 600 discontinuities allows for a rich analysis of the drivers of bunching. This type
of setting can help address challenges of bunching estimation where results can be somewhat local
to specic discontinuities. Building on the literature, this chapter develops methods for a setting
where many discontinuities are available and, in contrast to previous work, bunching methods are
used to estimate parameters that exacerbate bunching in this chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the empirical context
and the data, section 1.3 describes the empirical methodology, section 1.4 presents reduced-form
evidence, section 1.5 explores mechanisms behind the statutory age eect, and section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Context and Data
1.2.1 The German Public Pension System
Germany has a pay-as-you-go pension system that covers the vast majority of workers in the country
(86% of the labor force in 2014). Enrolment is mandatory for private-sector employees, but most
self-employed workers and civil servants are exempt. Contributions are levied as a payroll tax on
gross earnings.2 Benets are dened according to a pension formula based on a worker's lifetime
contribution history.3 Hence, pensions are roughly proportional to lifetime income and the system
is characterized by relatively little redistribution. The average replacement rate is 50% (OECD
2015). Public pensions are the main source of income for most recipients.4 Moreover, there is a
relatively strict earnings test for pension recipients where earnings above e450 per month lead to
reductions in benet payments. Only 2.5% of workers in the main sample have any income from
employment while receiving a pension, making retirement an absorbing state for most.
The key advantage of the institutional setting is the unique number of pension discontinuities it
provides. To begin with, the system features three types of statutory age thresholds where pension
eligibility changes. First, the Early Retirement Age (ERA) is the earliest age from which any
pension can be claimed. Second, the Full Retirement Age (FRA) is the earliest age from which
workers can claim their full pension. Third, the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) is the age from
which workers can get more than their full pension.5
There is a large amount of variation in statutory ages across workers along two dimensions. First,
there are six pathways into retirement that dier in their ERA and FRA, and workers need to meet
specic requirements to be eligible. Pathways are summarized in table 1.1. The basic pathway is
the regular pension that requires only 5 years of contributions. However, early retirement is not
possible in the regular pathway and the full pension can only be claimed at the NRA. In order
to enter a more generous pathway, workers must have contributed for longer and/or satisfy other
requirements such as disability. Specically, at 15 and 35 years of contributions, workers become
eligible for pathways with ERAs between 60 and 63, and FRAs between 63 and 65. Other pathway
requirements include gender, disability and periods of unemployment.
The second dimension of variation arises due to a series of cohort-based pension reforms enacted
since the early 1990s. Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of ERAs and FRAs for birth cohorts 1932
to 1949. Statutory ages dier considerably among the early cohorts, and they were changed in
2Workers in so-called mini jobs with earnings less than e450 are exempt from contributions. Besides, contributions
have to be paid for some non-work periods such as receiving certain types of unemployment benets.
3Appendix 1.A.2 provides additional details on benet calculation and other aspects of the institutional setting.
See also Borsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) and Borsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) for a more comprehensive overview.
4See Heien et al. (2005). In 2003, 11% of retirees reported to receive any income from employer pension schemes
and only 1% had a private pension, and the average income from those sources is small relative to public pensions.
Among retirees with any employer pension income, the employer pension amounts to 34% of their public pension on
average. The corresponding gure for private pensions is 23%. The numbers seem to increase somewhat for younger
cohorts, but remain small throughout the sample period.
5The distinction between the FRA and NRA is somewhat peculiar to the German system. Essentially, the FRA
was created to allow some workers to claim a \full pension" before the NRA if they satisfy certain requirements.
However, all workers can claim more than their full pension only after the NRA.
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dierent pathways at dierent times. For instance, the women's FRA was increased from 60 to
65 for cohorts 1940 to 1944. This was done gradually: the FRA increases by one month for each
month of birth in the reform cohort window. Similar gradual changes to the ERA and FRA were
also implemented in all other pathways.
In addition, the setting provides two sources of pension discontinuities not linked to statutory
ages, representing \pure nancial incentives". First, the contribution requirements of pathways
mentioned above create \notches" where workers discontinuously become eligible for more gener-
ous benets. Second, there is an invalidity pathway where pensions can be claimed at any age.
This pathway has a low contribution requirement of only 5 years, but a relatively strict disability
requirement. No statutory ages are dened for this pathway, but pension eligibility changes at
some thresholds.6 Section 1.2.3 explains in more detail how statutory ages and other benet rules
translate into budget constraint discontinuities.
1.2.2 The Role of Statutory Age Thresholds
Link to Pension Benets. Benet eligibility directly depends on statutory ages in all path-
ways (except invalidity pensions). A full pension level is dened at the FRA, and there are per-
manent reductions in benets for workers claiming before the FRA as well as permanent increases
in benets for claiming after the NRA. The adjustment function follows a kinked schedule, with
a penalty of 0.3% for each month of retirement before the FRA, no adjustment between the FRA
and the NRA, and a reward of 0.5% for each month of retirement after the NRA.
Framing of Benets and Retirement. Moreover, statutory age thresholds play an important
role for how benets and retirement are presented to workers. Appendix gure 1.A1 provides an
example of of framing from a leaet designed to inform workers about a pension reform that
increases the NRA to 67. Three features stand out. First, statutory ages are somewhat directly
suggested as retirement dates. For instance, the title \retirement at 67" refers to the post-reform
NRA at age 67. Workers are also told that \if they want to retire early" they can do so at the
ERA, and if they wish a full pension, they should retire at the FRA. Second, workers are warned of
losses if they retire before the FRA (\the penalty will remain for your entire retirement"). Third,
dierent pathways are explained to workers via dierences in statutory ages, and the pension reform
is explained as a change to statutory ages.
The example illustrates how pensions and retirement are framed in terms of statutory ages in
three ways. First, linking statutory ages to notions such as \full" and \normal" retirement may be
suggestive to workers and contribute to expectations regarding retirement dates. Second, pension
adjustment for early retirement is framed as a loss relative to a \full pension" level linked to the
FRA, while adjustment for late retirement is framed as a gain. In other words, statutory ages are
used as institutional reference points in terms of both retirement dates and benet levels. Third,
6Moreover, contribution points are credited to invalidity pensioners as if they had continued working until age
60, making benets less dependent on their contribution history.
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while dierent pathways eectively entail dierent benet levels for any given retirement age, the
distinction between pathways is framed via dierent statutory ages rather than directly in terms
of benet levels. This logic originates from German Social Law, where each pathway is dened in
terms of its statutory ages, and pension adjustment based on statutory ages is dened in a separate
section. Relatedly, major pension reforms are equally framed as changes to statutory ages rather
than the changes to benet levels that they eectively entail. Similar framing of retirement dates
and benet levels has been shown to aect reported retirement plans in lab settings (e.g. Brown
et al. 2013, Merkle et al. 2017).
Labor Supply Contracts. Finally, statutory ages can play a role in the termination of some
labor supply contracts. In particular, mandatory retirement clauses linked to workers' NRA can
be specied in collective industry agreements or in individual contracts. This is sometimes cited
as a way for rms to avoid high costs of ring of older workers. Importantly, there is no possibility
for mandatory retirement clauses linked to the ERA or FRA.7 The potential role of rms is further
addressed in section 1.5.2.
1.2.3 Lifetime Budget Constraint Discontinuities
In order to see how the pension system aects incentives for the timing of retirement, the net
present value of a worker i's lifetime income can be written as a function of her retirement (job
exit) age Ri:
NPVi(Ri) =
Ri 1X
t=0
twit(1  ~it) +
TiX
t=max(Ri;ERA)
tBi(Ri) (1.1)
The worker earns a gross wage w from starting age 0 to the period before retirement, which is subject
to income tax and social insurance contributions summarized in ~ . Pension benets B depend on
R both via contributions paid until retirement and pathway-specic pension adjustment. Benets
can be claimed from the age at job exit if the worker has already reached her ERA (and from the
ERA otherwise) and are paid until time of death T . Finally, all payments are discounted at factor
 = 11+r , where r is the interest rate.
To satisfy the lifetime budget constraint, Ci = NPVi, i.e. lifetime consumption possibilities
C are given by discounted lifetime income streams. The slope of the budget constraint, i.e. the
marginal gain in lifetime consumption from delaying retirement by one period, denes the implicit
net wage wnet = dCdR . Expressing the consumption gain as a fraction of gross earnings, the implicit
net-of-tax rate can be calculated as 1   = wnetw . In general, delaying retirement aects consump-
tion in three ways. First, the worker gains an additional period of wage earnings. Second, she
sees a permanent change in her benet eligibility dBdR . In the German case
dB
dR is always strictly
positive, since later retirement implies both more favorable pension adjustment and a larger sum
7Individual agreements between the worker and the rm to terminate a contract at the ERA/FRA can be added
to the contract no earlier than three years before the desired time of job exit, but similar agreements can also be
made in reference to other dates.
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of contribution points. Third, if she retires at the ERA or later, i.e. she is already eligible to claim
benets, there is an opportunity cost of work in terms of foregoing one period of benets.
Discontinuous changes in pension eligibility introduce discontinuities into the lifetime budget
constraint. The empirical setting provides more than 600 distinct discontinuities, which can be
grouped into the following three types:8
Kinks Linked to Statutory Ages. Figure 1.2 shows a stylized version of the lifetime budget
constraint. There are convex kinks, i.e. reductions in the marginal net-of-tax rate, at the ERA and
the FRA. Moreover, there is a non-convex kink, i.e. an increase in the marginal return to work,
at the NRA.9 The kinks at the FRA and NRA arise as a direct consequence of the discontinuous
pension adjustment described in the previous section, where annual adjustment falls from 3.6% to
0 at the FRA and jumps from 0 to 6% at the NRA. The convex kink at the ERA arises due to a
combination of pension adjustment and an additional opportunity cost of working, since workers
start foregoing benets once they reach the ERA.10 The location of statutory ages varies by pathway
and birth cohort and there are a total of 386 budget constraint kinks linked to statutory ages.
Contribution Notches. The contribution thresholds required for dierent pathways create
further budget set discontinuities in the form of notches, i.e. jumps in average net-of-tax rate. In
gure 1.2, for instance, the worker reaches 35 years of contributions when working until age 58,
where he becomes eligible for the long-term insured pathway and now faces both a lower ERA and
a lower FRA. Thus, he can receive a pension earlier (i.e. for more years) and his pension is higher
at any given age due to more favorable adjustment, which implies a discontinuous jump in pension
wealth. Similarly, workers face notches when they become eligible for other pathways at 5, 15 and
35 years of contributions.11 The precise location of these notches is worker-specic since it depends
on the individual career starting age. Combining variation across pathways, cohorts and age groups
yields a total of 180 such notches.
Kinks in the Invalidity Pathway. Pensions are also discontinuously adjusted in the invalidity
pathway. Specically, benets are increased by 3.6% p.a. for retiring between 60 and 63, with no
further adjustment when claiming before 60 and after 63. These kinks in the benet schedule
imply budget constraint kinks similar to those around statutory ages. However, the key dierence
to other pathways is that there are no statutory ages in the invalidity pathway.12 Including a
8See appendix 1.A.4.2 for the a complete list of all discontinuities used for bunching.
9An exception is the regular pathway where the ERA coincides with the NRA. In this case, there is a convex
kink at the ERA/NRA.
10The ERA kink could be smoothed out by actuarially fair adjustment of pensions. However, the actual adjustment
of 3.6% annually is not sucient (see Borsch-Supan and Wilke 2004).
11The notches at 5 years of contributions are not used in this chapter since the data on workers with less than 5
years of contributions is incomplete.
12This is presumably intended to mirror adjustment in the other pathways in order to avoid incentives for switching
to invalidity pensions. Notice that the invalidity adjustment function is equivalent to adjustment based on an ERA
of 60 and an FRA of 63, and thus coincides precisely with the benet schedule in the disability pathway which may
be seen as the closest substitute.
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gradual introduction period, there are 78 kinks invalidity pension kinks.
1.2.4 Data
The analysis is based on a novel set of administrative data covering the universe of retirees who
claimed a public pension between 1992 and 2014. The main data set is assembled from 23 single-
year cross sections provided by the German State Pension Fund.13 The sample is limited to workers
in the six main pathways who claimed a pension for the rst time between ages 55 and 67, have
earned at least 5 contribution points from at least 5 years of contributions and do not continue
work after retirement. Moreover, individuals part of whose earnings careers have been abroad and
members of a special scheme for miners are excluded. Finally, East Germans retiring in 1995 and
earlier are excluded since their pension was calculated under a particular set of post-reunication
rules. In order to have sucient parts of each cohort's retirement age distribution available, the
analysis focuses on workers born between 1933 and 1948. After applying those restrictions, the
individual sample contains around 8.9 million observations.
The data includes all variables necessary for the pension fund to determine a worker's pension
eligibility as well as a number of socioeconomic characteristics. Monthly benet claims and last
contributions can be directly observed. The month of job exit can be inferred from the time of
the last contribution for most of the sample. For those workers where the last contribution does
not coincide with employment, the time of job exit is imputed using additional information on the
insurance status in the last three years before retirement. Lifetime earnings and average annual
earnings are backed out using information on contribution periods and contribution points,14 and a
pension benet simulator is built to calculate individual benet eligibility across possible retirement
ages. Lifetime budget constraints are simulated as a version of equation (1.1) with a 3% discount
rate and heterogeneous life expectancies by gender and year of birth. In order to account for the
fact that observed take-up of pathways may reect workers' choices, pathways are assigned in terms
of eligibility as far as possible. This may be particularly important for cohorts where reforms could
induce some \switching" between pathways, which may change group composition over time.
In addition, survey data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) is used for part of
the analysis.15 SOEP is an unbalanced panel of around 1.4 million individual-year observations
spanning the period 1984 to 2013. It contains a wide range of socioeconomic variables including
labor market outcomes. Variables of interest are collapsed at the three-digit occupation level and
merged with the main data where occupation can be observed from 2000 onwards. This sample is
referred to as the occupation-matched sample.
As explained in section 1.2.1, pension discontinuities dier across pathways and cohorts. In
13Data citation: Versichertenrentenzugang 1992-2014, source: FDZ-RV. See appendix 1.A.3 for details of key
variables and other denitions.
14Contribution points are generally proportional to gross earnings. The only caveat is top-coding of earnings above
the contributions cap.
15Data citation: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984-2013, version 30i, SOEP, 2015. Appendix
1.A.3.3 provides details on survey variables and matching with the main data.
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practice, workers can be grouped by pathway and year of birth to capture this variation. Workers
born during reform periods where policy varies at the monthly level are grouped by pathway and
month of birth instead. The sample split yields 375 groups each of whom faces a distinct set of
statutory ages and lifetime budget constraint discontinuities. When analyzing contribution notches,
groups by pathway and year of birth are further divided into those retiring at ages 55 to 60 and 60 to
65 in order to capture variation of notch sizes with retirement age. In total, bunching is estimated
at 644 discontinuities, among which there are 386 statutory ages and 258 pure nancial incentive
discontinuities. For the analysis across discontinuities, bunching observations are collected in the
bunching sample, where each observation represents a discontinuity faced by a particular group of
workers.
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics for the individual sample in column (1), for the occupation-
matched sample in column (2) and for the bunching sample in column (3). In spite of the varying
sample restrictions, key observables are relatively balanced across the dierent samples. Table 1.3
summarizes the budget constraint discontinuities in the bunching sample. Across all statutory
age kinks, the average \kink size" is 0.08, i.e. the net-of-tax rate is reduced by 8 percent at the
threshold. This is driven by a combination of convex kinks at ERAs and FRAs with average size
between 0.3 and 0.4, and NRAs which feature non-convex kinks of average size -0.35. At pure
nancial incentive discontinuities, the average change in the net-of-tax rate is around 0.5, and the
contribution notches entail an average approximate kink size of 0.9. There is also some within-
group variation in the eective size of discontinuities due to dierent individual earnings histories,
but the within-group standard deviations tend to be small.
1.3 Empirical Methodology
1.3.1 Basic Bunching Method
The rst step of the empirical analysis is to measure retirement responses at each discontinuity.
The bunching method developed by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011), which can be applied to
the retirement age distribution,16 provides a way of detecting such responses. A bunching strategy
is naturally suited to the present context, since excess retirements measure both responses to kinks
in the budget constraint and any other impact of certain thresholds on retirement. An additional
advantage of the method is that it allows for the identication of responses within groups where
all individuals face the same incentives.
The bunching mass B at an age threshold R^ can be measured as the observed local spike in
the density of retirement ages above a counterfactual density h0(R^). The standard approach to
estimate h0(R^) is to t a exible polynomial to the observed density excluding the threshold. The
excess mass b = B=h0(R^) is computed as the bunching mass relative to the counterfactual. While
B measures the absolute number of excess retirements at R^, b expresses bunching in multiples of
the counterfactual and can thus be compared across thresholds.
16See e.g. Brown (2013) and Manoli and Weber (2016a) for previous work on retirement bunching.
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Assuming that the density would have been smooth in the absence of the threshold,17 bunching
can be interpreted in terms of a local retirement response. A standard approach focused on pure
price changes then computes an elasticity by relating the excess mass to the kink size dened as
the local percentage change in the implicit net-of-tax rate 1  . The elasticity of the retirement age
with respect to the net-of-tax rate can be calculated as
"^ =
b=R^
=(1  ) (1.2)
The formula is based on the insight that the excess mass is directly related to the labor supply
response of the marginal bunching individual (Saez 2010), i.e. b  R. Elasticities computed
according to (1.2) are referred to as observed elasticities for the remainder of the chapter.
1.3.2 Estimation Using Multiple Bunching Observations
The observed elasticity "^ corresponds to a structural labor supply elasticity in a frictionless model
without any responses to non-price factors. In such a model, bunching is only a function of the
elasticity and a vector of observable variables x related to the threshold, including the counterfac-
tual density and the kink size. Following the notation of Kleven (2016), B = B("; x), and " can
be estimated using a single bunching observation as above. However, the recent literature has cast
doubt on the structural interpretation of observed elasticities, and moved towards estimating ad-
ditional parameters to explain dierences in bunching across kinks. Writing bunching at threshold
i as Bi = B("; !; xi), where ! is a vector of k additional parameters, identication necessitates
observing n  k + 1 bunching moments. If n = k + 1, the implied system of n equations has
an exact solution given the set of observed bunching moments. If n > k + 1, parameters can be
estimated across \bunching observations" Bi.
Existing studies focus mostly on optimization frictions (e.g. Chetty et al. 2011, Kleven and
Waseem 2013, Gelber et al. 2017), where ! contains parameters such as a fraction of workers
unable to adjust or a xed cost of adjustment. This chapter, in contrast, is interested in estimating
the eect of statutory ages on bunching, which is later interpreted in terms of reference dependence.
Denoting Dsi an indicator for the presence of a statutory age at bunching threshold i,
Bi = B("; !(D
s
i ); xi) (1.3)
Hence, the presence of a statutory age aects bunching via !. Parameters can be identied when
bunching is observed at suciently many thresholds that vary in Dsi and xi under the following
assumption:
ASSUMPTION A. E("ijDsi ) = ". That is, structural elasticities do not vary systematically
between statutory age thresholds and pure nancial incentive discontinuities.
17The empirical implementation allows for round number eects at the threshold. See appendix 1.A.4.1 for details
of bunching estimation in practice.
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Intuitively, the assumption rules out that stronger responses to nancial incentives are falsely inter-
preted as statutory age eects. Note that the assumption is concerned with underlying structural
elasticities, which dier from observed elasticities estimated according to (1.2) in the presence of
statutory age eects. Indeed, equations (1.2) and (1.3) imply "^ = f("; !(Dsi )), such that dierences
in observed elasticities are a corollary of the equations. An observed elasticity overestimates the
true elasticity if some of the bunching occurs due to non-nancial factors.18 It is also important
to note that the bunching approach generally allows for heterogeneity in underlying elasticities
(and other parameters). In this case, bunching identies an average retirement response, and local
average parameter values at the threshold (see Kleven (2016)).
Within-group Estimation. For part of the analysis, parameters can be estimated within
groups indexed by g:
Big = B("g; !g(D
s
ig); xig) (1.4)
This requires observing bunching both at statutory ages and pure nancial incentive discontinuities
for the same group of workers g. Restricting the analysis to groups of workers facing both types of
discontinuities allows for identication under a weaker assumption.
ASSUMPTION B. E("igjDsig) = "g. That is, a given group of workers g exhibits the same
structural elasticity at statutory age thresholds and pure nancial incentive discontinuities.
Hence, elasticities can vary across groups in unrestricted ways, but a given group of workers are
required to respond to all nancial incentives in the same manner.
Optimization Frictions. Evidence from previous work indicates that optimization frictions
seem to play a relatively minor role for the timing of retirement (e.g. Manoli and Weber 2016b).
More generally, extensive margin responses are less subject to frictions than intensive margin re-
sponses (Chetty 2012). These ndings are also mirrored by the sharp retirement responses docu-
mented in this chapter. However, it is not necessary to assume that there are no frictions for the pur-
pose of the above analysis. Denoting a vector of friction parameters by , if Bi = B("; !(D
s
i ); ; xi),
the additional assumption necessary to identify a statutory age eect is that frictions do not vary
systematically with Dsi . In other words, if frictions attenuate responses to dierent thresholds in
the same way, the relative magnitude of the eects of interest can still be identied.19
18This contrasts to a situation with optimization frictions, where the observed elasticity underestimates the true
elasticity.
19For instance, this would be given if there was a constant share of non-optimizers, leading to a proportional
attenuation of bunching as in Kleven and Waseem (2013).
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1.4 Reduced-Form Evidence
1.4.1 Basic Bunching Analysis
1.4.1.1 Bunching at Specic Discontinuities: Some Cases
I begin by presenting some cases of bunching at specic discontinuities in order to illustrate the
variation in the data. In particular, this section focuses on cases that lend themselves to two natural
comparisons between statutory ages and pure nancial incentive discontinuities.
Statutory Age vs. Contribution Notch Within Group. First, panels A1 and A2 of
gure 1.4 show that the same group of workers responds more strongly to a discontinuity linked
to a statutory age than to pure nancial incentives. Panel A1 plots the job exit age distribution
of women born in 1945 and 1946 around their ERA of 60. The average kink size is 0.08, implying
an 8% reduction in the implicit net-of-tax rate at the threshold.20 There is large excess mass
of 12.3 and the observed retirement age elasticity calculated according to equation (1.2) is 4.45.
Panel A2 shows the distribution of years of contributions of women in the same birth cohorts
around the threshold of 15 years required for the women's pathway. At 14 years and 11 months
of contributions, women face a notch of size 1.007, i.e. they gain an average of 0.7% of lifetime
wealth from working an additional month. Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), the notch can be
approximated as a kink for the marginal buncher. Here, the notch corresponds approximately to a
kink of size 0.38. Indeed, there is sharp bunching at 15 years and some missing mass to the left of
the notch. However, the excess mass of 1.32 is signicantly less than that at the ERA in panel A1
where workers face smaller kink. The observed elasticity of 0.12 is much smaller than that of the
same group at the ERA.
Kinks in Disability vs. Invalidity Pathways. For the second comparison, panels B1 and
B2 show bunching at two very similar kinks, with and without the presence of a statutory age.
Panel B1 shows bunching around the FRA at 63 for cohorts 1945 and 1946 in the disability pathway.
The kink size is 0.51 and the excess mass is estimated at 10.5, which implies an observed elasticity
of 0.67. Panel B2 shows the distribution of job exit ages for workers born between 1938 and 1946
in the invalidity pathway. They face a kink of size 0.43 at age 63. Consequently, workers in panels
B1 and B2 face very similar kinks at the same age, but the threshold is not framed as the FRA in
the invalidity pathway. Indeed, responses are very dierent. In contrast to the large excess mass
at the FRA, bunching is hardly visible and the excess mass is only 0.08 at the invalidity kink.
Consequently, the observed elasticity of 0.006 is far below the estimate at the FRA.
1.4.1.2 Bunching Across all Discontinuities
Table 1.4 summarizes responses across all 644 discontinuities in the data. In columns (1), the
average excess mass of 21.8 across the 386 budget set kinks linked to statutory ages is very large.
20See appendix gure 1.A1 for lifetime budget constraints of the groups shown in gure 1.4.
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Columns (2) to (4) show that it is driven by large responses at all three types of statutory ages.
Attributing all bunching to the discontinuity in the implicit net-of-tax rate implies an average
observed elasticity of 1.64.21 This observed elasticity is two orders of magnitude above previous
estimates of around 0.01 to 0.04 by Brown (2013) and Manoli and Weber (2016a) from pure nancial
incentives. Moreover, a rst indication that bunching seems to occur somewhat irrespectively of
the nancial incentive is given by the large excess mass at the non-convex NRA kinks.
Next, columns (5) to (7) report bunching responses at the 258 pure nancial incentive discon-
tinuities. The average excess mass is 2.99. The average observed elasticity is 0.01 at pure nancial
incentive kinks, and 0.22 at contribution notches.22 Averaging across all pure nancial incentive
discontinuities yields an elasticity of 0.15, compared to 1.64 at statutory age kinks in column (1).
This implies that, conditional on kink size, bunching at statutory ages is more than ten times larger.
To further investigate to what extent dierences in bunching are driven by dierences in nancial
incentives, gure 1.5 shows binned scatterplots of the excess mass at a discontinuity against kink
size. Two main insights emerge from the gure. First, nancial incentives cannot explain the
bunching patterns well. In panel A, there is large bunching at statutory ages independently of the
underlying incentive.23 The estimated slope is positive but insignicant and there is large bunching
across all kink sizes, including close to zero and even negative ones. The second insight is that
statutory ages matter directly for bunching. There are much larger responses at statutory ages in
panel A than at pure nancial incentives in panel B for any given kink size. Note that this does
not necessary imply that nancial incentives do not matter. Panel B shows a signicant positive
relationship between bunching at pure nancial incentive discontinuities and the underlying kink
size. The estimated slope corresponds to a dierence-in-bunching elasticity of 0.18. However, even
at the largest pure nancial incentive discontinuities there is less bunching than at statutory ages.
1.4.2 Reduced-Form Estimation
The analysis so far suggests that there is large amount of additional bunching at discontinuities
linked to statutory ages. In order to gauge the quantitative importance of this \statutory age
eect", I use the following regression specication:
bi
R^i
= "
i
1  i +
X
s
sDsi + Z
0
i + i (1.5)
21Note that non-convex NRA kinks are not included in the elasticity estimation since bunching in response to
those would imply a negative elasticity.
22This dierence could be driven by several factors. First, kinks apply to the invalidity pathway where workers may
display a lower true elasticity than in other pathways. Second, observed elasticities measured at notches represent an
upper bound: Kleven and Waseem (2013) point out that the approximation of the notch as a kink for the marginal
buncher in order to compute a reduced-form elasticity undestimates the size of the discontinuity since everyone
between the marginal buncher and the notch faces a larger change in the marginal tax rate. Third, additional
months of contributions could come from some non-work periods such that workers may have additional margins of
adjustment to bunch at contribution notches.
23Appendix gure 1.A2 shows plots separately by statutory age types, suggesting that the at slope is driven by
a combination of positive slopes at ERAs and FRAs and a negative slope at NRAs.
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where an observation indexed by i corresponds to a discontinuity in the bunching sample. Dsi is an
indicator for a statutory age of type s 2 (ERA;FRA;NRA) attached to discontinuity i, and the
coecients s measure the additional bunching due to the respective statutory age type. Finally,
Zi is a vector of control variables, and i is an error term.
Equation (1.5) may be a natural way to detect a reduced-form statutory age eect, but it
can be also be interpreted as a simple, linear version of the bunching equation (1.3), where the
parameter vector ! consists of a set of linear regression coecients on the dummies Dsi . The
empirical setting provides many more bunching observations than parameters in the equation,
which has two advantages. First, additional regressors can be included, allowing to control for a
number of group-level characteristics and xed eects in a exible way. Second, rather than nding
a solution to an exactly identied system of bunching equations, the equation can be estimated
via OLS, combining the information provided by all available bunching moments. Intuitively, the
specication ts a regression to the discontinuity-level data, where the slope is interpreted as the
elasticity and additional intercepts are interpreted as statutory age eects. Hence, statutory age
eects are identied from the dierence in bunching between statutory age kinks and pure nancial
incentive discontinuities while the elasticity is identied from bunching at kinks of dierent sizes
within each type of discontinuity. Standard errors are obtained via bootstrap by re-sampling
bunching observations.24
The key identication assumption can be phrased in terms of this regression. i needs to
be uncorrelated with the regressors, which requires assumption A. To see this, consider a case
where true elasticities vary across discontinuities with Di = 0 and Di = 1. Then E(ijDi) 6= 0,
since i contains some residual bunching not captured by the average elasticity ", and this would
introduce bias into the estimation of . In practice, the inclusion of control variables and xed
eects somewhat weakens the required assumption, such that elasticities should be independent of
Di conditional on these controls. Note that some support for assumption A is lent by the results
from gure 1.5, where the implied dierence-in-bunching elasticities at statutory ages and other
discontinuities are relatively similar.
Table 1.5 reports results from regressions based on equation (1.5). To begin with, column (1)
shows results from a basic specication without controls. This yields an elasticity of 0.11 and
large and signicant statutory age eects. Next, column (2) adds interactions between dierent
statutory age types in order to account for the fact that more than one type is present at some
discontinuities. Columns (3) adds a set of worker controls, as well as pathway and year-of-birth
xed eects accounting for the dimensions along which groups are dened. Column (4) adds the
maximum set of group xed eects, controlling for pathway times year-of-birth xed eects. Finally,
column (5) controls for occupation-level characteristics including rm size and unionization rates.
In spite of the varying set of controls and xed eects, the estimated statutory age eects remain
at similar magnitudes. These coecients do not have a direct interpretation, but magnitudes can
24This corresponds to a block bootstrap procedure on the individual-level data, where blocks are dened by groups
of workers facing the same discontinuity.
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be compared. With a coecient of 0.8, the NRA has the largest eect on bunching, while the FRA
eect is around 0.3 and the ERA eect is 0.2. Elasticity estimates remain within a narrow range
between 0.05 and 0.1.
1.4.3 Heterogeneity
An important advantage of the empirical setting is that the large number of discontinuities allows
for an exploration into the determinants of bunching beyond the scope of existing bunching studies.
This section examines heterogeneity along a number of dimensions. The main nding is that the
\statutory age eect" found in the previous section does not seem to be confounded by observable
factors. Moreover, results from an additional estimation strategy are presented, where parameters
are allowed to vary across groups.
Worker and Firm Characteristics. Besides varying incentives, dierences in bunching
between statutory ages and other discontinuities could be driven by dierences in elasticities across
groups. Figure 1.6 shows average observed bunching elasticities at statutory ages and pure nancial
incentive discontinuities by a range of observables. Panels A to C focus on worker characteristics,
namely lifetime wealth (panel A), years of schooling (panel B), and health status proxied by sick
leave periods (panel C). Workers are grouped by quintiles of each variable. Those with higher
lifetime wealth and higher education seem to respond less strongly at statutory ages, but more
strongly at other discontinuities. In particular, workers in the highest schooling quintile seem
to respond more to pure nancial incentives. Groups in worse health, on the other hand, are
less responsive to both statutory ages and other discontinuities. Panels D to F sort bunching
observations by some occupation-level characteristics, in particular rm size (panel D), unionization
rate (panel E) and tenure in the rm (panel F). Recall that these characteristics are obtained
by matching the individual data with SOEP data at the 3-digit occupation level. Again, the
gap between bunching at statutory ages and other discontinuities diers somewhat across groups.
However, observed bunching elasticities are higher at statutory ages by at least a factor of two in
each quintile of each variable. Finally, panels G and H sort bunching observations by birth cohort
and the retirement age at the discontinuity. Responses are substantially larger at statutory ages
for each birth cohort and across the range of available retirement ages.
Appendix gures 1.A3 and 1.A4 provide two pieces of additional evidence. First, gure 1.A3
shows that the main results hold when considering heterogeneity closer to the group denitions in
the bunching sample, namely by retirement pathway, year of birth and the age at the discontinuity.
Both excess mass and observed elasticities are always larger at statutory ages than at pure nancial
incentive discontinuities. Second, gure 1.A4 shows that the patterns above hold when considering
raw excess mass rather than observed bunching elasticities.
Explanatory Power of Observed Characteristics. In order to quantify the explanatory
power of rm incentives and other observable variables, table 1.6 reports results from a Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition. Bunching observations are grouped into discontinuities linked to statutory
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ages and pure nancial incentive discontinuities. The decomposition attributes dierences in excess
mass across groups to a component explained by dierences in observables and an unexplained
component. Since results vary with the choice of reference group, the table reports results using
statutory ages as the reference group in column (1), pure nancial incentive discontinuities as the
reference group in column (2) and a weighted average of the two in column (3). Results conrm
that most of the additional bunching at statutory ages cannot be explained by observable factors.
Financial incentives account for a maximum of 23% of observed dierences, while worker and
rm variables including those discussed above explain up to 12% and 15%, respectively. Between
64% and 104% of the additional bunching at statutory ages cannot be explained by dierences in
observable characteristics.
Estimation with Heterogeneous Parameters. In the reduced-form estimation presented
in section 1.4.2, a concern for identication arises if parameters are heterogeneous across workers
facing dierent types of discontinuities. Adding xed eects somewhat alleviates the concern by
allowing for group-specic bunching intercepts. However, a more direct way to address this is to
allow for heterogeneous parameters in the following specication:
big
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where g indexes groups. Since the main issue with the previous specication is heterogeneity
correlated with kink sizes and statutory ages, a natural solution is to allow for heterogeneous
parameters at the level where these variables are determined, namely pathway and year of birth.
This strategy corresponds to a linear version of the within-group bunching equation (1.4), which
requires the weaker identication assumption B. The assumption states that the same group of
workers exhibits the same elasticity at dierent types of discontinuities, while true elasticities can
vary arbitrarily across groups.25
Table 1.7 reports results from estimating equation (1.6) with varying group denitions. Note
that table 1.7 reports weighted averages of coecients, while pathway- and cohort-specic esti-
mates are shown in appendix table 1.A1. First, column (1) replicates the basic specication with
homogenous parameters. Column (2) estimates a specication with pathway-specic coecients,
and column (3) repeats the exercise with groups dened by birth cohorts. In both specications, the
elasticity estimate increases somewhat compared to column (1), but statutory age eects remain
signicant and increase slightly in magnitude. Column (4) reports estimates with groups dened by
pathway and birth cohort. In the spirit of the comparison presented in gure 1.4, this specication
estimates elasticities and statutory age eects within narrowly dened groups such as women born
in 1945. Again, the estimates in column (4) are similar to the previous columns. Appendix table
25Also note that if underlying parameters are heterogeneous, even if its identication assumption is satised,
equation (1.5) identies weighted averages where the parameter of each group is weighted by the conditional variance
of the corresponding regressor within the group (see Angrist 1998). These weighted averages are not necessarily
equal to \true" population averages. However, the coecients identied in equation (1.6) can be used to calculate
population averages by weighting estimates by group size.
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1.A1 suggests some parameter heterogeneity across pathways, and little heterogeneity across birth
cohorts, which is in line with the evidence from appendix gure 1.A3. However, the fact that aver-
age parameters in table 1.5 change little when allowing for more heterogeneity indicates that there
is little bias in the basic specication with homogeneous coecients. Overall, the results suggest
large and signicant statutory age eects, and elasticity estimates are between 0.09 and 0.29.
1.5 Mechanisms
This section discusses potential mechanisms behind the \statutory age eect" found by the pre-
ceding analysis. I argue that the framing of statutory ages as reference points is the most plausible
mechanism for a number of reasons. First, section 1.5.1 shows evidence suggestive of framing eects
and argues that mistakes or a lack of information are unlikely to explain the observed patterns.
Second, the mechanism is consistent with the institutional setting presented in section 1.2.2, where
statutory ages are institutional reference points in the framing of benets and retirement. This is
likely to facilitate the formation of goals or expectations, which is typically interpreted as reference-
dependent preferences.26 Third, there is complementary evidence from surveys and experiments
on framing eects. For instance, Shoven et al. (2017) suggest that retiring at the NRA may be
perceived as a norm, and Merkle et al. (2017) nd experimental support for framing eects and
behavior consistent with reference dependence around statutory ages.
Fourth, alternative mechanisms including rm responses are addressed in details in section 1.5.2
and 1.5.3, and they do not seem to explain much of the eect. Finally, in the model presented
in chapter 2 of this thesis, reference dependence is a fairly general way the eect of interest: a
discontinuity in utility may capture a number of potential sources, including framing eects, but
also norms, \deep" internal preferences, or audience eects.27
1.5.1 Workers, Framing and Information
Worker characteristics. First, it may be interesting to examine which types of workers are
most likely to retire at statutory ages. Table 1.8 shows regressions of dummies for bunching at
dierent types of discontinuities on a number of worker characteristics.28 If statutory age retire-
ments were driven by a lack of information or mistakes, one might expect that workers with lower
nancial literacy are more likely to choose these ages. In column (1), however, workers retiring at
statutory ages have higher education and are more likely to be economically trained. They also
26In contrast to other decision environments, there is no status quo or previous outcomes in terms of the retirement
date. In the absence of such backward-looking experience, and faced with the diculty of predicting one's retirement
date, it may be natural to take public \advice" or perceived norms as a reference point for retirement.
27Although I argue in favor of framing eects, it remains outside the scope of this chapter to oer fully conclusive
proof of the exact source of reference dependence. Instead, the model is devised in a \pragmatic approach" (Chetty
2015) in the sense that it may not necessary to fully specify the sources of behavior to draw conclusions about the
eects of a policy such as a statutory age, and to provide useful predictions regarding counterfactual policies.
28While the heterogeneity analysis in section 1.4.3 tests whether dierences in responses across discontinuities can
be explained by dierences in observables, the specication presented here asks which individual workers are more
likely to be among the bunchers.
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have higher lifetime earnings, higher last earnings before retirement and higher pension wealth.
Interpreting these characteristics as a proxy for nancial literacy, this suggests that a pure infor-
mation mechanism does not seem to be at work. Columns (2) and (3) show that workers retiring
at the ERA/FRA are less educated but more likely economically trained, while retiring at the
NRA is associated with higher education but negatively related to economic training. All types of
statutory ages seem to attract workers with higher earnings. Hence, even though there is usually
a disincentive to retire, more educated and higher-income workers are more likely to choose the
NRA. Economic training somewhat reduces the probability of bunching at the NRA, but the eect
is limited in magnitude.
Columns (4) repeats the exercise with pure nancial incentive discontinuities. These are pos-
itively associated with education and economic training, but negatively with lifetime earnings.
Finally, column (5) focuses on other round ages. Figures 1.1 and 1.4 indicate clear bunching at
round ages not linked to statutory ages. Round-number bunching has been observed in a number
of contexts and has been attributed to reference point eects (see Kleven 2016). Hence, they may
oer an interesting point of comparison. Round-number bunchers are less educated, more likely to
economically trained and with higher earnings, which makes them similar to workers bunching at
the ERA/FRA.
Information Provision and Framing. As explained in section 1.2.2, the way information is
provided to workers and how it is framed could play an important role for retirements at statutory
ages. To test this, I exploit a reform implemented in Germany in the early 2000s, where the
state pension fund drastically increased the frequency of information letters to workers. Before
June 2002, a detailed letter was sent on workers' 55th birthdays. Under the new regime phased
in between June 2002 and December 2003, a basic letter is sent to every worker every year, and
detailed letters are sent every 3 years from age 55. The stated goal of the reform was to inform
workers better about benets and retirement. Letters are personalized and they provide detailed
information on the worker's contributions so far, how pensions are calculated, and some guidance
on making intertemporal decisions.29 Projected benet amounts for the individual at dierent
retirement ages are also shown. However, letters also seem to reinforce the framing of retirement in
terms of statutory ages. In particular, workers are shown the date when they will reach the NRA
at the beginning of the letter, and two out of three benet scenarios use the NRA as a reference
point.
Figure 1.7 shows monthly fractions bunching at dierent types of discontinuities around the
reform. In panel A, there is no change in the response to pure nancial incentives, but there is an
increase in the probability of bunching at statutory ages. Panel B show that this is driven by more
workers bunching at the NRA, whereas the probability of bunching at the ERA/FRA is constant
throughout the reform. Since letters specically emphasize the NRA, this pattern may imply an
additional framing eect. Appendix table 1.A2 shows results from a version of the main estimation
29Appendix gure 1.A5 shows an example letter. See also appendix 1.A.2.4 for further details on the content of
letters and information provision.
30
with eects of annual information letters. The insignicant coecients on the interaction between
kink size and annual letters conrm that additional information does not aect the response to
nancial incentives. However, letters increase the response to statutory ages in columns (1) and
(2). Columns (3) and (4) suggest that this is indeed driven by larger responses at the NRA and
possibly the FRA. Overall, two conclusions arise. First, increasing the frequency of information
provision does not increase responses to nancial incentives. Second, framing retirement around
statutory ages seems to induce more workers to retire at these ages.
Mistakes and Inattention. A potential alternative to framing eects and reference depen-
dence may be mistakes, for instance because workers misperceive the incentives linked to statutory
ages. However, this would require that workers perceive a strong incentive to retire at all statu-
tory ages, including NRAs that entail a disincentive to retire. In addition, the size of perceived
incentives would have to extremely large: a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that in order
to generate the observed excess mass at statutory ages, workers would have to perceive an average
kink size of at least 95%.30 Such a large kink does not exist anywhere in the pension system, and
actual kink sizes at statutory ages vary between -40% and 50%.
Moreover, when optimization requires costly attention, one may expect that the frequency of
mistakes depends on the stake workers have in the decision. Retirement is generally a high-stake
decision with large consequences in terms of lifetime consumption possibilities, but stakes vary
across workers. For instance, some workers may have contributed to the public system only for
part of their earnings career, or they may not be the main household earner. Table 1.8 shows
that workers with higher stakes seem to be, if anything, more likely to bunch at statutory ages.
The ratio of pension wealth to annual earnings, which proxies for the relative importance of public
pensions for the worker, increases the probability of bunching at statutory ages. Married females,
who tend to rely less on their own pension for old-age consumption, are less likely to bunch at
statutory ages. Both eects also hold when focusing only on the NRA where mistakes may be
particularly likely. Finally, another measure of stakes could be the size of the local incentive. For
instance, if a kink is very small, choosing a \wrong" retirement age may not be very costly. This
would imply that observed elasticities are increasing in kink sizes because it is more worthwhile to
optimize at large kinks. Appendix gure 1.A6 shows binned scatterplots of observed elasticities vs.
kink sizes. There is no evidence of larger responses at large kinks: across all types of discontinuities
observed elasticities are at or even decreasing with kink size. Appendix table 1.A3 reports results
from corresponding regressions, conrming that observed elasticities do not increase with the kink
size.
30This calculation assumes that the elasticity w.r.t. perceived kinks is the same as the measured elasticity w.r.t.
actual kinks. Even if the elasticity w.r.t. perceived kinks was substantially larger, implausibly large perceived kink
sizes would be needed to justify observed responses. Importantly, a large elasticity w.r.t. perceived kinks alone could
not rationalize observed patterns, since bunching occurs at negative kink sizes as well.
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1.5.2 The Role of Firms
Self-Employed and Very Small Firms. To begin with, I show that subgroups where rm
incentives play a small role or no role at all also bunch at statutory ages. Two such groups
are available in the present context. First, although limited, there is a number of self-employed
individuals enrolled in the public pension system.31 Second, very small rms with less than 10
employees are exempt from employment protection, which implies that there should be less ring
frictions and hence less need for employers to use statutory ages to lay o older workers. Figure 1.8
shows job exit age distributions among the full occupation-matched sample (panel A), self-employed
workers enrolled in the public pension system (panel B), the 20 occupations most frequently in
very small rms, including medical receptionists, hairdressers, pharmacists, orists, and dental
technicians (panel C), and the 20 occupations least frequently in small rms, including bankers,
executives, machine operators, miners and train drivers (panel D). There are sharp spikes among
the self-employed and the fraction of 28% who bunches at statutory ages is only marginally smaller
than in panel A. Moreover, although the vast majority of contracts falls below the threshold for
employment protection, there are also sharp spikes among workers most frequently in small rms,
31% of whom bunch at statutory ages. There is however somewhat more bunching among those
least frequently in small rms. Hence, groups of workers where rm incentives play a small role
or no role at all still exhibit large bunching, which suggests that rm responses are not the main
driver of statutory age retirements.
Mandatory Retirement. The most direct way for rms to induce workers to retire at statu-
tory ages is through mandatory retirement clauses linked to the NRA. A natural way to check
whether the previous results are driven by this is to exclude all statutory ages from the analysis
where this rm-induced mandatory retirement is possible. Appendix table 1.A4 shows results from
regressions analogous to table 1.7, but excluding all discontinuities linked to a NRA. Results are
virtually unchanged, with elasticity estimates ranging from 0.14 to 0.26, and highly signicant
statutory age eects at the ERA and FRA similar in magnitude to those in table 1.7. Thus, even
in the unlikely case that all NRA job exits are driven by mandatory retirement, there remains a
large portion of unexplained statutory ages retirements.
Proxying for Firm Incentives. To shed light on the role of rms more generally, statutory
age retirements can be related to a number of variables proxying for rm incentives. First, ring
frictions are more severe for larger rms since employment protection becomes stricter in line with
certain size thresholds. Second, ring costs may change when workers are more unionized. Third,
ring costs are higher for workers with longer tenure since employment protection increases as a
function of tenure thresholds. Fourth, job exits at statutory ages are not necessary at all as a
31Self-employed individuals can be enrolled in the public pension system for two reasons. First, there may be
part of a small set of occupations where enrollment is mandatory. This includes mainly craftspersons, workmen,
self-employed teachers and educators, nurses and artists. Second, self-employed workers can voluntarily enrol in the
public scheme.
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tool for rms when workers have contracts that end automatically after a term limit. Finally, in a
tighter labor market it may be more valuable to rms to keep older workers beyond statutory age
thresholds.
Figure 1.9 show binned scatterplots of the fraction of workers bunching at statutory ages against
the proxies discussed above. Panels A to D include rm size, unionization, tenure and the frequency
of unlimited contracts at the occupation level. Labor market tightness in panel E is constructed
from annual vacancy and unemployment data at the state level. The fraction bunching at statutory
ages is large in all bins of the explanatory variables and the estimated slopes are relatively at.
While there seems to be no eect of unionization, the fraction bunching is indeed increasing in rm
size, average tenure and the fraction of workers in unlimited contracts. Somewhat surprisingly,
there seem to be more statutory age job exits in tighter labor markets.
Table 1.9 shows results from corresponding individual-level regressions of a dummy for statutory
age job exits on all these variables, including worker controls as well as pathway and year-of-birth
xed eects. The positive relationship of statutory age retirements with rm size remains, while the
eect of unionization, tenure and unlimited contract turns negative. Columns (2) and (3) report
results for the NRA and the ERA/FRA separately. The NRA oers the clearest channel for rm
responses, but results do not dier substantially from column (1). Overall, the probability that
an individual worker retires at statutory ages seems to be only weakly related to rm incentives.
Larger rms may induce some additional statutory age retirements, but the magnitude of this eect
is limited.32 This is consistent with the results from section 1.4.3, where rm-related variables
explain only a small share of dierences in bunching across types of discontinuities.
1.5.3 Other Checks
Benet claiming at statutory ages. While job exits could be externally induced in some
cases, the timing of benet claiming is determined by workers themselves. In particular, if they
were laid o but did not want to retire yet, one might expect that some aected workers delay
benet claiming beyond statutory ages in order to search for another job. Appendix gure 1.A7,
panel A shows a histogram of the gap between job exit and benet claiming among workers who
exit at a statutory age (white bars), and workers who exit at other ages but would be eligible to
claim immediately (red bars). Around half of workers exiting at other ages claim immediately,
while a substantial shares seem to wait up to around 12 months to claim. For statutory age job
exits, however, the fraction claiming immediately is a striking 95%. In addition, panel B shows the
job exit age and claiming age distribution of workers not exiting at statutory ages who are eligible
to claim immediately. There are sharp spikes in claiming at the main statutory age thresholds, in
particular at age 65, which suggests that many workers seem to wait until a statutory age to claim,
even if their job exit occurs at other ages.
32Of course these correlations do not prove a role for rms themselves. For instance, the eect of rm size may
stem from stronger social norms or peer eects in larger rms, possibly enhancing reference point eects of statutory
ages.
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Salience of incentives. It could also be that statutory ages make underlying nancial in-
centives more salient rather than serving as reference points. In other words, there could be more
bunching at statutory ages than at other discontinuities because workers are more aware of the
underlying budget set kink. A priori evidence against this hypothesis is provided by the results
from gure 1.5, where large bunching at statutory ages occurs at all kink sizes, including negative
ones. If incentives were made more salient by statutory ages, one would expect a dierent pattern,
where bunching is more steeply increasing in kink size than at pure nancial incentives. Appendix
table 1.A5 provides a further test, repeating the analysis of table 1.7 with additional interactions
of kink size with statutory age dummies. Interaction eects are insignicant or even negative,
implying that workers do not respond more to nancial incentives at statutory ages.
Finally, a number of other channels have been discussed in the literature, but are unlikely to
play a role in the present context.
 Default options. In the German context, statutory age thresholds do not constitute a
default option for retirement. Benet claiming always requires an active choice in the form
of an application by workers themselves.33
 Liquidity constraints. Liquidity constraints may be a potential explanation for job exits
at the ERA. Since pension benets are only paid from the ERA onwards, workers who exit
their jobs before the ERA may have to use savings or borrow against their future pension in
order to smooth lifetime consumption throughout the gap between job exit and ERA. This
may not be possible to the desired extent with credit constraints. However, recent evidence
by Goda et al. (2018) suggests that liquidity constraints are not the main driver of ERA
retirements in the U.S. In addition, table 1.8 shows no indication of liquidity constraints at
the ERA. Workers retiring at the ERA/FRA have both higher lifetime incomes and higher
last incomes before retirement.
 Health insurance. Finally, health insurance availability has been suggested in the U.S.
context as a potential driver of retirements at the NRA. However, in Germany there is uni-
versally mandated public health insurance that covers workers as well as pensioners. Hence,
the availability of health insurance does not depend on age and is unlikely to be a driver of
retirements at any particular age.
1.6 Conclusion
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in retirement decisions and their responsiveness to pension
system features. While there have been studies on some reforms and idiosyncratic features, the
overall evidence is inconclusive. This chapter aims at lling this gap by providing a comprehensive
33This contrasts with the setting of Lalive et al. (2017) where workers are retired by default at the FRA in
Switzerland.
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view of the eect of two key features of pension systems, namely statutory age thresholds and
nancial incentives. The results highlight the important role of statutory ages: around 30% of
job exits occur at a statutory age, and the responses are largely driven by reference point eects.
Nevertheless, workers also respond to nancial incentives, as is particularly visible in bunching at
notches. Job exit age elasticities with respect to the net-of-tax rate are larger than those found in
previous studies, with estimates around 0.1 to 0.3.
There are implications for the design of pensions and reform options. Having established their
direct impact on behavior, statutory age thresholds themselves can be viewed as a policy instru-
ment independent of nancial incentives. Chapter 2 shows in simulations that increasing average
retirement ages can be an eective way to increase actual retirement ages with a positive scal
eect. However, questions remain to what extent policy can exploit reference dependence with
respect to established thresholds by arbitrarily shifting those, since workers' notion of reference
points may originate to some degree from a \real" incentive. Moreover, this raises important new
issues of distribution since certain types of workers seem to be more prone to responding to these
reference points.
The result may also have more general implications for the interpretation of bunching patterns.
Incentive schemes in other contexts are also framed by statutory thresholds that may serve as
reference points. For instance, taxes and social insurance contributions are often dened in terms
of thresholds, and many other policies divide the choice space into discrete categories rather than
emphasizing continuous choices. This may reduce complexity and thus help individuals make
decisions, but the results of this chapter highlight that strongly framed thresholds can become
reference points somewhat independently of the original incentive.
It may be worthwhile for future research to study the sources of reference-dependent retirement
behavior more closely. For instance, this could be done via some controlled variation in the framing
of benets and retirement and the information environment more generally. Similarly, it may
be interesting to test for individuals' perceptions and intentions more explicitly, for example via
surveys. Finally, the degree to which workers internalize reference points set by the government may
depend on cultural aspects, and it may be interesting to see how results compare across cultural
contexts.
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Figure 1.1: Job Exit Age Distribution (Full Sample)
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Note: This gure shows the pooled distribution of job exit ages for all workers born between 1933 and 1948. The connected
dots show the count of job exits within monthly bins. Vertical red lines indicate the location of main statutory ages throughout
the sample period.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.2: Stylized Lifetime Budget Constraint
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Note: The gure shows a stylized lifetime budget constraint for a worker who faces an Early Retirement Age of 60, a Full
Retirement Age of 63 and an Normal Retirement Age of 65, who becomes eligible for a pathway requiring 35 years of
contributions at age 58. The slope of the BC is the implicit net wage dened as wneti = (1   i)wi as shown in section 1.2.3.
The stylized shape of the constraint corresponds to incentives faced by the average worker: On average, workers face a 32%
reduction in the implicit net wage (\kink size") at age 60, a 42% reduction at age 63%, and a 21% increase in the implicit net
wage at age 65.
37
Figure 1.3: Evolution of Statutory Ages
Panel A: Early Retirement Ages (ERA)
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Panel B: Full Retirement Ages (FRA)
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Note: The gures show the evolution of Early Retirement Ages (ERA) and Full Retirement Ages (FRA) of dierent pathways
across monthly birth cohorts. In Panel A, the regular ERA is increased from 65 to 65/3 between 1947 and 1949 and the
unemployed/part-time ERA is gradually increased from 60 to 63 between 1946 and 1948. In Panel B, the long-term insured
FRA is increased from 63 to 65 between 1937 and 1938 and from 65 to 65/3 for cohort 1949, the women's FRA from 60 to 65
between 1940 and 1944, the unemployed/part-time FRA from 60 to 65 between 1937 and 1941, the disability FRA from 60 to
63 between 1941 and 1943, and the regular FRA 65 to 65/3 between 1947 and 1949. See table 1.1 for an overview of pathways.
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Figure 1.4: Bunching at Specic Discontinuities
Panel A: Statutory age vs. pure nancial incentive notch
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A1: Early Retirement Age
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Panel B: Statutory age vs. pure nancial incentive kink
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B1: Full Retirement Age
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Note: This gure shows bunching at some cases of specic discontinuities. Panel titles indicate the type of discontinuity and
panel subtitles indicate pathways and birth cohorts used. In panels A1, B1 and B2, the connected black dots show counts of job
exit ages in monthly bins for the group indicated by the respective panel title. In panel A2, the black dots show counts of years
of contributions instead. In all panels, the red line shows the counterfactual distribution estimated as a 7th-order polynomial,
including round-age dummies in panels A1 and B1. Vertical red lines indicate the location of the discontinuity. b is the excess
mass, d=(1  ) is the change in the implicit net-of-tax rate at the discontinuity (kink size), and " is the implied elasticity of
the retirement age w.r.t. the implicit net-of-tax rate. See appendix gure 1.A1 for the lifetime budget constraints of the four
groups.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.5: Bunching and Financial Incentives
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Note: The gure shows binned scatterplots of the excess mass at pure nancial incentive discontinuities (panel A) and statutory
ages (panel B) against kink size. In panel B, the type of statutory ages (Early, Full or Normal Retirement Age) controlled for.
Each panel also includes the coecient from a regression of normalized excess mass b=R^ on kink size, which can be interpreted
as a dierence-in-bunching elasticity, with bootstrapped standard error in parantheses. Appendix gure 1.A2 shows additional
graphs by type of statutory age.
Data sources: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.6: Heterogeneity
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Note: The gure shows average observed bunching elasticities by quintiles of worker and rm-related characteristics, namely
estimated lifetime wealth, schooling periods, health status (5=healthiest), a rm size index computed from discrete size cat-
egories, unionization rate, tenure, birth cohort and the retirement age at the discontinuity. Black dots indicate bunching at
statutory ages, whereas red triangles are for bunching at pure nancial incentive discontinuities. The horizontal bars around
the point estimates mark condence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors. Observed elasticities are only calculated
at convex kinks. Corresponding graphs with excess mass are in appendix gure 1.A4. Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle
SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.7: The Eect of Information Letters
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Note: Panel A of the graph shows the fraction of job exits at ages 55 and above occurring at statutory ages and other round
ages through a period where the pension fund increased the amount of information provided to workers. Before the reform, a
detailed letter was sent to each worker only once. Under the new regime, a basic letter is sent to workers every year, and a
detailed letter is sent every 3 years. The dotted vertical line indicates the beginning of the phase-in in June 2002 and the solid
vertical line in December 2003 indicates the time when the reform was fully phased in. The black connected dots show the
fraction bunching at any statutory age in every month, and the red connected dots show the fraction bunching at pure nancial
incentive discontinuities (values on the right axis). Series residualized for calendar month eects. Panel B shows the same
series for statutory ages by type, where the hollow connected dots show the fraction bunching at the Early/Full Retirement
Age (ERA/FRA), and the grey connected dots show the fraction at the Normal Retirement Age (NRA).
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.8: Self-Employed and Small Firms
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Note: This gure shows the pooled distribution of job exit ages for all workers in the occupation-matched sample (panel A),
self-employed workers (panel B), the 20 occupations most frequently in small rms with less than 20 employees (panel C), and
the 20 occupations least frequently in small rms (panel D). The connected dots show the count of job exits within monthly
bins. Vertical red lines indicate the location of main statutory ages throughout the sample period. pstat indicates the fraction
of workers bunching at statutory ages among the group in each panel.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.9: Bunching and Firm Incentives
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Panel C: Tenure
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Panel D: Unlimited contracts
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Note: This gure plots the fraction of workers in an occupation exiting their jobs at a statutory age against a number of variables
related to rm incentives. Black dots show average values by decile of the respective explanatory variable. Firm size index is
average value out of four size categories, 0=below 20 employees, 1=20 to 200, 2=200 to 2000, 3=above 2000. Unionization rate
is fraction with union membership. Average tenure years is workers of all ages in an occupation. Fraction in unlimited contracts
is fraction with term limit in their employment contract. Labor market tightness is calculated as the vacancies-unemployment
ratio at the state-year level. In panels A to D, the red line is tted by a univariate occupation-level regression whose slope
coecient are also shown with robust standard errors in parantheses. The occupation-level data is weighted by group size for
both bin calculation and regressions. In panel E, the red line is tted by a univariate individual-level regression whose slope
coecient is shown with standard error clustered at the pathway  month level in parantheses.
Data sources: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold; SOEP v30i
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Table 1.1: Pathways into Retirement
Pathway Required Other requirements FRA ERA
contributions (after 1990s reforms)
Regular 5 years - 65 65
Long-term insured 35 years - 65 63
Women 15 years female 65 60
10 years full
Unemployed/part-time 15 years unemployed or in old-age 65 60
8 years full part-time work before retirement
Disability 35 years disability status 63 60
Invalidity 5 years stricter disability status - -
3 years full
Note: This table presents an overview of pathways into retirement, including eligibility requirements and the Full Retirement
Age (FRA) and Early Retirement Age (ERA) in each pathway. \1990s reforms" denotes any reforms phased up until cohort
1945. For the unemployed/part-time pathway, unemployment for at least 1 year or old-age part-time work for at least 2 years
after age 58 is required. For the disability pathway, an ocially recognized disability of a certain degree is required; invalidity
entails a stricter disability requirement such that the worker is not able to work more than 3 hours a day in any job. Full
contribution years excludes periods where contributions were paid voluntarily.
45
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
individual sample occupation-matched bunching sample
sample
job exit age 60.87 61.89 60.87
(2.79) (2.67) (1.46)
benet claiming age 62.03 62.61 62.12
(2.34) (2.12) (1.44)
career length 43.57 44.18 43.60
(6.54) (6.94) (2.35)
contribution points 37.00 38.99 36.76
(17.21) (18.08) (10.67)
lifetime wealth 1,082,887 1,120,252 1,074,722
(420,416) (434,983) (258,461)
female 0.45 0.45 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.43)
east 0.17 0.20 0.18
(0.38) (0.40) (0.09)
married 0.76 0.76 0.76
(0.42) (0.43) (0.06)
sick leave (years) 0.075 0.056 0.07
(0.26) (0.21) (0.04)
schooling (years) 10.60 10.74 10.64
(1.58) (1.79) (0.28)
small rm 0.27
(0.18)
large rm 0.44
(0.18)
tenure 8.95
(2.80)
unlimited contract 0.83
(0.09)
Obs. (individuals) 8,880,619 3,955,574
Obs. (discontinuities) 644
Note: This table summarizes selected variables in the samples used. The individual and occupation-matched samples are at the
worker level, while the bunching sample collects bunching observations at the discontinuity level. Job exit and benet claiming
ages are in years. \Career length" is time between rst and last contribution. \Lifetime wealth" is in net present value terms
as in equation (1.1). \East" is a dummy for residence in East Germany. \Small rm" and \large rm" are indicators for rms
with less than 20 employees and more than 200 employees, respectively. Firm size, tenure and fraction in unlimited contract
are at the occupation level. Standard deviations in parantheses. See appendix 1.A.3.1 for further details of variable denitions.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 1.3: Summarizing Discontinuities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statutory ages Pure nancial incentives
all Early Full Normal all kinks notches
Mean kink size 1  0.08 0.32 0.41 -0.35 0.80 0.47 0.94
s.d. across groups 0.42 0.28 0.34 0.15 0.61 0.21 0.67
s.d. within group 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.28 0.13 0.34
No. discontinuities 386 117 257 93 258 78 180
Note: This table shows summary statistics of discontinuities in the bunching sample by type of discontinuity. \Kink size" is the
percentage reduction in the net-of-tax rate at the discontinuity. \s.d. across groups" is standard deviations across discontinuities
of a given type. \s.d. within group" is standard deviation within a group of workers facing the same discontinuity. Note that
the number of discontinuities in columns (2) to (4) are larger than the total in column (1) because some kinks are linked to
more than one type of statutory age. All statistics weighted by group size.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
Table 1.4: Bunching across all Discontinuities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statutory ages Pure nancial incentives
all Early Full Normal all kinks notches
Excess mass b 21.8 13.8 20.6 31.8 2.99 0.09 4.31
(0.88) (0.96) (0.87) (1.99) (0.27) (0.04) (0.34)
Observed 1.64 1.91 1.39 4.12 0.15 0.009 0.22
elasticity "^ (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) (0.55) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02)
Note: This table summarizes bunching responses by type of discontinuity in the bunching sample. Excess mass and observed
elasticities are computed as described in appendix 1.A.4. All statistics are weighted by group sizes. Standard errors in
parantheses. Observed elasticities are only calculated only at convex kinks, that is excluding non-convex NRA kinks.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
47
Table 1.5: Reduced-Form Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Excess mass b=R^
kink size 1  0.11*** 0.092*** 0.087 0.040 0.074
(0.027) (0.027) (0.10) (0.15) (0.19)
Statutory age at kink:
Early Retirement Age 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.17** 0.18 0.18
(0.029) (0.024) (0.085) (0.11) (0.14)
Full Retirement Age 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.047) (0.036) (0.071) (0.099) (0.11)
Normal Retirement Age 0.77*** 0.85*** 0.83*** 0.80*** 0.82***
(0.077) (0.082) (0.16) (0.25) (0.32)
Observations (discontinuities) 644 644 644 644 583
R-squared 0.66 0.70 0.85 0.88 0.86
Stat. age interactions no yes yes yes yes
Worker controls no no yes yes yes
Pathway FE, year-of-birth FE no no yes yes yes
Pathway  year-of-birth FE no no no yes yes
Occupation-level controls no no no no yes
Note: This table shows results from group-level regressions of excess mass normalized by the retirement age b=R on kink size
as well as dummies for the presence of statutory age types s 2 (ERA;FRA;NRA) based on equation (1.5), using the bunching
sample. Statutory age interactions are interactions between dummies for each statutory age type. Worker controls include
dummies for female, married and East Germany, last income before retirement, lifetime wealth, career length, sick leave years
and education years. Occupation-level controls include rm size index, unionization rate, active union member rate, tenure in
the rm, fraction in unlimited contracts, fraction receiving severance pay, fraction of involuntary job exits. Regressions weighted
by group size. Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 1.6: Oaxaca-Blinder Bunching Decomposition
(1) (2) (3)
reference category: statutory ages pure nancial average
incentives
Excess mass dierence -18.9 -18.9 -18.9
Explained by
nancial incentives 2.84 -4.38 -0.77
% -15.0% 23.1% 4.07%
worker variables -2.26 0.41 -0.93
% 11.9% -2.16% 4.88%
rm variables 0.08 -2.92 -1.42
% -0.42% 15.4% 7.52%
Unexplained -19.6 -12.0 -15.8
% 103.5% 63.6% 83.5%
Obs. (discontinuities) 629 629 629
Note: This table shows results from a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, where dierences in excess mass between statutory ages
and pure nancial incentive discontinuities are attributed to dierences in explanatory variables and an unexplained component.
The bunching sample is used. \Financial incentives" includes only kink size. \Worker variables" includes dummies for female,
married and East Germany, last income before retirement, lifetime wealth, career length, sick leave years and education years.
\Firm variables" includes the following occupation-level variables: rm size index, unionization rate, active union member rate,
tenure in the rm, fraction in unlimited contracts, fraction receiving severance pay, fraction of involuntary job exits. Columns
dier according to which group is chosen as a reference group, i.e. the coecients of which group are used to calculate explained
shares. In column (1), the reference group are statutory ages, in column (2) the reference group are pure nancial incentive
discontinuities, and in column (3) coecients based on the two groups averaged.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 1.7: Reduced-Form Estimation: Heterogeneous Coecients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Excess mass b=R^
kink size 1  0.092*** 0.29*** 0.16*** 0.26***
(0.026) (0.056) (0.039) (0.035)
Statutory age at kink:
Early Retirement Age 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.30***
(0.027) (0.015) (0.036) (0.036)
Full Retirement Age 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.42***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.056)
Normal Retirement Age 0.85*** 1.05*** 1.00*** 1.00***
(0.078) (0.063) (0.097) (0.082)
Observations (discontinuities) 644 627 627 627
R-squared 0.69 0.87 0.81 0.96
Stat. age interactions yes yes yes yes
Heterogeneous coecients:
by pathway no yes no yes
by year of birth no no yes yes
by pathway  year of birth no no no yes
Note: This table shows results from group-level regressions of excess mass normalized by the retirement age b=R on kink size
as well as dummies for the presence of statutory age types s 2 (ERA;FRA;NRA) based on equation (1.6), using the bunching
sample. Column (1) reports coecients from a regression according to equation (1.5) without controls. Columns (2) to (4)
report weighted averages of heterogeneous coecients estimated according to equation (1.6), where column (2) denes groups
by pathway, (3) denes groups by year of birth, and (4) by pathway  year of birth. Groups with no variation in Ds are
excluded from the within-group estimation in columns (2) to (4) since group-specic coecients cannot be estimated in this
case. Regressions weighted by group size. Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 1.8: Worker Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Dummy for job exit at...
any statutory ERA/FRA NRA other pure nancial
age round age incentive
schooling 0.007*** -0.009*** 0.015*** -0.002*** 0.0001***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0000)
economic training 0.015*** 0.053*** -0.038*** 0.023*** 0.001***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
female -0.020*** 0.11*** -0.13*** 0.026*** -0.004***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0005)
married -0.17*** -0.017*** -0.15*** -0.0000 0.005***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0003)
female  married -0.009** 0.035*** -0.044*** 0.004*** 0.0002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0002)
life earnings 0.26*** 0.095*** 0.17*** 0.011*** -0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.0006)
last earnings 0.089*** 0.021*** 0.068*** 0.021*** 0.002***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0001)
pension wealth/annual earnings 0.039*** -0.002* 0.041*** -0.001** -0.0003***
(0.006 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.0001)
Mean dep. var. 0.32 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.005
Observations 3,557,890 3,557,890 3,557,890 3,557,890 3,557,890
R-squared 0.15 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.02
Add. worker controls yes yes yes yes yes
Occ.-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
Year of birth FE yes yes yes yes yes
Pathway FE yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The table shows results from an individual-level regression of dummies job exits at some ages of interest on worker
characteristics. Additional worker controls include dummy for East Germany, career length, sick leave years. Occupation-level
controls include rm size index, unionization rate, active union member rate, tenure in the rm, fraction in unlimited contracts,
fraction receiving severance pay, fraction of involuntary job exits. Standard errors clustered at the pathway  month of birth
level.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
51
Table 1.9: Firm Incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Dummy for job exit at...
any statutory ERA/FRA NRA pure nancial other
age incentive round age
rm size index 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.009*** 0.018*** -0.0003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002)
union -0.055*** 0.019*** -0.073*** -0.004 0.002***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.0007)
tenure -0.0007*** -0.0009*** 0.0002 -0.0009*** 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
unlimited -0.032*** 0.002 -0.034*** -0.011*** 0.001***
contracts (0.005) (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) (0.0005)
labor market 0.41*** -0.093* 0.50*** -0.062*** 0.036***
tightness (0.05) (0.05) (0.057) (0.023) (0.005)
Mean dep. var. 0.32 0.18 0.14 0.07 0.005
Observations 3,537,802 3,537,802 3,537,802 3,537,802 3,537,802
R-squared 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.02
Worker controls yes yes yes yes yes
Year of birth FE yes yes yes yes yes
Pathway FE yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The table shows results from an individual-level regression of dummies job exits at some ages of interest on variables
related to rm incentives, using the occupation-matched sample. Firm size index, unionization, tenure and fraction in unlimited
contracts are at occupation level. Labor market tightness is at state-year level. Worker controls include dummies for female,
married and East Germany, last income before retirement, lifetime wealth, career length, sick leave years and education years.
Standard errors clustered at the pathway  month of birth level.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure 1.A1: Framing
Note: This gure shows excerpts of an information leaet that informs workers about a pension reform. Explanation/translation
of the main points is provided in the red boxes on the right. Source: http://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/cae/
servlet/contentblob/232636/publicationFile/49694/rente_mit_67.pdf
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Figure 1.A0: Framing (continued)
Note: This gure shows excerpts of an information leaet that informs workers about a pension reform. Explanation/translation
of the main points is provided in the red boxes on the right. The bottom right panel is taken from an information leaet
on invalidity pensions. Sources: http://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/232636/
publicationFile/49694/rente_mit_67.pdfhttp://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/
232616/publicationFile/49858/erwerbsminderungsrente_das_netz_fuer_alle_faelle.pdf
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Figure 1.A1: Budget Constraint Discontinuities
Panel A: Statutory age vs. contribution notch
ERA
kink=0.08 (0.01)
life
tim
e 
we
al
th
57 58 59 60 61 62 63
job exit age
Women, 1945−1946
A1: Early Retirement Age
contribution threshold
notch=0.007 (0.003)
approx. kink=0.38 (0.14)
n
o
rm
a
liz
ed
 lif
et
im
e 
we
al
th
13 14 15 16 17 18
years of contributions
Women, 1945−1946
A2: Contribution notch
Panel B: Statutory age vs. pure nancial incentive kink
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Note: This gure shows the lifetime budget constraint discontinuities around which bunching is estimated in gure 1.4. Panels
A1 and B1 show kinks linked to the FRA in the disability pathway and the ERA in the women's pathway, respectively. Panel
A2 shows a notch arising from the 15-year contribution requirement in the women's pathway, and panel B2 shows a kink due
to nancial adjustment of pensions in the invalidity pathway. Note that the size of the discontinuity varies across workers, and
graphs show actual slopes for an average-income worker. "kink" denotes average kink size =(1  ) dened the proportional
change in the implicit marginal net-of-tax rate at the discontinuity, with standard deviations in parantheses. "notch" denotes
average notch size dened as the implicit average net-of-tax rate just below the kink relative to above. In panel A2, \approximate
kink size" is calculated by approximating the notch as a kink for the marginal buncher following Kleven and Waseem (2013).
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Figure 1.A2: Bunching and Financial Incentives
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Note: The gure shows binned scatterplots of the excess mass at pure nancial incentive discontinuities (panel A), ERAs
(panel B), FRAs (panel C) and NRAs (panel D)against kink size. Each panel also includes the coecient from a regression
of normalized excess mass b=R^ on kink size, which can be interpreted as a dierence-in-bunching elasticity, with bootstrapped
standard error in parantheses.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.A3: Heterogeneity: Groups and Discontinuities
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Note: The gure shows average excess mass (left panels) and average observed bunching elasticities (right panels) by re-
tirement pathway, year of birth and the retirement age at the discontinuity. Black dots indicate bunching at statutory ages,
whereas red triangles are for bunching at pure nancial incentive discontinuities. The horizontal bars around the point estimates
mark condence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors. Observed elasticities in the right panels are only calculated
at convex kinks.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.A4: Heterogeneity: Worker and Firm Characteristics
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Note: The gure shows average observed bunching elasticities by quintiles of estimated lifetime wealth, schooling periods,
sick leave periods, a rm size index computed from discrete size categories, unionization rate and tenure. The latter three
variables are at the occupation-level. Black dots indicate bunching at statutory ages, whereas red triangles are for bunching
at pure nancial incentive discontinuities. The horizontal bars around the point estimates mark condence intervals based on
bootstrapped standard errors. Observed elasticities in panel B are only calculated at convex kinks. The corresponding excess
mass is in gure 1.6.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.A5: Information Letters
Note: This gure shows an information letter (Renteninformation) sent annually to each worker from 2004. Red boxes highlight the main information provided by the letter,
with explanation/translation on the right.
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Figure 1.A6: Larger responses at larger kinks?
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Note: The gure shows binned scatterplots of the observed elasticity at pure nancial incentive discontinuities (panel A),
ERAs (panel B), FRAs (panel C) and NRAs (panel D)against kink size. Each panel also includes the coecient from a regres-
sion of observed elasticities on kink size, with bootstrapped standard error in parantheses.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 1.A7: Benet Claiming Patterns
Panel A: Claiming gaps of workers eligible to claim immediately
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Panel B: Claiming ages of workers eligible to claim immediately who do not exit at
statutory age
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Note: Panel A of the gure shows a histogram of the gap in months between workers' job exit and benet claim among those
exiting their job at a statutory age (white bars) and those exiting at other ages (red bars). Only workers who are already
eligible to claim are included in both groups. Panel B plots the distribution of job exit ages (black connected dots) and benet
claiming ages (red connected dots) among workers who are eligible to claim immediately.
Data sources: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold; SOEP v30i
61
Table 1.A1: Reduced-Form Estimation: Heterogeneous Coecients
Panel A: by pathway
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Long-term Women Unemp./ Disability Invalidity
Insured part-time
kink size 1  0.62*** 0.13*** 0.44* 0.20*** 0.0064**
(0.085) (0.044) (0.24) (0.011) (0.0030)
Statutory age at kink:
Early Retirement Age 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.094** 0.38***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.042) (0.016)
Full Retirement Age 0.14* 0.57*** 0.12 0.13***
(0.078) (0.052) (0.11) (0.018)
Normal Retirement Age 1.11*** 1.16*** 0.53*** 1.34***
(0.070) (0.12) (0.17) (0.050)
Discontinuities 98 127 159 165 78
Stat. age interactions yes yes yes yes yes
Panel B: by year of birth (selected)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1933 1936 1939 1942 1945 1948
kink size 1  0.082 0.078 0.086** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.18*
(0.61) (0.34) (0.036) (0.080) (0.059) (0.10)
Statutory age at kink:
Early Retirement Age 0.56 0.67** 0.15 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.30***
(0.44) (0.33) (0.17) (0.064) (0.057) (0.070)
Full Retirement Age 0.17*** 0.64*** 0.14 0.31***
(0.037) (0.11) (0.40) (0.073)
Normal Retirement Age 1.02** 0.87*** 0.66** 2.12*** 1.22*** 0.80***
(0.49) (0.22) (0.31) (0.84) (0.47) (0.22)
Discontinuities 15 15 46 58 23 37
Stat. age interactions yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: This table shows heterogeneous coecients whose weighted averages are presented in table 1.7. Panel A presents
heterogeneous coecients by pathway, where the regular pathway is excluded because there is no variation in the presence of
statutory ages. Panel B shows heterogeneous coecients cohort for selected years of birth. Regressions weighted by group size.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 1.A2: Reduced-Form Estimation: Eects of Information Letters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Excess mass b=R^
kink size 1  0.085** 0.029 0.094*** 0.040
(0.041) (0.099) (0.016) (0.097)
Statutory age at kink:
Early Retirement Age 0.070* 0.13 0.15*** 0.18*
(0.039) (0.090) (0.032) (0.098)
Full Retirement Age 0.14*** 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.33***
(0.048) (0.085) (0.058) (0.083)
Normal Retirement Age 0.78*** 0.68*** 0.82*** 0.70***
(0.074) (0.16) (0.11) (0.15)
Interactions:
annual letters  kink size 0.085 -0.054 -0.003 0.042
(0.12) (0.091) (0.054) (0.12)
annual letters  statutory age 0.20*** 0.11*
(0.054) (0.061)
annual letters  Early Retirement Age 0.003 0.021
(0.054) (0.062)
annual letters  Full Retirement Age 0.14* 0.038
(0.08) (0.069)
annual letters  Normal Retirement Age 0.044 0.17
(0.18) (0.15)
Observations (Discontinuities) 644 644 644 644
R-squared 0.71 0.86 0.70 0.86
Statutory age interactions yes yes yes yes
Worker controls no yes no yes
Year of birth FE no yes no yes
Pathway FE no yes no yes
Note: This table shows results from group-level regressions analogous to table 1.5, allowing for additional interactions of the
presence of statutory ages with an indicator for annual information letters in 2004 and later. Excess mass normalized by the
retirement age b=R is regressed on kink size as well as dummies for the presence of statutory age types s 2 (ERA;FRA;NRA)
based on equation (1.5). Regressions weighted by group size. Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 1.A3: Reduced-Form Estimation: Larger responses at larger kinks?
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Observed elasticity "^
kink size 1  -0.012 0.001 -0.76***
(0.058) (0.13) (0.27)
Statutory age at kink:
Early Retirement Age 1.60*** 1.94*** 0.92***
(0.16) (0.067) (0.32)
Full Retirement Age 0.59*** 1.06*** 0.17
(0.091) (0.093) (0.25)
Normal Retirement Age 1.82*** 1.12*** 6.03
(0.48) (0.24) (10.2)
Observations (Discontinuities) 568 568 568
R-squared 0.69 0.75 0.86
Statutory age interactions no yes yes
Worker controls no no yes
Year of birth FE no no yes
Pathway FE no no yes
Note: This table shows results from group-level regressions analogous to table 1.5, allowing for additional interactions of the
presence of statutory ages with an indicator for reform periods. Excess mass normalized by the retirement age b=R is regressed
on kink size as well as dummies for the presence of statutory age types s 2 (ERA;FRA;NRA) based on equation (1.5).
Regressions weighted by group size. Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 1.A4: Reduced-Form Estimation Excluding NRA Discontinuities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Excess mass b=R^
kink size 1  0.14*** 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.26***
(0.012) (0.027) (0.039) (0.037)
Statutory age at kink:
Early Retirement Age 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.30***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.039) (0.036)
Full Retirement Age 0.37*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.34***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.056)
Observations (discontinuities) 551 551 551 551
R-squared 0.74 0.87 0.77 0.88
Stat. age interactions yes yes yes yes
Heterogeneous coecients:
by pathway no yes no yes
by year of birth no no yes yes
by pathway  year of birth no no no yes
Note: This table shows results from group-level regressions analogous to table 1.7, excluding all discontinuities linked to a
NRA. Column (1) reports coecients from a regression according to equation (1.5) without controls. Columns (2) to (4)
report weighted averages of heterogeneous coecients estimated according to equation (1.6), where column (2) denes groups
by pathway, (3) denes groups by year of birth, and (4) by pathway  year of birth. Groups with no variation in Ds are
excluded from the within-group estimation in columns (2) to (4) since group-specic coecients cannot be estimated in this
case. Regressions weighted by group size. Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 1.A5: Reduced-Form Estimation with Salience Eects
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Excess mass b=R^
kink size 1  0.16** 0.16*** 0.17***
(0.066) (0.062) (0.022)
Statutory age at kink:
Early Retirement Age 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.22***
(0.052) (0.050) (0.034)
Full Retirement Age 0.57*** 0.80*** 0.35**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Normal Retirement Age 0.30* 0.14 -0.0018
(0.16) (0.15) (0.22)
Interactions:
kink size  any statutory age -0.89*** -1.34***
(0.29) (0.27)
kink size  Early Retirement Age 0.052
(0.19)
kink size  Full Retirement Age 0.039
(0.32)
kink size  Normal Retirement Age -1.72***
(0.38)
Observations (discontinuities) 644 644 644
R-squared 0.66 0.70 0.75
Stat. age interactions no yes yes
Note: This table shows results from group-level regressions analogous to table 1.5, allowing for additional interactions of kink
size with the presence of statutory ages. Excess mass normalized by the retirement age b=R is regressed on kink size as well as
dummies for the presence of statutory age types s 2 (ERA;FRA;NRA) based on equation (1.5). Statutory age interactions
are interactions between dummies for each statutory age type. Regressions weighted by group size. Bootstrapped standard
errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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1.A.2 Institutional Details
1.A.2.1 Pathways and Statutory Ages
Pensions in the German public pension system (gesetzliche Rentenversicherung) are legally dened
in German Social Law, vol. 6 (Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) VI ), where a section is devoted to each of
the six pathways. First, the regular pathway is dened in SGB VI x235. Workers are eligible for this
pathway with at least 5 years of contributions (Wartezeit, lit. waiting time). A regular pension
can only be claimed from the NRA. Hence, the implicit ERA and FRA of the regular pathway
coincide with the NRA. The NRA is 65 for workers born until 1946, but for cohorts 1947 to 1964
it increases gradually by one month for each year of birth from 65 to 67 (x235(2)).
Second, the long-term insured pathway is dened in x236. Workers are eligible with at least 35
years of contributions. The ERA is 63 throughout the sample period. The FRA is 63 until 1936, is
raised gradually by 1 month for each month of birth from 63 to 65 during birth cohorts 1937 and
1938 (SGB VI appendix 21) where it remains until cohort 1948. The FRA increases to 65 and 3
months for cohort 1949 and further increases gradually by one month for each year of birth from
65/3 to 67 for cohorts 1950 to 1964 (x236(2)).
Third, the women's pathway is dened in x237a. Women with at least 15 years of contributions
are eligible. At least 10 years have to be full contributions, i.e. excluding voluntary contributions,
made after their 40th birthday. The ERA is 60 throughout the sample period. The FRA is 60
until 1939, is raised to 65 during cohorts 1940 to 1944 (SGB VI appendix 20) and remains 65 for
women born until the end of the sample period. For cohorts born 1952 and later, the pathway will
be abolished.
Fourth, the unemployed/part-time pathway is dened in x237. Eligibility requires at least 15
years of contributions, and at least 8 out of the 10 years before retirement have to be full contribu-
tions. Moreover, the workers must be either unemployed for at least 1 year after age 58 years and
6 months, or in old-age part-time work. Old-age part-time work is a program where workers aged
55 and older reduce their hours to part-time while the decrease in earnings is partly compensated
by a government subsidy to the worker. Note that the program has been terminated in 2009. The
ERA of this pathway is 60 for workers born until 1945, rises gradually by 1 month for each month
of birth from 60 to 63 during birth cohorts 1946 to 1948 (SBG VI appendix 19), and remains 63
until the end of the sample period. The FRA is 60 until 1936, increases gradually by 1 month for
each month of birth from 60 to 65 during birth cohorts 1937 to 1940 (SBG VI appendix 19) and
remains 65 until the end of the sample period. For cohorts born 1952 and later, the pathway will
be abolished.
Fifth, the disability pathway is dened in x236a. Workers with at least 35 years of contributions
and with an ocially recognized disability of at least degree 50% are eligible. The degree of
disability is an index factoring in all types of permanent physical and mental conditions. The ERA
is 60 throughout the sample period. The FRA is 60 for workers born until 1940, is raised gradually
by 1 month for each month of birth from 60 to 63 during birth cohorts 1941 to 1943 (SGB VI
appendix 22), and remains 63 until the end of the sample period.
All these pathways are introduced in conjunction with the relevant statutory ages. The NRA
(Regelaltersgrenze) is dened in x235 as the age from which a regular pension can be claimed.
For the remaining pathways, the FRA (Altersgrenze) and the ERA (Alter der fruhestmoglichen
Inanspruchnahme) are specied along with the pathways themselves. The FRA is further described
as the \age from which an insured person is eligible", while the ERA is the\age from which early
claiming is possible".
The sixth pathway, the invalidity is dened in x43. Workers are required at least 5 years of
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contributions, and at least 3 out the 5 years before retirement must be full contributions. Moreover,
workers must have been ocially recognized as \low earnings potential", which entails permanently
not being able to work more than 3 hours per day in any job. A partial invalidity pension may be
available if the worker is deemed to be able to work more than 3 but less than 6 hours per day.
Invalidity pensions can be claimed at any age and there is no ERA or FRA in this pathway. Earned
points are \lled up" (Zurechnungszeit) as if the worker had kept on earning their average pre-
retirement income until age 60. Hence, invalidity pensions feature an additional insurance element
compared to other pathways since benets are less dependent on lifetime contributions.
1.A.2.2 Pension Adjustment
Explicit pension adjustment for a worker's retirement age was introduced into the pension formula
(Rentenformel) in 1997 along with the ERA and FRA reforms described above. The adjustment
factor (Zugangsfaktor) is dened in x77 SGB and is 100% if a worker claims their pension at the
FRA of their pathway. For each month of claiming before the FRA, the adjustment factor (and
hence the benet paid) is reduced by 0.3%, with the maximum negative adjustment implied by the
distance between the ERA (the earliest claiming age) and FRA. The adjustment factor remains
100% between the FRA and the NRA. Only after the NRA, there are rewards for late retirement:
the adjustment factor increases by 0.5% for each month of claiming after the NRA.
Since 2001, invalidity pensions are also subject to an adjustment factor dened in x77(2)3. Until
the end of the sample period, invalidity pensions are decreased by 0.3% for each month of claiming
before age 63. There is a maximum negative adjustment of 10.8% that applies to claims below
age 60. Moreover, there was a transition period between 2001 and 2003 according to SBG VI
appendix 23, where the maximum negative adjustment was gradually increased from 0 to 10.8%.
This was done to avoid a notch in the budget set of invalidity workers that would have created a
strong incentive to retire before 2001. The end of the lling period of earned points was gradually
extended from 55 to 60 at the same time.
1.A.2.3 Benet Calculation
Upon submitting her pension claim, a worker's benets Bi are computed according to the following
\pension formula":
Bi(Ri) = V  (max(Ri; ERA)) 
Ri 1X
t=0
wit
wt
(1.7)
The formula has three components. The rst component is the sum of earned points. In the
Bismarckian system, the points a worker earns in a year are equal to her earnings wit relative to
the average income among the insured population wt. Points are then summed across all years
in which contributions were paid. Hence, additional contributions always increase the worker's
benets and pensions become roughly proportional to lifetime income. Second, the worker is
assigned an adjustment factor  as a function of her benet claiming age. The benet claiming age
max(Ri; ERA) is the job exit age if the job exit occurs no earlier than the the ERA, or the ERA
otherwise. Adjustment is framed around the FRA, where a worker can claim her full pension, i.e.
(FRA) = 100%. The adjustment function  follows a kinked schedule, with a penalty of 0.3%
for each month of retirement before the FRA, a reward of 0.5% for each month of retirement after
the NRA, and no adjustment between the FRA and the NRA. The third component is the pension
value V which translates adjusted earned points into monthly benets. V is indexed to annual
nominal wage growth (e26.39 in 2014).
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1.A.2.4 Information Provision
In addition to online material and a service hotline, the main way the German pension fund provides
information about pensions and retirement is via information letters, whose content is dened in
x109. Before June 2002, a detailed information letter (Rentenauskunft) was sent to each enrolled
worker in the month they turned 55 years old. The frequency of information letters was drastically
increased between June 2002 and December 2003. During this transition period, the pension fund
conducted surveys of workers and the design of letters was optimized in order to provide information
in a more concise and easily comprehensible way. Under the new information provision regime from
January 2004, workers are sent a detailed letter every three years from age 55, and a basic letter
(Renteninformation) is sent annually from age 27.
The basic letter contains information information on contributions paid and points earned so
far, the benet amount the worker is currently eligible for, a projection of her benet amount
if she keeps working until the NRA, and the date on which she will reach the NRA. There is
also an explanation of how benets are calculated, in particular how contributions translate into
benet eligibility, and the tax treatment of pension benets. Moreover, workers are cautioned about
potential losses of purchasing power under dierent ination scenarios, and the potential need to
supplement public pensions with private savings. In addition to this, the detailed letter provides
a more extensive account of the worker's contribution payments so far, and informs about possible
retirement dates before and after the NRA with corresponding pension adjustment.
1.A.3 Data
1.A.3.1 Variable Denitions
Job exit ages. A worker's age at benet claiming and the age of the last contribution can be
observed in the data as the distance between the month of birth and the month of claiming or the
last contribution. Job exit ages cannot be directly observed, but correspond to the age at the last
contribution for most workers. However, for some workers their last month of work does not entail
any contributions, or their last month of contributions stems from a status other than employment.
To account for this, additional information on the insurance status in the last three years before
a worker's benet claim is used. This status is coded into four categories, 1=work/contributions,
2=no work/no contributions, 3=work/no contributions, 4=no work/contributions. If a worker's
last known status is 1 or 2, the last contribution coincides with the job exit. This is the case
for 87% of workers in the sample. Categories 3 and 4 pose the problem that the job exit cannot
be inferred from the last contribution. However, the timing of job exits can be bounded by the
information on workers' status in the three years before retirement. For instance, if a worker is
known to be in category 1 20 months before benet claiming and category 4 8 months before
retirement, her job exit is age must have been between 20 months and 8 months before the benet
claiming age. Hence, job exit ages of the remaining workers are imputed via a uniform distribution
between the closest known bounds. This imputation is mostly relevant for job exits before the ERA
since gaps between job exits and benet claiming occur in these cases. At the ERA or later, most
workers claim benets right after their job exit so last contributions are not typically confounded
by a status other than work.
Years of Contributions. Pathway eligibility is partly determined by a worker's years of
contributions (Wartezeit, lit. waiting time). Besides contribution periods (Beitragszeiten) from
employment, a number of other periods such as voluntary contributions of self-employed individuals
and \substitute periods" (Ersatzzeiten, e.g. due to political imprisonment in the former GDR)
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count towards the 15-year threshold. In addition, some periods of education, childcare, sick leave,
receipt of some types of unemployment benets and the invalidity lling period (Berucksichtigungs-
, Anrechnungszeiten) count towards the 35-year threshold. The contribution periods actually used
for pension calculation cannot be observed directly in the data, but they can be reconstructed from
a variables related to workers' earnings histories. Around the 15-year threshold, contributions are
calculated as the sum of contribution (both full and partial) and substitute periods. For the 35-year
threshold, other relevant periods are added as far as they are observed.
Lifetime budget constraints. Lifetime budget constraints are simulated based on the for-
mulas presented in section 1.2.3. First, a pension benet calculator is constructed according to
equation (1.7) using a sample period average pension value V , a worker's observed sum of earned
points
PRi 1
t=0
wit
wt
and the adjustment factor function (Ri; ERA) that applies to their specic
pathway and birth cohort. Individual lifetime wealth at the worker's actual job exit age is then
computed according to equation (1.1) with a discount factor of 3% and remaining life expectancies
at age 55 taken from mortality tables by the German Federal Statistics Oce taking into account
heterogeneity by gender and year of birth. Lifetime gross wage earnings are approximated as the
sum of earned points multiplied by an average of mean annual incomes across the sample period.
Net earnings are calculated from gross earnings using an tax simulator taking into account personal
income tax and social insurance contributions, and income splitting is applied to married individ-
uals. Since the budget constraint abstracts from periods of inactivity, the starting age is set to 25
years, a value that would generate roughly the observed average earned points if all workers had
uninterrupted earnings careers.
In order to simulate lifetime wealth across a range of job exit ages, an approximation of annual
earnings wit is needed. A lifetime average of gross annual earnings is computed as lifetime wage
earnings divided by the hypothetical uninterrupted career length from age 25 until the observed job
exit age. Net annual earnings are calculated using the income tax simulator. A worker's lifetime
wealth can then be simulated across a range of job exit ages by extrapolating additional income
from work based on annual earnings and simulating pensions across claiming ages, the latter taking
into account additional contributions and changing adjustment. Monthly implicit net wages are
calculated as the increment in simulated lifetime wealth, and the implicit net-of-tax rate is the
implicit net wage divided by gross income.
1.A.3.2 Group Assignment
Pathway eligibility. As explained in section 1.2.4, workers choose the pathway from which to
claim a pension, and reforms induce some partly mechanical switching between pathways. In
particular, when FRAs are increased to 65 in a certain pathway, an increase in the number of
workers eligible for that pathway claiming regular pensions can usually be observed. This occurs
because there is no dierence in benets across pathways at the NRA and beyond, and workers may
perceive claiming a regular pension as easier or more natural than claiming a special, non-regular
pension. To account for this, pathway assignment is based on eligibility in order to keep group
composition as stable as possible.
Pathway eligibility is based on observable characteristics where possible, with some imputation
to account for unobservables. Workers with at least 35 years of contributions are eligible for the
long-term insured pathway. For the women's pathway, women with at least 15 years of contributions
are deemed eligible. The additional requirement of full contributions in 8 out of the last 10 years
cannot be used since the exact timing of contributions is insuciently observable. Workers are
dened as eligible for the the unemployed/part-time pathway if they have at least 15 years of
contributions, and they are observed to be unemployed or in part-time work within the last 3 years
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before benet claiming. Unfortunately, disability cannot be observed in the data, but a subset of
workers satisfying the contribution requirements of the disability and invalidity pathways of 35 and
5 years, respectively, is identied.
If a worker is eligible for only one pathway, assignment is unambiguous. Moreover, workers who
are observed to claim from one of the non-regular pathways are assumed to have chosen their \best"
pathway and are thus assigned. Among the remaining workers who are found eligible for more than
one pathway, assignment is based on a notion of which of those pathways is most advantageous. For
instance, if a woman is eligible for the women's pathway, she must also be eligible for the regular
pathway, but the feasible set of retirement age/consumption combinations in the women's pathway
dominates that of the regular pathway because both ERA and FRA are lower. Besides, she may
be eligible for the unemployed/part-time and/or long-term insured pathways, but those are also
dominated by the women's pathway. Hence, women claiming a regular pension who are eligible for
the women's pathway (and possibly unemployed or long-term insured) are assigned to the women's
pathway rather than regular. Unemployed/part-time is assigned analogously.
Both long-term insured and disability pathways require at least 35 years of contributions, but
among the workers satisfying this, only those with an ocial disability can choose the disability
pathway. Since counterfactual disability status cannot be observed, the share of workers satisfying
the requirement has to be imputed. In particular, it is assumed that the relative shares of disabled
individuals among those potentially eligible for both pathways is the same as the shares among
those actually claiming in the pathways at a given age. Hence, the ratio of disability/long-term
insured claimants is computed for each integer retirement age in each year of birth, and ambiguous
cases are assigned based on the corresponding ratio. Similarly, invalidity and regular pensions both
require only 5 years of contributions, and the ratio of actual claimants by year of birth and integer
retirement age is used to impute eligibility in ambiguous cases.
As shown in table 1.2, the most important dierence between the number of actual claimers and
eligible workers arises in the regular pathway where eligibility is largely overestimated by claiming.
Hence, many regular claimers are eligible for more advantageous pathways, particularly long-term
insured and women's pathways. The vast majority of these switchers are workers retiring at the
NRA and beyond, where they receive the same benets from the regular pathway as they would
from other pathways.
Groups and Discontinuities. Workers are grouped into cells by year of birth and pathway,
since this split accounts for most of the variation in statutory ages and lifetime budget constraints
faced by workers, while still preserving suciently large group sizes for the purpose of bunching
estimation. During the cohorts where reforms change statutory ages at the month-of-birth level,
workers around the statutory age in the aected pathway are grouped by pathway and month of
birth instead. This split yields a total number of 420 groups of whom 108 are at the year-of-birth
and 312 at the month-of-birth level.
Moreover, there are seven types of notches created by pathway contribution thresholds. At 5
years of contributions, workers switch from no pension at all to either regular or invalidity. At 15
years of contributions, women switch from the regular pathway to the women's pathway. Moreover,
workers who are unemployed or in old-age part-time work before retirement switch from regular to
that pathway at 15 years of contributions. At 35 years of contributions, regular workers switch to
the long-term insured or disability pathway. Finally, workers previously eligible for the women's
or unemployed pathway may switch to the disability pathway at 35 years. For each year of birth,
workers around a notch are identied based on pathway eligibility as described above. Restrictions
in terms of years of contributions are relaxed in order to observe workers to the left of the notch who
are close to the threshold but, by denition of the threshold, cannot yet be observed to claim the
corresponding pathway. In order to account for variation in the notch size depending on retirement
71
ages, each year of birth and type of notch is further divided into two ranges of retirement ages, 55
to 60 and 60 to 65. This yields a total of 78 groups each of whom faces one notch.
1.A.3.3 Survey Data
Survey Sample and Variables. The German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) is a panel house-
hold survey, of which the waves 1984 to 2013 are used. In total, there are 175,224 working indi-
viduals whose occupation is reported. To maximize power, all age groups are used to compute
occupation-level averages. There are an average of 475 workers in each 3-digit occupation cell. The
following variables of interest can be directly observed in the survey: union membership, active
union membership, currently in unlimited contract, severance paid upon job exit, involuntary job
exit. A rm size index is computed based on the size categories <20 employees, 20 to 200, 200 to
2000, and >2000 employees. Tenure on the job can be computed as the time from the month of
job start to the month of interview.
Matching at Occupation Level. In the administrative data, occupations are reported at
the 3-digit level according to the KldB 1988 classication. The survey data reports occupations
according to the slightly updated KldB 1992 classication. A mapping between the two classi-
cations is created manually. Among the 337 3-digit KldB 1988 occupations, 90% have a unique
match in KldB 1992. 10% have two or more matches, and 4% have three or more matches. To get
occupation-level values, the occupation-level average from the survey data is taken if the occupa-
tion has a unique match. If there is more than one match, an average weighted by the size of each
occupation cell among the matches is taken.
1.A.4 Empirical Methodology
1.A.4.1 Bunching Estimation
The bunching estimation is based on Chetty et al. (2011) where a counterfactual density is tted
to the observed distribution of job exit ages around each discontinuity, excluding the data in the
bunching region around the discontinuity. The counterfactual Cj is estimated as a regression of the
form
Cj =
pX
i=0
i(Rj)
i +
X
r2 
r1(Rj = r) +
R+X
k=R 
k1(Rj = k) + "j
where Cj is the number of individuals in monthly job exit age bin j,   is a set of round retirement
age types, and [R ; R+] is the excluded range of job exit ages around the discontinuity. Hence,
the regression ts a p-th order polynomial to the distribution of job exit ages, while allowing for
additional round-number bunching through the coecients r. The counterfactual density at the
discontinuity is then predicted as
C^j =
pX
i=0
^i(Rj)
i +
X
r2 
^r1(Rj = r)
thus omitting the contribution of the dummies in the excluded range. The bunching mass B^ =PR+
k=R  Cj   C^j is the dierence between the observed and the counterfactual distribution in the
bunching region. Finally, the excess mass is dened as bunching relative to the counterfactual
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density:
b^ =
B^PR+
k=R  C^j=(R
+  R  + 1)
In practice, the order of the polynomial is chosen as p = 7 and the excluded range [R ; R+]
as well as the set of round ages   to control for are determined separately for each type of dis-
continuity. Around statutory ages, the bunching region is generally dened as the discontinuity
and one additional month on either side. Round-age dummies are included for each full-year age
above 55, where additional dummies for full-year ages above 60 and 64 allow for heterogeneity
in round-number bunching by age. Other statutory ages that may fall in the estimation range
are also netted out of the counterfactual by dummies. Between 24 and 36 bins are included on
both sides of the discontinuity for the estimation of the polynomial, with the exception of ERAs
where only 12 bins are included to the left. In the regular pathway, invalidity and some cohorts of
unemployed/part-time, round-number dummies are not included because there is no visible round-
number bunching. In invalidity, bunching is restricted to the month of the discontinuity itself as
there is no visible diuse bunching mass. For groups at the month-of-birth level, dummies for job
exit ages that fall in the calendar month of December are additionally included in  . December
eects are also allowed to be heterogeneous across 5-year age ranges. The estimation around the
pathway switching notches includes 120 bins on each side of the notch in order to increase statistical
power, and has no round-number dummies. The month of the notch itself and 12 months to the
left are excluded to account for missing mass. Bunching is estimated sharply at the month of the
notch. The missing mass is extended to 24 months in the long-term insured pathway to line up
with the relatively larger bunching mass.
Observed elasticities are calculated at each discontinuity according to equation (1.2). Kink sizes
are computed as the marginal implicit net-of-tax rate just before the kink divided by the rate at the
kink. Notches are approximated as kinks faced by the marginal buncher: The average net-of-tax
rate between the location of the marginal buncher and the notch is used as the rate before the kink,
and divided by the actual marginal net-of-tax rate after the kink. Standard errors for individual
bunching mass estimates are bootstrapped by re-sampling the individual data within the respective
group. Standard errors for regressions based on bunching estimates are block bootstrapped, that
is the data is re-sampled at the discontinuity level.
1.A.4.2 Discontinuities Used for Bunching
The following table lists all discontinuities where bunching is estimated. Note that 11 out of the 655
discontinuities where the local density is too low to estimate a stable counterfactual are excluded
from the main analysis.
Pathway Cohorts Age Group Frequency Source of Discontinuity Type Number
Regular 1933-1949 55-67 annual ERA=FRA=NRA kink 17
Long-term insured 1933-1936 55-67 annual ERA=FRA kink 4
Long-term insured 1937-1949 55-67 annual ERA kink 13
Long-term insured 1939-1946 55-67 annual FRA=NRA kink 8
Long-term insured 1947-1948 55-67 annual FRA kink 2
Long-term insured 1933-1938 55-67 annual NRA kink 9
1947-1949
Long-term insured 1937-1938 55-67 monthly moving FRA kink 36
1949
Women 1933-1939 55-67 annual ERA=FRA kink 7
Women 1940-1949 55-67 annual ERA kink 10
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Women 1945-1946 55-67 annual FRA=NRA kink 2
Women 1947-1949 55-67 annual FRA kink 3
Women 1933-1944 55-67 annual NRA kink 15
1947-1949
Women 1940-1944 55-67 monthly moving FRA kink 60
Unemp./part-time 1933-1936 55-67 annual ERA=FRA kink 4
Unemp./part-time 1937-1945 55-67 annual ERA kink 9
1949
Unemp./part-time 1942-1946 55-67 annual FRA=NRA kink 5
Unemp./part-time 1947-1949 55-67 annual FRA kink 3
Unemp./part-time 1933-1941 55-67 annual NRA kink 12
1947-1949
Unemp./part-time 1937-1941 55-67 monthly moving FRA kink 60
Unemp./part-time 1946-1948 55-67 monthly moving ERA kink 36
Disability 1933-1940 55-67 annual ERA=FRA kink 8
Disability 1941-1949 55-67 annual ERA kink 9
Disability 1944-1949 55-67 annual FRA kink 6
Disability 1933-1949 55-67 annual NRA kink 17
Disability 1941-1943 55-67 monthly moving FRA kink 36
Invalidity 1938-1949 55-67 annual pension adjustment around age 63 kink 12
Invalidity 1938-1943 55-67 monthly adjustment introduction in 2001 kink 72
Long-term insured 1937-1949 55-63/0 annual 35 year contribution threshold (from regular) notch 13
Long-term insured 1938-1943 63/1-65 annual 35 year contribution threshold (from regular) notch 17
Women 1937-1949 55-60/0 annual 15 year contribution threshold (from regular) notch 13
Women 1933-1949 60/1-65 annual 15 year contribution threshold (from regular) notch 17
Unemp./part-time 1937-1949 55-60/0 annual 15 year contribution threshold (from regular) notch 13
Unemp./part-time 1933-1949 60/1-65 annual 15 year contribution threshold (from regular) notch 17
Disability 1937-1949 55-60/0 annual 35 year contribution threshold (from regular) notch 13
Disability 1933-1949 60/1-65 annual 35 year contribution threshold (from regular) notch 17
Disability 1937-1949 55-60/0 annual 35 year contribution threshold (from unemp.) notch 13
Disability 1933-1949 60/1-65 annual 35 year contribution threshold (from unemp.) notch 17
Disability 1937-1949 55-60/0 annual 35 year contribution threshold (from women) notch 13
Disability 1933-1949 60/1-65 annual 35 year contribution threshold (from women) notch 17
total 655
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Chapter 2
Bunching Responses to Reference
Points: Theory and Applications
2.1 Introduction
The notion of reference-dependent preferences has gained increasing empirical support in recent
studies. Across dierent contexts, results suggest individuals seem to evaluate outcomes relative
to reference points. A classic example is Camerer et al. (1997) who show that taxi drivers evaluate
their earnings relative to daily targets. DellaVigna et al. (2018), Rees-Jones (2018) and Allen et al.
(2016) show evidence of reference-dependent behavior among job seekers, tax lers, and marathon
runners, respectively. Similarly, the rst chapter of this thesis argues that framing pensions and
retirement decisions around statutory retirement ages induces workers to perceive those thresholds
as reference points.
The dening feature of reference dependence is some form of discontinuity in the way individuals
evaluate an outcome. For instance, loss aversion, a commonly used type of reference dependence,
entails a discontinuous change in marginal utility at the reference point. A direct consequence
of such a discontinuity in preferences is bunching of the outcome at the reference point. Indeed,
Rees-Jones (2018) and Allen et al. (2016) argue in favor of reference dependence based on bunching
that occurs at a threshold with no extrinsic incentives. At the same time, there is a large and
growing literature on bunching (see Kleven 2016 for a survey) exploiting discontinuities in extrinsic
incentives to measure responses to these incentives. The bunching literature provides methods to
estimate excess bunching and to link observed responses neatly to underlying parameters, such as
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
This chapter argues that bunching methods are naturally suited to quantify reference-dependent
preferences and to recover underlying parameters. To do so, I exploit the direct analogy between
responses to reference points and responses to discontinuities in extrinsic incentives. Using a stan-
dard labor supply model, the workhorse of the bunching literature, I rst show that the dierent
types of reference dependence considered in previous studies have a key prediction in common:
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They imply sharp bunching of the outcome at the reference point. Moreover, observed bunching
responses can be linked to the parameters governing reference dependence. On this basis, I pro-
pose both structural and reduced-form estimation methods to implement a bunching approach to
reference dependence. Finally, the chapter presents two empirical applications of these ideas in the
context of retirement decisions. The rst application estimates responses to a type of pure reference
point, namely round retirement ages. The second application extends the analysis from chapter 1,
recovering reference dependence parameters from bunching at statutory retirement ages, and the
resulting estimates are used to simulate policy counterfactuals.
I divide the analysis in this chapter into two parts. The rst part characterizes bunching
responses to reference points in a standard labor supply model. This type of model is commonly
used to analyze bunching at a budget constraint kink where the marginal tax rate changes. Two
dierent types of reference dependence are then incorporated into the model. The rst type is \loss
aversion", a discontinuity in marginal utility at the reference point dividing the choice set into gains
and losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Loss aversion can occur relative to a consumption level,
or as a discontinuity in marginal disutility from work, which can also be interpreted as loss aversion
in leisure. Interpretations put forward for such \utility kinks" include workers' expectations or
endowment eects with respect to a status quo. The second type of reference dependence is a
\utility notch", where the level of utility jumps at the reference point (Allen et al. 2016). Utility
notches can be one-sided, for instance when workers perceive a certain level of consumption or
labor supply as a goal. It could also be that individuals derive discontinuously higher utility only
exactly at the reference point, and deviations in any direction are costly. Such a two-sided utility
notch can be motivated by a perceived norm in favor of the threshold, for example.1
Next, I show that all types of reference dependence have a key prediction in common: sharp
bunching of labor supply at the reference point. Analogously to a budget constraint discontinuity, a
number of individuals choose to locate at the reference point as a corner solution. There are however
important dierences in the direction of labor supply responses and the implied shape of the density
around the reference point. For instance, loss aversion in consumption induces workers to increase
labor supply towards the reference point, such that bunching occurs from below. Loss aversion in
the labor supply/leisure dimension, on the other hand, implies that workers reduce labor supply
towards the reference point, and bunching occurs from above. Moreover, utility notches produce
\holes", i.e. missing mass in the density, but utility kinks do not.
The theoretical results can be useful for several types of empirical applications. The rst and
most straightforward possibility is a \pure" reference point without any economic incentives. In
this case, parameters can be directly estimated from observed bunching at the reference point. A
second, somewhat more challenging case for estimation is when a potential reference point coincides
with economic incentives, such as in the context of chapter 1. Here, bunching must be observed at
this combined threshold, and at at least one other threshold varying in the underlying economic
1Another possible type of reference dependence is \diminishing sensitivity", a discontinuity in the second deriva-
tive of utility. Since this feature is mostly relevant for choice under uncertainty, it is not considered in this chapter.
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incentive and/or the presence of a reference point. It is then possible to jointly estimate reference
dependence parameters and an elasticity with respect to the incentive. A nal task for estimation
may be to empirically distinguish between dierent types of reference dependence. One way to do
this is to rely on the shape of the distribution around the reference point. For instance, to distinguish
between a kink in utility from consumption and a kink in disutility from work, it is sucient to
estimate the share of responses originating from below vs. above in addition to bunching at the
reference point.
The above estimation strategies can be implemented via a structural approach, parametrically
specifying the type(s) of reference dependence at work. However, I also suggest a reduced-form
method to estimate the quantitative importance of reference dependence without such an assump-
tion. In particular, a simple linear decomposition of bunching at a potential reference point can be
interpreted as an approximation of the structural bunching equations from the theoretical frame-
work. For both structural and reduced-form methods, identication requires observing at least as
many bunching moments as parameters are to be estimated. They key identication assumption is
that bunching at dierent thresholds is generated by the same underlying parameters.
The second part of this chapter presents two empirical applications in the context of retirement
decisions, using the empirical setting from chapter 1. The rst application estimates responses at
a pure reference point. Bunching at round numbers has been observed in dierent contexts and
has been attributed to reference dependence (Kleven 2016). Similarly, there is clear bunching at
round ages in the distribution of job exits of German workers.2 While most existing bunching
applications treat round-number eects as a confounder of the eect of incentives, I aim at quan-
tifying round-number eects and estimating implied reference dependence parameters. The sharp
bunching at round retirement ages translates into a strongly signicant excess mass between 0.6
and 1.1. Strikingly, this implies that workers bunch at arbitrary round numbers at a similar mag-
nitude to bunching in response to some substantial nancial incentives from chapter 1. In terms of
magnitudes, the estimated kinks in disutility from work at round ages correspond to kinks in the
implicit tax rate of 11% to 17%.
The second application extends the analysis of statutory retirement ages presented in this the-
sis. The evidence from the rst chapter suggests that workers perceive statutory ages as reference
points3, and the estimation in this chapter has two additional goals. First, the quantitative im-
portance of reference dependence vs. nancial incentives in explaining bunching at statutory ages
2The analysis focuses on round ages other than those framed as statutory retirement ages in order to isolate the
eect of round numbers.
3Reference dependence may not be the only way to rationalize the strong documented responses at statutory
ages, but the approach has several advantages. First, workers perceiving statutory ages as reference points is a
plausible notion from the viewpoint of the institutional setting, where they are framed as such. Second, there is
complementary evidence from surveys and experiments, suggesting that retiring at statutory ages may be perceived
as a norm, and providing support for reference-dependent behavior around statutory ages (Shoven et al. 2017, Merkle
et al. 2017). Third, the reference dependence model replicates key features of observed retirement behavior, including
sharp bunching at statutory ages even if there is a disincentive to retire. Fourth, reference-dependent decision utility
is a fairly general way to model the eect of interest, capturing a number of potential sources. The evidence suggests
that framing eects may be at work, but this may not exclude alternative sources such as social norms or \deep"
internal preferences leading to the same type of behavior.
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can be gauged. I nd large and signicant reference point eects, and the estimated parameters
imply that 50% to 80% of actual statutory age retirements in the data are attributed to reference
dependence. The second goal is to empirically distinguish between dierent types of reference
dependence. Since statutory ages are framed by policy as reference points both in terms of con-
sumption and in terms of the retirement age itself, reference dependence in these two dimensions
may be plausible. Results suggest that bunching at the Early Retirement Age seems to be due
to workers postponing retirement and is mainly driven by reference dependence in consumption.
Bunching at the Normal Retirement Age is driven by reference dependence in work/leisure and
occurs due to workers moving retirement forward.
In addition, a key advantage of the structural approach relative to the reduced-form estimation
from chapter 1 is that counterfactuals can be simulated in order to highlight policy implications.
First, an increase in the Normal Retirement Age from 65 to 66 is predicted to lead to an increase
in average actual retirement ages by 4 months. Second, I simulate the eect of providing more
nancial incentives for late retirement. Although both policies are calibrated to have the same
eect on average retirement ages, the scal impact is very dierent: The increase in the Normal
Retirement Age entails a net scal gain +e700m, whereas the increase in nancial rewards would
lead to a net loss of -e200m. The dierence in scal eects arises because the increase in late
retirement rewards more than osets additional contributions due to longer working lives, while
shifting a statutory age is virtually costless to the government.
Hence, reforms shifting statutory ages are eective in inuencing retirement behavior and can
generate a positive scal impact. The overall welfare eects of the policies crucially depend on the
extent to which the planner values reference point eects, however. In particular, the government
may not want to fully \exploit" reference dependence with respect to statutory ages if it represents
a pure bias. In this case, increasing nancial rewards may even be the preferred policy, since its
negative scal eect can be more than oset by the gain in workers' utility from moving away from
their inecient choice of retiring at the reference point.
This chapter relates mainly to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the bunching
literature reviewed by Kleven (2016). Bunching methods have been pioneered bySaez (2010) and
Chetty et al. (2011) in the context of taxable income responses. Applications to retirement decisions
include Brown (2013) and Manoli and Weber (2016a). Bunching is generally used to estimate
responses to extrinsic incentives, and some studies extend the method to account for optimization
frictions (Kleven and Waseem 2013, Gelber et al. 2017). This chapter is the rst to incorporate
reference dependence into a standard bunching model, highlighting that bunching methods can be
used to estimate responses to intrinsic, non-nancial factors.
Second, the chapter contributes to the literature on the role of reference points. Despite its
prominence in behavioral models such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), there
are relatively few studies on the impact of reference dependence in eld settings (Barberis 2013).
DellaVigna et al. (2018) demonstrate loss aversion among job seekers, and Rees-Jones (2018) and
Allen et al. (2016) suggest reference dependence among tax lers and marathon runners, respec-
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tively.4 Showing bunching at reference points, the last two studies come closest to the methods
used in this chapter. This chapter links bunching responses to reference dependence parameters and
systematically develops estimation strategies for this purpose. Moreover, the applications in this
chapter add a new important context by measuring reference dependence in retirement behavior.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the labor supply model
and characterizes bunching at reference points,, section 2.3 develops estimation strategies based on
the theoretical results, section 2.4 presents the two empirical applications in the retirement context,
and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Reference Dependence and Bunching in a Labor Supply Model
2.2.1 Basic Setup and Bunching at a Budget Constraint Kink
This section sets out the basic labor supply model used to analyze bunching responses. Following
the bunching literature (Saez 2010, Kleven 2016) the analysis is framed in terms of taxable income
as the running variable. Taxable income z is generated from labor supply h paid at wage rate w.
It is straightforward to adapt the model to account for other choice variables. For instance, section
2.4.1 presents an application to retirement ages.
Workers maximize utility
U = u(c)  v(z; n)
c is consumption, z is taxable income and n is an ability parameter. Utility is increasing and
concave in consumption and disutility from work is convex such that u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0, vz > 0,
and vzz > 0. Moreover, low earnings ability increases disutility from work such that vzn > 0 The
budget constraint is
c = z   T (z) (2.1)
where w is the wage rate, and T (z) is a function capturing the tax schedule that earnings are
subject to.
Consider rst the case of a linear budget constraint with a constant net-of-tax rate 1   , and
as is standard in the bunching literature, a utility function that is quasi-linear in consumption and
iso-elastic in labor supply such that
U = (1  )z   n
1 + 1"
 z
n
1+ 1
"
(2.2)
where " is the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the implicit net-of-tax rate. Workers'
utility maximization yields
z = n(1  )"
4In addition, there is some empirical evidence on reference dependence from the behavioral nance literature, for
example on the "disposition eect" (Barberis and Xiong 2009).
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If the distribution of ability F (n) is smooth, this implies a smooth distribution of taxable income
with density h0(z).
Suppose now that there is a kink in the budget constraint such that the net-of-tax rate decreases
by  at some level of taxable income z^. Figure 2.1 illustrates the eect of the budget set kink
in a budget set diagram and density diagram following Saez (2010) and Kleven (2016). Whilst an
individual with ability n^ initially chooses taxable income z^, there is a marginal buncher with ability
n whose indierence curve is tangent to the initial budget set at z and to the upper part of the
new budget set at z^. All workers initially located between z^ and z bunch at the kink, while all
individuals initially to the left of the kink leave their labor supply unchanged and all individuals
initially to the right of z stay above the kink.
Total bunching is
B =
Z z
z^
h0(z)dz  h0(z^)(z   z^)
where h0(z^) is the pre-kink density and the approximate equality holds if h0(z) is constant on [z^; z
].
The two tangency conditions for the marginal buncher imply z = n(1 )" and z^ = n(1  )"
and thus
z
z^
=

1  
1    
"
(2.3)
or, in terms of the excess mass b = B=h0(z^),
b
z^
=

1  
1    
"
  1 (2.4)
2.2.2 Reference Dependence
Throughout this chapter, reference dependence is dened as a situation where workers evaluate
outcomes relative to some threshold level of consumption or labor supply. In the language of the
bunching literature, this corresponds to a discontinuity in utility at the reference point.5 This
section considers four versions of reference-dependent preferences, all of which arguably have some
plausibility or have been discussed in previous literature (e.g. Allen et al. 2016). There are two
dimensions along which the variants dier. First, there can be a reference point in terms of con-
sumption or in terms of labor supply. Second, it can be parametrized as a kink (i.e. a discontinuity
in marginal utility) or a notch (i.e. a discontinuity in the level of utility).
Version 1a: Kink in utility from consumption
U = u(z)  v(z; n)  1(c  c^)  c(c^  c) (2.5)
5This relatively general denition may also include notions not typically subsumed under reference dependence,
including norms and other utility costs of deviating from certain reference levels. The common feature that creates
discontinuities in utility are that they lead to discontinuous responses for intrinsic reasons, as opposed to the extrinsic
incentives usually considered in the bunching literature.
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Version 1b: Kink in disutility from work
U = u(c)  v(z; n)  1(z  z^)  l(z   z^) (2.6)
The last term in equation (2.5) introduces a discrete jump in marginal utility from consumption at c^
where the parameters c > 0 captures the size of this kink. Thus, workers' marginal utility gain from
approaching c^ from below is greater than their marginal utility gain from increasing consumption
beyond the level at this reference point. This corresponds to the loss aversion property from
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), where the choice set is divided into two domains,
gains and losses. Panel A of gure 2.2 shows the impact on the utility function and indierence
curves. Indierence curves exhibit a convex kink at c^ in this case. On the other hand, the last term
in equation (2.6) introduces a discrete jump in the marginal disutility from work at z^. Panel B of
gure 2.2 shows that this introduces a convex kink in indierence curves at z^. This can also be
interpreted as loss aversion with respect to a reference level of leisure. Interpretations put forward
for such utility kinks include workers' expectations or endowment eects with respect to a status
quo (Kleven 2016).
Version 2a: One-sided utility notch
U = u(c)  v(z; n) + 1(z  z^)   (2.7)
Version 2b: Two-sided utility notch
U = u(c)  v(z; n) + 1(z = z^)  2 (2.8)
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) introduce a discrete jump in utility at z^ where the parameters  > 0
and 2 > 0 capture the size of this notch. Equation (2.7) describes a situation where the worker's
satisfaction jumps when they attain at least z^.6 As shown in Panel C of gure 2.2, this implies a
notch in indierence curves at z^. Reasons for a one-sided notch may include workers perceiving z^
as a level of aspiration or a goal. On the other hand, equation (2.8) corresponds to a case where
utility increases only when labor supply is exactly z^. Panel D shows that such a two-sided notch
implies that indierence curves are unchanged, except a point originally below the curve is now
part of a given indierence set. For instance, this could be motivated by a norm in favor of z^, or z^
serving as a default option where any deviations are costly to workers.
2.2.3 Bunching Responses at Reference Points
This section shows how sharp bunching occurs at reference points of any of the four types described
above. The budget constraint is assumed to be linear with net-of-tax rate 1   throughout.
6Unlike in the case of utility kinks, it does not matter whether utility notches are written in terms of labor supply
or consumption.
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2.2.3.1 Kink in Utility from Consumption
Suppose rst that there is a consumption reference point as in equation (2.5). The left panels of
gure 2.3 illustrates the impact in the usual budget set and density diagrams. In the absence of the
reference point, workers locate along the budget line depending on their abilities. An individual
with ability n^ is initially located at z^ and n is located at z. When the reference point is introduced,
the individual whose indierence curve was initially tangent to the budget line at z sees a clockwise
rotation of their indierence curves below the reference point, and the new point of tangency is
at z^. This individual is the marginal buncher: All workers initially located between z and z^ now
bunch at the reference point, while all individuals initially to the right of the reference point leave
their labor supply unchanged and all individuals initially to the left of z stay below the reference
point. Like a kink in the budget constraint, a kink in utility does not produce a hole in the density
of taxable incomes, since workers initially below z also work more, causing a rightward shift in
the density below z^ that lls the hole.
Bunching at the reference point is
B =
Z z^
z
h0(z)dz  h0(z^)(z^   z)
With quasi-linear and iso-elastic utility, the two tangency conditions for the marginal buncher imply
z = n(1  )" and z^ = n[(1 + c)(1  )]". Hence
z
z^
=

1
1 + c
"
(2.9)
or
b
z^
= 1 

1
1 + c
"
(2.10)
Bunching in response to a kink in utility from consumption only depends on the strength of the
reference point c and the the elasticity and is independent of the net-of-tax rate. Intuitively, the
marginal gain in consumption is valued more by workers below the reference point, and the elasticity
determines by how much they are willing to increase labor supply in response. Equation (2.10)
implies that the parameter c can be estimated can be calculated based on observed bunching,
given an estimate of the elasticity.7
2.2.3.2 Kink in Disutility from Work
Suppose instead that there is a labor supply reference point as in (2.6). In the right panel of gure
2.3, an individual with ability n^ is initially located at z^ and n is located at z. The marginal
buncher whose indierence curve was initially tangent to the budget line at z sees a counter-
clockwise rotation of their indierence curves to the right of the reference point, and the new point
of tangency is at z^. All workers initially located between z^ and z now bunch at the reference point,
7Section 2.3 describes in more detail how reference dependence parameters can be estimated.
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while all individuals initially to the left of the reference point leave their labor supply unchanged
and all individuals initially to the right of z stay above the reference point. Note that bunching
occurs from the right in this case, while bunching in response to the consumption reference point is
from the left. Again, the kink in utility does not produce a hole in the density of taxable incomes,
since workers initially above z also work less, causing a leftward shift in the density above z^.
Bunching at the reference point is
B =
Z z
z^
h0(z)dz  h0(z^)(z   z^)
The two tangency conditions for the marginal buncher imply z = n(1 )" and z^ = n(1  l)".
Hence
b
z^
=

1  
1     l
"
  1 (2.11)
Equations (2.4) and (2.11) implies that a kink in disutility from work has the same bunching eect
as a kink in the budget set. Indeed, a local change in the net-of-rax rate  = l would produce
exactly the same bunching response.
2.2.3.3 One-Sided Utility Notch
Consider next a one-sided utility notch as in equation (2.7). In the left panel of gure 2.4, an
individual with ability n^ is initially located at z^ and n is located at z. When the utility notch
is introduced, indierence curves become discontinuous at z^, and the individual initially located at
z is now indierent between z and z^. This worker is the marginal buncher. All workers initially
located between z and z^ bunch at the reference point, while individuals initially to the left of z
or to the right of z^ do not alter their labor supply. Hence, all bunching originates from the left.
Moreover, the utility notch produces a hole in the density since no individual is willing to locate
between z and z^.
Bunching at the reference point is
B =
Z z^
z
h0(z)dz  h0(z^)(z^   z)
Based on the utility specication in equation (2.2), utility of the marginal buncher at z^ is
U^ = (1  )z^   n

1 + 1"

z^
n
1+ 1
"
+ 
Using the rst-order condition z = n(1   )", utility at the initial interior solution z can be
expressed as
UI =
1
1 + "
n(1  )1+"
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The indierence condition U^ = UI then implies
1
1 + "
z
z^
+
"
1 + "

z
z^
  1
"
= 1 +

c(z^)
(2.12)
where c(z^) = (1   )z^. Equation (2.12) denes bunching in response to a given utility notch,
although there is generally no closed-form solution for b or z=z^. The parameter  can be directly
calculated from observed bunching, given an estimate of the elasticity.
Note that the solution given by equation (2.12) is conceptually similar to bunching at a down-
ward tax notch (a discrete increase in the average net-of-tax rate). Furthermore, the equation
implies that lim"!0+ z

z^ = 1. Hence, there is no bunching when labor supply is perfectly inelastic,
which rules out the existence of a dominated region as with a downward tax notch.
2.2.3.4 Two-Sided Utility Notch
Suppose nally that there is a two-sided utility notch according to equation (2.8). In the right
panel of gure 2.4, An individual with ability n^ is initially located at z^, n+ is located at z+, and n 
at z . When the utility notch is introduced, indierence curves become discontinuous at z^. The
individual initially located at z+ is now indierent between z+ and z^ and the individual initially
at z  is now indierent between z  and z^. These two are the the upper marginal buncher and
the lower marginal buncher, respectively. All workers initially between z  and z+ bunch at the
reference point, while individuals initially to the left of z  or the right of z+ do not alter the choice.
Hence, bunching at the reference point occurs from both sides, and there is a hole in the density
between z  and z+.
Bunching at the reference point is
B =
Z z+
z 
h0(z)dz  h0(z^)(z+   z )
Analogously to equation (2.12), the indierence condition for the lower marginal buncher implies
1
1 + "
z 
z^
+
"
1 + "

z 
z^
  1
"
= 1 +
2
c(z^)
Similarly, the upper marginal buncher is indierent between the interior solution at z+ and the
reference point such that
1
1 + "
z+
z^
+
"
1 + "

z+
z^
  1
"
= 1 +
2
c(z^)
Hence, z+ and z  are two solutions to the same non-linear equation, where z+  z^ and z+  z^.
Note that, as with the one-sided utility notch lim"!0+
z 
z^ = 1, i.e. there is no bunching from the
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left with a zero elasticity. However,
lim
"!0+
z+
z^
= 1 +
2
c(z^)
Thus, there is bunching from the right even as " converges to zero. This implies that the two-sided
utility notch creates a dominated region to the right of the reference point for a given value of 2,
a situation similar to an upward tax notch.
2.2.4 Bunching Responses when Reference Points Coincide with Economic In-
centives
Certain types of reference points are unrelated to nancial incentives, such as round numbers or
endowment eects where gains and losses are relative to a status quo. However, a reference point
may also coincide with economic incentives - for instance when certain incentives are framed as
reference points as argued in chapter 1. This section analyzes such a situation, where there is
both a budget constraint kink and a reference point attached to some threshold z^. For the sake
of brevity, the analysis focuses on the \utility kink" versions of reference dependence. Appendix
section 2.A.2 repeats the analysis for utility notches.
2.2.4.1 Reference Dependence in Consumption
Suppose that a consumption reference point according to equation (2.5) coincides with a budget
set kink. In order to compute total bunching, this situation needs to be compared to an initial
one without any discontinuity. The left panel of gure 2.A1 illustrates the joint eect. There is an
individual whose initial indierence curve is tangent at z  and her new, kinked indierence curve is
tangent to the lower part of the kinked budget set at z^. This worker is the lower marginal buncher.
In addition, there is an upper marginal buncher exactly like in the case of only a budget set kink.
This individual is tangent to the original budget set at z+ and tangent to the upper part of the
kinked budget set at z^. All individuals to the left of z  work more due to the atter indierence
curves, and all individuals to the right of z work less due to the atter budget line. Hence, there
is no hole in the density from either side.
Bunching at the threshold is
B =
Z z+
z 
h0(z)dz  h0(z^)(z+   z )
The lower marginal buncher is determined analogously to equation (2.9)
z 
z^
=

1
1 + c
"
The upper marginal buncher, on the other hand, follows the standard formula with a budget set
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kink only in equation (2.3)
z+
z^
=

1  
1    
"
Total bunching is
b
z^
=

1  
1    
"
 

1
1 + c
"
(2.13)
Hence, bunching has two additive components in this case. All bunching due to the reference point
character of the threshold is from below, and occurs independently of the size of the budget set kink.
On the other hand, all bunching due to the budget set kink occurs from above and is independent
of the strength of the reference point.
2.2.4.2 Reference Dependence in Labor Supply
Suppose now instead that utility is reference-dependent according to equation (2.6). The right panel
of gure 2.A1 illustrates the joint eect of the utility kink and the budget set kink. The marginal
buncher's initial indierence curve is tangent to the initial budget set at z and his new, kinked
indierence curve is tangent to upper part of the kinked budget set at z^. Again, all individuals to
the right of z decrease their labor supply due to the joint eect of the utility kink and the budget
set kink, so that there is no hole in the density.
The two tangency conditions for the marginal buncher imply z = n(1   )" and z^ = n(1  
     l)". Hence
z
z^
=

1  
1       l
"
(2.14)
or
b
z^
=

1  
1       l
"
  1 (2.15)
The equations show that the budget set kink and the utility kink are \perfect substitutes" in terms
of producing bunching. Hence, the additional eect of a reference point on bunching at an existing
budget set kink is as if the budget set was made more discontinuous. Indeed, when comparing
equation (2.15) to equation (2.11), the response z=z^ increases by a factor

1  
1   l
"
. Hence,
the additional bunching from the reference point scales bunching from the budget set kink by a
factor that relates the size additional utility kink to the existing post-kink slope of the budget set.
2.2.5 Extensions
Heterogeneous Parameters. The preceding analysis assumes homogenous preferences. However,
parameter heterogeneity can be incorporated into the bunching approach. Kleven (2016) shows that
in the presence of heterogeneous elasticities bunching at a pure budget set kink can be related to
a local average elasticity. Consider a joint distribution f^(n; ") and a joint counterfactual density
of labor supply ~h0(z; "), such that h0(z) =
R
"
~h0(z; ")d". Denoting by z

" the response of the
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marginal buncher at ", total bunching can be written as
B =
Z
"
Z z"
z^
~h0(z; ") dz d"  h0(z^)E[z" ]
where the approximate equality holds if ~h0(z; ") is constant on [z^; z

" ] for each ". Hence, z
 can be
replaced by E[z" ] in equation (2.3) to account for the local average response.
Similarly, joint distributions of (n; "; c) or (n; "; l) can be incorporated into the bunching
quantities leading to equations (2.9), (2.11) and (2.24). For instance, with heterogeneity in reference
dependence in consumption,
B =
Z
c
Z
"
Z z";c
z^
~h0(z; "; c) dz d" dc  h0(z^)E[z";c ]
where ~h0(z; "; c) is the counterfactual and z

";c
is the response of the marginal buncher at
("; c). The approximate inequality holds if ~h0(z; "; c) is constant on [z^; z

";c
] for each ("; c).
Thus, equation (2.9) is identied o the average response E[z";c ].
Income/Wealth Eects. The standard bunching formula (2.3) applies to small kinks where
income eects are small (Saez 2010). Equivalently, the formula can be derived from a quasi-linear
utility function as above. For larger kinks, however, there may be income eects arising from the
change in the implicit net wage. Kleven (2016) argues that in this case, bunching recovers a weighted
average between a compensated and an uncompensated elasticity. In other words, if one views the
bunching elasticity as an estimator of a compensated elasticity, it is downward biased towards the
uncompensated elasticity (assuming leisure is a normal good). The intuition behind this result is
that income eects attenuate responses to price changes, since they work in the direction opposite
to the substitution eect.
A similar intuition applies to bunching in response to reference points: The presence of income
or wealth eects attenuate the response of the marginal buncher. For instance, the marginal
buncher responding to a consumption reference point by increasing their labor supply described by
equation (2.9), is willing to decrease labor supply by less if the marginal utility of the additional
consumption available at higher labor supply is lower. In other words, with income eects, the
bunching equations (2.3), (2.9), (2.11) and (2.24) overstate the response at given parameter values.
Therefore, estimated parameters can be interpreted as lower bounds on the \compensated" ", c
and l in the presence of income eects.
2.3 Estimation
The conceptual framework allows for identication of reference dependence parameters based on
observed bunching. This section rst discusses identication assumptions and illustrates structural
estimation methods for some cases of interest. In addition, a reduced-form decomposition method is
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proposed that allows for quantifying the importance of reference dependence as a source of bunching
without parametrically specifying the type of reference point.
2.3.1 Identication
In order to estimate the underlying utility parameters, the rst step is to quantify bunching re-
sponses at the reference point and possibly at other thresholds. Following the standard methods
laid out in section 1.3 of chapter 1, the bunching mass B can be measured as the observed density
spike at a threshold z^, assuming that the density would have been smooth in the absence of any
discontinuity in preferences or incentives. In terms of identication, bunching must be estimated
at at least as many thresholds as parameters are to be estimated.8 For instance, to identify the
two parameters " and c in equation (2.13), bunching must be observed at at least two thresholds
that vary in the nancial incentive and/or the presence of a reference point.9
The second step of the estimation is to calculate parameters based on bunching at the available
thresholds. Indexing i = 1; :::; n the discontinuities available for estimation, and k the number of
parameters to be estimated, parameters are \just identied" if n = k. As in chapter 1, bunching at
discontinuity Bi can be written as a function of the elasticity, a vector of additional parameters !,
an indicator for the presence of a reference point Di and additional variables at the threshold xi.
Bi = B(";!(Di);xi)
yields a system of equations that can be solved for " and !. The key identication assumption
is that bunching at each discontinuity is generated by the same underlying parameters " and !.
For instance, equations (2.4) and (2.10) can be solved to yield implied values of " and c when
bunching is observed at two thresholds.
In some cases, parameters are \over-identied", i.e. n > k. Bunching at threshold i can be
written as
Bi = B(";!(Di);xi) + i
including an error term i. Instead of nding an exact solution to the system of equations, pa-
rameters can be estimated, for instance by minimizing squared deviations. This is the case for the
reduced-form estimation in chapter 1, where there are many more discontinuities than parameters.
The identication assumption becomes that of chapter 1: Parameters should not be correlated with
Di or xi across discontinuities.
8Other applications of this idea include Gelber et al. (2017) who use two bunching observations to solve for two
parameters, an elasticity and an adjustment cost parameter.
9For simplicity, most of the arguments in this section are presented using the \kink in utility from consumption"
version of reference dependence. Assuming other types of reference dependence, " and l,  or 2 can be estimated
analogously.
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2.3.2 Structural Estimation
In the following, I discuss how the structural bunching equations from the conceptual framework can
be used to estimate reference dependence parameters. Three potential applications are considered.
First, a pure reference point can be estimated if the type of reference dependence is known. Second,
reference dependence vs. economic incentives can be quantied as sources of bunching. Third,
dierent types of reference dependence can be empirically distinguished when additional moments
of the distribution are available.
2.3.2.1 Estimation of a Pure Reference Point
First, suppose a threshold serves as a (suspected) reference point, and there is no change in in-
centives at this threshold. In this case, nding signicant bunching at the threshold provides a
direct test of whether there is indeed a reference point. In order to estimate utility parameters,
it is necessary to assume a particular type of reference dependence. For instance, assuming there
is loss aversion in consumption, equation (2.10) can be used to estimate c. A caveat is that the
elasticity has to be known or estimated as well, since responses also depend on ". If " is known
from other sources, equation (2.10) can be directly used to estimate c from observed bunching at
the reference point.
Aa arguably more compelling alternative is to estimate both parameters from the same context.
Denoting by b1 observed bunching at the reference point z^1 and b2 bunching at a pure budget set
kink =(1  ) at z^2, the two parameters can be calculated by solving
b1
z^1
= 1 

1
1 + c
"
b2
z^2
=

1  
1    
"
  1
The underlying identication assumption is that " does not dier across the two thresholds. Stan-
dard errors on the parameter estimates can be obtained via the usual bootstrap method.
2.3.2.2 Reference Dependence vs. Economic Incentives
A second case of interest may be when one observes bunching at a threshold that features economic
incentives, but it may also serve as a reference point exacerbating bunching. In this case, the meth-
ods proposed in this chapter can be used to empirically distinguish between reference dependence
and incentives as sources of bunching. This may be useful for two reasons. First, reference depen-
dence itself may be the object of interest, but it is confounded by incentives. Second, standard
bunching applications aiming at estimating a \true" labor supply elasticity need to consider that
certain thresholds may serve as reference points, and estimate the elasticity \net" of this eect.
To estimate both parameters of interest, it is necessary to observe bunching at at least two
thresholds that vary in the underlying economic incentives and/or the presence of a reference
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point. For instance, one could use the threshold z^1 where both a budget set kink and a consumption
reference point is present, and a pure budget set kink at threshold z^2 . Then, " and c can be
calculated based on
b1
z^1
=

1  
1    
"
 

1
1 + c
"
b2
z^2
=

1  
1    
"
  1
where again the key assumption is that " is constant across z^1 and z^2.
2.3.2.3 Distinguishing Dierent Types of Reference Dependence
Finally, it may be desirable to empirically distinguish between dierent types of reference depen-
dence. The diculty is that observing bunching alone is not sucient to distinguish between the
types, as they all lead to sharp bunching at the threshold. Thus, additional bunching moments
are needed to make progress. One possibility is to use the fact that the dierent types of reference
dependence have dierent implications for the shape of the distribution around the reference point.
Suppose for instance that there is a threshold z^ that serves as a reference point but it is unkown
whether it is in terms of consumption or labor supply. It may be possible to use the density around
the threshold to infer whether bunching originates from below vs. above, which in turn implies
which type is at work.
One way to implement this idea is by estimating the share of bunching from below . The
excess mass originating from below b  = b can be written as
b 
z^
= 1 

1
1 + c
"
and bunching from above b+ = (1  )b is
b+
z^
=

1  
1     l
"
  1
The two equations can be solved for c and l, given that " is known or estimated from another
discontinuity. Section 2.4.3.2 provides an application of this idea, using the observed density around
thresholds to distinguish between reference dependence in consumption vs. labor supply.
2.3.3 Reduced-Form Estimation
The approaches discussed above yield estimates of reference dependence and its underlying param-
eters, given an assumption on the type of reference dependence. One may be able to empirically
distinguish dierent types, but in some instances an attractive alternative may be an approach
where reference point eects can be quantied without specifying the type of reference dependence.
The basis for such an approach is the observation that bunching at a budget set kink is ap-
proximately linear in the nancial incentive at the threshold (Saez 2010, Kleven 2016). Note that
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log(z=z^)  z=z^, and log(1      )=(1   ))   =(1   ) when  is small and hence
z = z   z^ is small. Take logs on equation (2.3)
log
z
z^
=  " log

1  
1  

which implies
b
z^
 " 
1   (2.16)
Thus, bunching is approximately linear in the kink size. This idea can be extended to the
presence of a reference point at the threshold. For instance, if there is a budget set kink and
a consumption reference point at the threshold, and when  is small and hence z+ is small,
equation (2.13) implies
b
z^
 " 
1   + 1 

1
1 + c
"
Hence, bunching is approximately linear in kink size and additive in a component related to
the nancial incentive and one related to reference dependence. Appendix 2.A.3 shows that this
insight also applies to the other types of reference dependence.10
This motivates a simple linear, additive decomposition of observed bunching across thresholds.
bi
z^i
= "
i
1  i + Di (2.17)
where i indexes thresholds and Di is an indicator for a reference point being attached to threshold
i. The parameter  can be interpreted as the additional bunching due to a reference point of any
type. The identication assumption is the same as for structural estimation:  should not dier
across thresholds, such that additional bunching can be attributed to reference dependence.
Moreover, the conceptual framework implies a mapping between  and underlying utility pa-
rameters under each type of reference dependence. For instance, in the case of a kink in utility from
consumption,  = 1 

1
1+c
"
or   "c for small c. Hence, the specication used in section 1.4
of chapter 1 can be viewed as a reduced-form decomposition of the eects of nancial incentives
vs. reference points under the model presented in this chapter.
2.4 Applications: Reference Dependence in Retirement Behavior
2.4.1 Conceptual Framework
The remainder of this chapter presents applications of the methods presented above to the context
of retirement behavior. To begin with, this section considers a simple static model of retirement
decisions in order to derive bunching equations analogous to those from sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.
10In the case of a kink in utility from consumption and a one-sided utility notch, the approximation holds if 
is small. In the case of a kink in disutility from work,  + l is required to be small. The only exception is the
two-sided utility notch, where the additional bunching due to a reference point is not fully independent of the kink
size, which may introduce some bias into an estimation using equation (2.17).
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The static model considered in this section corresponds to the \lifetime budget constraint" model of
retirement suggested by Burtless (1986). Similar static models are used in recent retirement bunch-
ing applications such as Brown (2013) and Manoli and Weber (2016b). Section 2.4.1.3 provides an
outlook on the relationship with a full dynamic model.
2.4.1.1 Basic Setup
Workers maximize lifetime utility
U = u(C)  v(R;n)
where C is lifetime consumption, R is the worker's retirement age relative to a career starting age
normalized to 0, and n is a parameter capturing earnings ability at old age. In the retirement
context, a stylized lifetime budget constraint can be written as the sum of wage earnings until
retirement subject to payroll tax ~ , and pension benets B(R) that are paid from R to time of
death T :
C = w(1  ~)R+B(R)(T  R) (2.18)
The implicit net-of-tax rate 1   is dened via
dC
dR
= w(1  )
where dCdR is the marginal gain in consumption from postponing retirement by one period, or the
implicit net wage. the implicit net wage. Consider rst the case of a linear budget constraint
C = w(1   )R, and assume as in section 2.2.1, that utility is quasi-linear in consumption C and
iso-elastic in labor supply R. Then workers' utility maximization yields R = n [w(1  )]", where "
is the elasticity of the retirement age with respect to the implicit net-of-tax rate. If the distribution
of ability F (n) is smooth, this implies a smooth distribution of retirement ages with density h0(R).
2.4.1.2 Retirement Bunching Responses
Now the model can be used analogously to the standard labor supply model in order to quantify
retirement bunching. There is bunching in the running variable R at discontinuities in marginal
incentives captured by the implicit net-of-tax rate as well as bunching at reference points.
Bunching at a Budget Set Kink. Analogously to gure 2.1, there is bunching at a lifetime
budget constraint kink where the marginal implicit tax rate increases by  at some retirement
age threshold R^. There is a marginal buncher with ability n whose indierence curve is tangent to
the initial budget set at R and to the upper part of the new budget set at R^. All workers initially
retiring between R^ and R bunch at the kink, while all individuals initially to the left of the kink
leave their retirement age unchanged and all individuals initially to the right of R stay above the
kink.
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Total retirement bunching is
B =
Z R
R^
h0(R)dR  h0(R^)(R   R^)
The two tangency conditions for the marginal buncher imply R = n[w(1  )]" and R^ = n[w(1 
  )]" and thus
b
R^
=

1  
1    
"
  1 (2.19)
In addition to the preferences described above, workers may evaluate outcomes relative a thresh-
old retirement age R^. Previous work on the retirement context has pointed out that such reference
dependence may be present in both utility from consumption and disutility from work (e.g. Be-
haghel and Blau 2012, Merkle et al. 2017). Both are considered here and modeled as a kink in the
utility function.11
Bunching at a Consumption Reference Point. Consider rst a change in utility from
consumption at the reference point:
U = u(C)  v(R;n)  1(C  C^)  c(C^   C) (2.20)
The last term in equation (2.20) introduces a discrete jump in the marginal utility from consumption
at the reference level C^ = C(R^). For example, such loss aversion in consumption may arise due to
gain-loss framing of pension adjustments around age thresholds or expectations set by benet or
consumption levels linked to \full" or \normal" retirement ages.
Analogously to section 2.2.3.1, it can be shown that retirement bunching at the reference age is
b
R^
=

1
1 + c
"
  1 (2.21)
Bunching at a Labor Supply Reference Point. The second type of reference dependence
is captured by
U = u(C)  v(R;n)  1(R  R^)  el(R  R^) (2.22)
where marginal disutility from labor supply jumps by el > 0 at R^. Higher disutility from continuing
work after the threshold is consistent with an interpretation where workers perceive continuing work
after the threshold as a loss in lifetime leisure, for instance relative to \full" or \normal" retirement
ages, or other round ages.
As in section 2.2.3.2, retirement bunching at the reference point is
b
R^
=

1  
1     l
"
  1 (2.23)
11The \loss aversion" functional form of reference dependence is most commonly used in the literature (e.g. Rees-
Jones 2018 and DellaVigna et al. 2018).
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where l = el=w is the parameter normalized by the wage.
2.4.1.3 Extension: Dynamics
Bunching applications typically use static models, but retirement decisions are dynamic problems
and often modeled as such in other contexts. Appendix 2.A.4 sets out a dynamic life-cycle model
of retirement, and shows how it linked to the static model considered in this section. In particular,
the static model can be viewed as a reduced form of the full dynamic model under two assump-
tions: First, all uncertainty in earnings capacity is realized at the \beginning" of old age when the
retirement age is decided, and second, there are no liquidity constraints.
This chapter focuses on the static model for several reasons. First, simple and transparent
bunching equations can be derived from the static version. Second, the static model is directly
analogous to a standard labor supply model and thus results can be easily compared to those
from existing bunching models. Third, the sharp bunching responses documented in this chapter
1 may indicate that dynamic uncertainty does not play a large role for the response of retirement
to dierent discontinuities. Fourth, as long as uncertainty attenuates responses at statutory ages
and pure nancial incentives in the same way, the relative magnitude of the parameters of interest
can still be identied.
2.4.2 Application 1: Bunching at Round Retirement Ages
The rst application analyzes a type of \pure" reference point in the context of retirement decisions,
namely round retirement ages. Bunching at round numbers has been observed in dierent contexts
including taxable income (Kleven and Waseem 2013) and house prices (Best and Kleven 2018)
and has been attributed to reference dependence (Kleven 2016). In typical bunching applications,
round-number eects are treated as a confounder of the eect of incentives and are netted out of
the bunching analysis by allowing for round-number eects in the counterfactual.12 In contrast,
this section aims at estimating the reference dependence parameters implied by observed bunching
at round retirement ages.
Specically, round ages other than those framed as statutory retirement ages are considered.
Other round ages plausibly represent pure reference points since they do not entail any change in
nancial incentives, nor any regulation that would facilitate rm responses. The most plausible
type of reference dependence at round ages is arguably in terms of the retirement age itself (or
equivalently lifetime leisure), where they may serve as goals or expectations that workers strive for.
It is unlikely that round retirement ages serve as consumption reference points since, in contrast to
statutory retirement ages, the consumption or benet level associated with them is not framed in
a particular way. Assuming that they serve as reference points in terms of labor supply, bunching
at a round age is given by equation (2.23). Hence, the parameter of interest l can be estimated
from observed bunching at the round age, given an estimate of " from the same context.
12An exception is Allen et al. (2016) where the object of interest is bunching at round marathon nishing times.
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Panel A of gure 2.6 shows the retirement age distribution among workers born between 1933
and 1948, that is the full sample from chapter 1.13 Vertical red lines indicate the location of the main
statutory retirement ages where very large bunching occurs. However, bunching at other round ages
is also clearly visible, in particular at ages 61, 62 and 64. Panels B to D zoom into the retirement age
distribution around these ages, where all birth cohorts are again pooled. The connected black dots
show the actual distribution and the tted red curve is a counterfactual estimated as a 7th-degree
polynomial. Although the density has dierent shapes around the three ages, there is clear and
sharp bunching at each round age. Table 2.1 shows bunching estimates and implied parameters.
The excess mass is 0.61 at age 61, 0.89 at age 62 and 1.12 at age 64. An advantage of pooling all the
full sample is that sample sizes are large: There are around 1 to 1.5 million individuals around each
threshold. Bootstrapped standard errors are small and all estimates are highly signicant. The
magnitudes of responses are substantially smaller than bunching observed at statutory retirement
ages. However, it is striking that the bunching mass is similar or even larger than that at sizeable
nancial incentives in gure 1.4 of chapter 1.
The implied values of l, the parameter governing the kink in marginal disutility from work, can
be calculated based on equation (2.23). The results are included in the respective panel of gure 2.6
for each round age. The estimate of l is 0.05 at age 61 and around 0.07 at ages 62 and 64, and all
estimates are signicantly dierent from zero. An intuitive interpretation of the magnitudes arises
from to the analogy of a kink in disutility from work and a budget set kink discussed in section
2.2.4.2. The estimates imply that the eect of round ages as reference points corresponds to a kink
in the implicit tax rate =(1  ) between 11% and 17%.
2.4.3 Application 2: Bunching at Statutory Retirement Ages
The second application estimates reference dependence at statutory retirement ages analyzed in
chapter 1. Adding structural estimation to the reduced-form estimation of chapter 1 serves several
purposes. First, more externally valid utility parameters governing reference dependence can be
recovered. Second, while the reduced-form estimation is a linear approximation, the structural
approach can estimate an exact relationship under the parametric assumptions from section 2.4.1.14
Third, bunching can be simulated under some counterfactual assumptions regarding parameters and
policy variables.
This section considers statutory ages as potential reference points both in terms of consumption
and in terms of labor supply. This is motivated by the fact that the framing discussed in chapter
1 is consistent with loss aversion in consumption and labor supply. Moreover, there is independent
empirical support for both types of reference dependence. For example Merkle et al. (2017) show
that gain/loss framing of pension benets around statutory ages induces loss averse behavior in
survey respondents, and Shoven et al. (2017) nd that statutory ages may be perceived as norms
13See section 1.2 of chapter 1 for a detailed description of the empirical setting and data.
14Based on the arguments in section 2.3.3, the reduced-form specication from chapter 1 can be interpreted as a
linear approximation of the structural equation (2.24) for small  and l. Appendix 2.A.5.4 shows in more detail
how the reduced-form coecients can be linked to the model parameters.
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in terms of the retirement date itself. In the following, a bunching equation nesting both types is
derived, and estimation results are presented from focusing on either type, as well as estimating
both jointly.
At statutory age thresholds, a potential reference point coincides with a change in incentives.
Appendix gure 2.A2 illustrates the joint eect on retirement bunching. There is an individual
whose initial indierence curve is tangent at R  and her new, kinked indierence curve is tangent
to the lower part of the kinked budget set at R^. This worker is the lower marginal buncher who
bunches due to the consumption reference point. In addition, individuals bunch from the right due
to the combination of the budget set kink and reference dependence in disutility from work. There
is an upper marginal buncher whose original indierence curve is tangent to the original budget set
at R+ and whose kinked indierence curve is tangent to the upper part of the kinked budget set
at R^. Hence, all individuals initially located between R  and R+ bunch, and there is no hole in
the density because workers to the left of R  also delay retirement due to their atter indierence
curves, and workers to the right of R+ retire earlier due to the atter budget line and the steeper
indierence curves.
Bunching at the threshold is
B =
Z R
R^
h0(R)dR  h0(R^)(R+  R )
The lower marginal buncher is determined analogously to equation (2.21)
R 
R^
=

1
1 + c
"
The two tangency conditions for the upper marginal buncher imply R+ = n+[w(1   )]" and
R^ = n+[w(1       l)]". Hence
R+
R^
=

1  
1       l
"
Total bunching at the combined threshold can be expressed as
b
R^
=

1  
1       l
"
  1

+

1 

1
1 + c
"
(2.24)
Hence, bunching is additive in two components. The rst term in equation (2.24) captures bunching
from the right due to the combination of the budget set kink and reference-dependent disutility from
work. The second term in the equation captures bunching from the left due to reference-dependent
utility from consumption.
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2.4.3.1 Basic Estimation: Upper Bounds
Taking the model to the discontinuity-level data in the bunching sample from chapter 1, equations
(2.19) and (2.24) imply that bunching at discontinuity i is given by
bi
R^i
=

1  i
1  i  i  
P
s 
s
lD
s
i
"
  1

+

1 

1
1 +
P
s 
s
cD
s
i
"
+ i (2.25)
where i is an error term. Recall that the discontinuities in the bunching sample vary in the kink
size i and in the presence of statutory ages of types s 2 (ERA;FRA;NRA). However, a key
issue with the estimation is that sc and 
s
l cannot be separately identied for a given statutory age
type based solely on equation (2.25). Intuitively, both reference dependence in consumption and
leisure lead to sharp bunching at the threshold R^ such that a given amount of excess mass could
be rationalized by a range of combinations of sc and 
s
l . In other words, one bunching equation
per discontinuity is not sucient to separately identify the two parameters. A rst solution to
this problem is to estimate upper bounds on both types of reference dependence, assuming that
all reference point bunching is only driven by loss aversion in consumption or loss aversion in
leisure. This can be done by restricting sl and 
s
c to zero, respectively. The method is based
on the estimation strategy from section 2.3.2.2, where one type of reference dependence can be
distinguished from the eect of nancial incentives.
Appendix table 2.A2 presents the full set of non-linear least squares estimates based on equation
(2.25). Column (1) reports upper bounds on sc obtained from estimating the model with all 
s
l set
to zero. The elasticity of 0.15 is precisely estimated and very similar to the reduced-form results.
Upper bounds on the sc parameters are positive and highly signicant. While 
ERA
c can be bounded
around 5, FRAc is larger and the estimation does not seem able to bound 
NRA
c in an informative
way. Column (2) reports results from the reverse exercise, setting all sc to zero. Upper bounds on
the sl parameters are also positive and highly signicant, with magnitudes varying between 0.1 and
0.4. As expected, the implied strength of reference dependence at statutory ages is substantially
larger than that at other round ages.
2.4.3.2 From Parameter Ranges to Point Estimates
Next, a range of possible c-l combinations can be estimated. To see this, it is useful to recall the
discussion in section 2.3.2.3 on how two types of reference dependence can be distinguished when
the shares of bunching from the two sides are known. Bunching from the right at discontinuity i is
b+i
R^i
=

1  i
1  i  i  
P
s 
s
lD
s
i
"
  1

+ i (2.26)
and bunching from the left is
b i
R^i
=

1 

1
1 +
P
s 
s
cD
s
i
"
+ i (2.27)
97
where bi = b
+
i + b
 
i . Now the full range of parameter combinations consistent with equation
(2.25) can be estimated by varying the bunching shares from each side between their minimum and
maximum possible values. Denoting i the share of excess mass originating from the right, this share
ranges between a minimum ^i and 1. The minimum right bunching share ^i is given by the fraction
of bunching that would persist of workers only bunch due to the budget constraint kink. Appendix
2.A.5 provides for further details of the implementation of this and the other estimation strategies.
Figure 2.7 plots all possible combinations of sc and 
s
l for each statutury age type, obtained from a
simulation where the bunching share from the right at each discontinuity is gradually moved from
its minimum to 1 as described above. The negative slope of the relationship illustrates the intuition
that the two types of reference dependence are substitutes in terms of rationalizing observed excess
mass. However, the simulated ranges are wide, including large positive values of NRAc , and negative
values of FRAl , which indicates the need for further narrowing down the parameter estimates.
In order to make progress and obtain point estimates of both sc and 
s
l , i.e. to quantify the
relative importance of reference dependence in consumption and leisure, empirical estimates of i
are needed. Under some additional assumptions, the empirical density around thresholds can be
used to this avail. To illustrate the idea, gure 2.8 plots pooled distributions around the dierent
statutory age types, omitting the bunching region. There seems to be some \missing" density to
the left of the ERA, and a clear drop in the density to the right of the NRA, while the situation
is less clear around the FRA. As a rst attempt to use this information, column (3) of table 2.A2
presents parameter estimates under an ad-hoc assumption based on this visual inspection, where all
reference point bunching is assumed to be due to sc at the ERA and FRA and due to 
s
l at the NRA.
Results remain highly signicant and suggest that this combination of dierent types of reference
dependence produces tighter bounds on the underlying parameters than previous specications.
Finally, bunching shares from both sides can be computed based on empirical estimates of the
corresponding density shifts. Intuitively, the counterfactual density is assumed to be continuous
around the threshold, and the relative number of bunchers from the left and from the right is inferred
from the vertical dierence between the counterfactual density and the one actually observed on
both sides of the threshold. In addition, an augmented method measures the horizontal density
shift on both sides, taking into account that observed vertical shifts may be confounded by dierent
gradients of the density. In general, this estimation requires a stronger assumption about the true
relative density shifts being reasonably well approximated by locally observed relative shifts.
Panel A of table 2.2 shows estimates of relative bunching from the two sides and appendix table
2.A1 presents additional robustness checks. Between 64% and 87% of ERA bunching is estimated
to originate from the left, and with 80% to 99% a large majority of NRA bunching is from the right.
56% to 68% of FRA bunching originates from the right. Taking into account the density gradient
seems to make little dierence to the estimated shares. Columns (4) and (5) of table 2.A2 present
parameter estimates based on these estimates. ERAc remains at a magnitude between 3 and 4,
indicating that reference dependence in consumption is the most important source of bunching at
the ERA. Conversely, most bunching at the NRA seems to be due to reference dependence in leisure
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as NRAl is virtually the same as its upper bound of 0.38. Bunching at the FRA, on the other hand,
seems to be driven by a mixture of the two types of reference dependence. The labeled dots in
gure 2.7 mark the parameter combinations selected by the bunching share estimation, conrming
that the estimation successfully bounds parameters in a narrower, positive range.
Overall, the estimated utility parameters are large in magnitude. For instance, ERAc = 4 implies
that marginal utility from consumption just before the ERA is ve times larger than just after the
ERA. The sl have an additional, natural interpretation: The estimated magnitudes correspond to
the increase in the implicit tax rate at the kink that would produce the same amount of bunching.
For example, NRAl = 0:38 corresponds to the eect of a 38 percentage point kink at the NRA.
Moreover, there are interesting dierences in the role of reference dependence in consumption
and leisure at dierent types of statutory ages. The estimation suggests that loss aversion in
lifetime consumption plays an important role at the earlier statutory ages, which induces workers
to postpone retirement until the ERA in particular. The FRA seems to set expectations regarding
both consumption and lifetime leisure, implying bunching from both sides. Bunching at the NRA,
on the other hand, is mostly due to strongly increased disutility from postponing retirement beyond
this age.
2.4.3.3 Implications and Counterfactual Simulations
In contrast to round numbers, statutory ages are framed by policy and they can be used for potential
pension reforms. This section rst uses the structural estimates as the basis for some metrics to
illustrate the magnitude of responses to statutory ages, and then simulates the eects of a range of
counterfactual assumptions on parameters and policy variables.
Metrics Related to Bunching. First, table 2.2, panel B presents some metrics implied by the
structural estimates. The gures are based on the preferred specication using gradient-corrected
left/right bunching share estimates. The implied retirement age responses are large: the right
marginal buncher moves their retirement date forward by around 5 months at the ERA, 11 months
at the FRA and 29 months at the FRA. However, the ERA and FRA also induce some individuals
to postpone retirement by between 9 and 10 months. These responses imply substantial changes
in lifetime consumption. Workers moving retirement forward towards statutory ages incur lifetime
consumption losses of around e5000 at the ERA, e11,000 at the FRA and e37,000 at the NRA.
These correspond to 0.5%, 1% and 3.6% of estimated lifetime consumption of the aected workers,
respectively. Consumption gains of workers postponing retirement towards the ERA and FRA
are between e12,500 and e14,000 or just above 1% of lifetime consumption. Finally, hypothetical
nancial incentives that would imply the same bunching responses are very large. Kink sizes
between 2 and 3.6, i.e. changes in the implicit net-of-tax rates of at least 200%, would be necessary
to induce spikes in retirement similar to the ones observed at statutory ages.
Financial Incentives vs. Reference Dependence. In terms of counterfactual simulation,
a natural rst question may be how much bunching at statutory age retirements would prevail in
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the absence of reference points. Panel A of table 2.3 shows results from a simulation of the job
exit age distribution under this assumption. Column (1) reports the actually observed fraction
of job exits and average excess mass at discontinuities, while column (2) shows simulated gures
based on the structural estimates. Over the entire sample period, 29% of workers actually retire
at statutory ages. In the counterfactual scenario with sc and 
s
l set to zero, this fraction is
estimated to decrease to only 6 percentage points. Hence, the estimation attributes around 80% of
actual retirements at statutory ages to reference dependence. The average excess mass across all
discontinuities is predicted to decrease even more dramatically from 19.2 to 0.99. This sharp drop
is partly a consequence of the simulation predicting negative excess mass (holes) in the job exit age
distribution at non-convex kinks. When attention is restricted only to convex statutory age kinks,
the average excess mass is predicted to decrease from 14.7 to between 1.71. In addition, columns
(3) and (4) show results from analogous simulations based on the lower bound and the upper bound
of the reduced-form elasticity estimates, respectively. The fraction of retirements at statutory ages
is estimated to decrease to between 5 and 10 percentage points. In other words, at most 35% of
statutory age retirements are attributed to nancial incentives. Figure 2.9, panel A shows a graph
of the simulated job exit age distribution under the central scenario. As expected, the spikes at
the main statutory ages are greatly reduced in magnitude. Moreover, the graph illustrates the
predicted un-bunching patterns based on the estimated bunching shares from each side. There is a
visible upward shift in the density below age 60, and even more strongly, at job exit ages above 65.
Appendix table 2.A3 relaxes the assumption that all additional eects at statutory ages can be
attributed to reference dependence. In particular, it allows for the possibility that rms make use of
mandatory retirement clauses linked to NRA to lay o older workers. In column (2), a mandatory
retirement eect is introduced by assuming that the NRA is viewed by workers as a reference point
equally to the FRA, and the remaining bunching at the NRA is attributed to mandatory retirement.
Allowing for this eect in combination with nancial incentives for workers increases the explained
share of statutory age job exits to 26%. Column (3) aims at estimating a lower bound on the role
of reference points by making the extreme assumption that all bunching at NRAs is driven by rm
responses. In combination with worker incentives, this would explain 57% of all statutory age job
exits, leaving a lower bound of 43% of job exits attributed to reference dependence.
Policy Reforms. Finally, the parameter estimates can be used to simulate the eects of
counterfactual policy scenarios. In particular, I focus on two policies that represent realistic options
for pension reform. The rst reform increases the NRA from 65 to 66, keeping incentives around
the NRA constant. The second reform increases rewards for late retirement from the current level
of 6%, keeping the NRA at 65. Panel B of gure 2.9 and panel B of table 2.3 summarize the eects.
Under the NRA increase, there is un-bunching of the spike at 65, and since most NRA bunching
is from the right, the previous bunchers are dispersed mainly above age 65. A large job exit spike
emerges at the new NRA of 66. Actual retirement ages increase by around 4 months, and the
increase among individuals who retire at 65 and above is 11 months. In the second scenario, the
increase in late retirement rewards is calibrated to match the eect on the average retirement age in
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the rst scenario. In order to get the same eect, an increase in rewards by 75% (from currently 6%
p.a. to 10.5% p.a.) would be needed. In the graph, providing more incentives for late retirement
leads to a decrease in the excess mass at the NRA by more than half, and the previous bunchers
disperse along the density above age 65.
Hence, both types of policies could achieve an increase in actual retirement ages above the NRA.
However, the predicted scal impact of the two scenarios is very dierent. The NRA increase has
a simulated net scal eect of +e731m per year. This is due to the additional contributions of
workers who postpone retirement, countered only by a small increase in pension liabilities since no
additional pension adjustment has been introduced. On the contrary, the scal eect of increased
rewards is negative at -e206m. Workers also contribute longer in this scenario, but this is more
than oset by the large increase in pensions necessary to induce them to postpone retirement.
These results highlight the potential eectiveness of using statutory age thresholds as a policy tool.
If the government wants to increase average retirement ages to improve the scal balance of the
system, increasing statutory ages may be an attractive policy option.
Welfare Eects of Policy Reforms. Whereas simulating the scal impact of reforms is
relatively straightforward, an important but trickier issue is how to calculate a welfare eect beyond
purely scal considerations. One reason why it is not obvious how to calculate welfare in the
presence of reference dependence is because such an evaluation requires taking a stance on the
extent to which workers actually experience reference point eects. Write workers' experienced
utility as
U = u(C)  v(R;n)  !
h
1(C  C^)  c(C^   C) + 1(R  R^)  el(R  R^)i (2.28)
where ! 2 [0; 1] is the weight on the reference dependence component of the utility function.
The distinction between decision utility and experienced utility is that according to the model in
section 2.4.1, decision utility is as if ! = 1 in the equation above. Hence, workers' decisions fully
take account of reference points, but they may experience actual utility eects from deviating from
reference points fully, partially, or not at all. In terms of experienced utility, there are two polar
cases. ! = 0 represents the case where reference point eects are a pure bias and workers only
experience standard disutility from work and utility from consumption. On the other hand, ! = 1
is the case where workers fully experience reference point eects, too. Based on these extreme
cases, bounds on welfare eects can be computed.
Panel B of 2.3 shows welfare eects of the simulated reforms. Total welfare is calculated based
on equation (2.28) as the sum of workers' utility from consumption, their disutility from work,
the utility component related to reference dependence weighted by !, and the net scal eect
is added.15 Worker consumption increases under both scenarios due to the increase in lifetime
earnings when postponing retirement. The eect of the increase in nancial rewards of around
15An implicit assumption behind the calculation is that worker consumption and government revenue carry the
same marginal value.
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+e1567m in net present value terms is much larger than the +e630m from the NRA increase
since workers additionally receive higher pensions under the second reform. Worker welfare, which
includes consumption, labor supply and reference point eects, hardly changes under the NRA
increase. Moreover, the eect does seem to depend much on the assumption about !. Intuitively,
most workers do not deviate from the reference point both before and after the reform, so the
assumption on how much they experience a utility cost of such deviations is not crucial. The
increase in nancial rewards, on the other hand, has large eect on worker welfare. It increases by
e804m under ! = 1, and by e1262m under ! = 0. The dierence between the two cases arises
because many workers move away from the NRA with stronger nancial incentives, and when a
positive weight is placed on these reference point eects this causes utility cost. The increase in
total welfare is around e800m under the NRA increase, regardless of the assumption on !. The
larger nancial rewards, on the other hand, increase total welfare by e598m if ! = 1 and by
e1056m if ! = 0.16 Hence, the NRA increase has larger positive eects on welfare if workers fully
experience reference point eects, but the increase in nancial rewards is more benecial if workers
do not experience reference point eects. The results illustrate that the assumptions made on the
utility function are crucial for evaluating welfare.
2.5 Conclusion
A growing literature uses bunching methods to identify responses to local changes in tax rates
and other extrinsic variables. At the same time, the notion of reference dependence has been
gaining support with recent empirical evidence from several domains. This chapter aims at linking
the two literatures by using bunching methods to quantify reference-dependent preferences. Two
empirical applications illustrate the idea. First, bunching at round retirement ages is estimated as
an example of pure reference points. Second, responses at statutory retirement ages are estimated,
where economic incentives and potential reference points coincide. This context is also used to
illustrate how dierent types of reference dependence can be potentially distinguished.
The arguments presented in this chapter have implications for the bunching literature. First,
reference points may be an important confounder of the eect of economic incentives. For instance,
if one were to estimate labor supply elasticities from bunching at statutory retirement ages, this
would vastly exaggerate the responsiveness of retirement decisions to nancial incentives. However,
the methods proposed in this chapter point towards a solution to this problem. When bunching
is observed at multiple thresholds that vary in the nancial incentive and/or the presence of refer-
ence points, the \true" labor supply elasticity can be jointly estimated with reference dependence
parameters. A second implication is that bunching methods can be used to quantify objects other
than responses to extrinsic incentives. If the goal is to identify reference points, detecting bunching
at such a threshold provides compelling, prima facie evidence of reference dependence and may be
an alternative to other identication strategies requiring stronger assumptions. More generally, the
16The fact that both reforms have positive welfare eects is due to the fact that workers retire ineciently early
to begin with, since the pension system generally entails an implicit net-of-tax rate of less than 1.
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concept of reference dependence used in this chapter can be extended to other non-nancial factors
that change discontinuously at some value of the running variable.
Two limitations of the approach may be worth pointing out. First, the methods are designed
to quantify a reference point at a given location. This chapter is silent about why a reference point
emerges, or how it may evolve endogenously. Second, a key assumption for bunching estimation is
that the counterfactual density would be smooth in the absence of a budget constraint discontinuity
or a reference point. This obviously excludes other sources of bunching such as rm responses, but
it also calls for some caution in dening what is included in the notion of a reference point. For
instance, in the case of statutory retirement ages, they may serve as an \intrinsic" reference point,
but part of the reference point character may be an \extrinsic" social norm in favor of retiring at
these ages. Hence, reference point eects may subsume several factors and it may be challenging
to further disentangle these.
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Figure 2.1: Bunching at a Budget Set Kink
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Note: This gure shows an indierence curve diagram and a density diagram on bunching responses to a budget set kink. In
the upper panel, the blue line is the post-kink budget set, whereas the dashed grey line is the pre-kink budget set. The dotted
curve is an indierence curve of an individual with ability n^ who chooses z^ before and after the change. The solid curves are
indierence curves of the marginal buncher with ability n who is tangent to the old budget set at z and tangent to the upper
part of the new budget set at z^. In the lower panel, the solid blue line denotes the post-kink density, whereas the dotted line
denotes the pre-kink density. The blue shaded area is the initial location of the mass of workers bunching in response to the
kink.
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Figure 2.2: Reference-Dependent Preferences
Panel A: Kink in Utility from Consumption
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Figure 2.2 continued
Panel C: One-Sided Utility Notch
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Panel D: Two-Sided Utility Notch
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Note: This gure illustrates the eect of dierent types of reference-dependent preferences on the utility function (left panels)
and indierence curves (right panels). \Pre" and \post" denote the situations before and after the introduction of the reference
point, respectively. Panel A shows that a kink in utility from consumption according to equation (2.5) induces an increase in
marginal utility from consumption below c^ and a kink in indierence curves at the threshold in the z   c space, reecting the
discontinuous change in the marginal rate of substitution. Panel B illustrates the eect of a kink in disutility from work as in
equation (2.6). Disutility from earning taxable income is steeper above the reference point z^, and indierence curves exhibit
a kink at the threshold. Panel C shows that the one-sided utility notch from equation (2.7) implies an upward jump in the
level of utility at the reference point z^, and a downward jump in indierence curves at z^ since less consumption is needed to
compensate the individual once z^ is crossed. Panel D illustrates the two-sided utility notch from equation (2.8), where the
individual derives higher utility only exactly at the reference point. Hence, indierence curves include a point below the curve
at z^ since the individual is indierent between a lower level of consumption at z^ and any point on the curve.
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Figure 2.3: Bunching with Utility Kinks
Left Panel: Right Panel:
Kink in Utility from Consumption Kink in Disutility from Work
zz z^
c
c(z^)
type n^type n
zz^ z
c
type n^
type n
zz^z
h(z)
bunching
mass
pre
post
bunching
zz^ z
h(z)
bunching
mass
pre
post
bunching
Note: This gure shows bunching responses to a kink in utility from consumption (left panel) and to a kink in disutility from
work (right panel) in an indierence curve diagram. In the top diagram of the left panel, the dashed grey curves are the pre-
reference point indierence curves of the marginal buncher with ability n, whereas the solid red curves are her post-reference
point indierence curves. The dotted curves are indierence curves pre-ref. (grey) and post-ref. (red) of an individual with
ability n^ who retires at z^ before and after the change. The marginal buncher is tangent at z in the absence of the reference
point, and tangent at z^ with the reference point. In the top diagram of the right panel, the dashed grey curves are the pre-ref.
indierence curves of the marginal buncher with ability n, whereas the solid red curves are her post-ref. indierence curves.
The dotted curves are indierence curves pre-ref. (grey) and post-ref. (red) of an individual with ability n^ who retires at z^
before and after the change. The marginal buncher is tangent at z in the absence of the reference point, and tangent at z^ with
the reference point. In both of the bottom diagrams, the solid red line denotes the post-ref. density, whereas the dotted line
denotes the pre-ref. density. The red shaded area is the initial location of the mass of workers bunching in response to the kink.
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Figure 2.4: Bunching with Utility Notches
Left Panel: Right Panel:
One-Sided Utility Notch Two-Sided Utility Notch
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Note: This gure shows bunching responses to a one-sided utility notch (left panel) and to a two-sided utility notch (right panel)
in an indierence curve diagram. In the top diagram of the left panel, the dashed grey curves are the pre-kink indierence
curves of the marginal buncher with ability n, whereas the solid red curves are her post-kink indierence curves. The dotted
curves are indierence curves pre-kink (grey) and post-kink (red) of an individual with ability n^ who chooses z^ before and after
the change. The marginal buncher is tangent at z in the absence of the reference point and becomes indierent between z
and z^ with the reference point. In the top diagram of the right panel, the solid curves are the pre-kink indierence curves of
the lower marginal buncher with ability n  and the upper marginal buncher with ability n

+. Post-kink, the red dots become
parts of the indierence sets to which they are connected with the dashed lines. The dotted curves is an indierence curves of
an individual with ability n^ who chooses z^ before and after the change. The lower (upper) marginal bunchers is tangent at z 
(z+) in the absence of the reference point and becomes indierent between z
 (z+) and z^ with the reference point. In both of
the bottom diagrams, the solid red line denotes the post-notch density, whereas the dotted line denotes the pre-notch density.
The red shaded area is the initial location of the mass of workers bunching in response to the notch.
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Figure 2.5: Bunching when Reference Points Coincide with Economic Incentives
Left Panel: Right Panel:
Kink in Utility from Consumption Kink in Disutility from Work
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Note: This gure shows bunching responses to a kink in utility from consumption (left panel) and to a kink in disutility from
work (right panel) in combination with a budget set kink. In the top diagram of the left panel, the blue line is the kinked
budget set, whereas the dashed grey line is the initial budget set. The dashed grey curves are the initial indierence curves of
the lower marginal buncher with ability n  without the reference point, whereas the solid red curves are her indierence curves
with the reference point. The lower marginal buncher is tangent at z  in the absence of the reference point and the budget set
kink, and tangent at z^ with the reference point and the budget set kink. The solid black curves are indierence curves of the
upper marginal buncher who is tangent to the initial budget set at z+ and tangent to the kinked budget set at z^. In the top
diagram of the right panel, the blue line is the kinked budget set, whereas the dashed grey line is the initial budget set. The
dashed grey curves are the indierence curves of the marginal buncher with ability n without the reference point, whereas the
solid red curves are her indierence curves with the reference point. The marginal buncher is tangent at z in the absence of
the reference point and the budget set kink, and tangent at z^ with the reference point and the budget set kink. In both of the
bottom diagrams, the solid blue line denotes the post-kinks density, whereas the dotted line denotes the pre-kinks density. In
the bottom left diagram, the red shaded is the initial mass of workers bunching from below, and the blue shaded area is the
initial location of the mass of workers bunching from above. In the bottom right diagram, the red-and-blue shaded area is the
initial location of the mass of workers bunching in response to the combined threshold.
109
Figure 2.6: Bunching at Round Retirement Ages
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Panel B: Age 61
b=0.89 (0.01)
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Panel B: Age 62
b=1.12 (0.01)
λl=0.067 (0.001)
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Note: This gure shows bunching at round retirement ages. Panel A shows the full distribution of retirement ages for workers
born between 1933 and 1948, corresponding to chapter 1, gure 1.1. Note that the large spikes at ages 60, 63 and 65 correspond
to the main statutory retirement ages. Panels B to D zoom into the distribution around other round ages, namely 61, 62 and
64. The connected black dots show counts of job exit ages in monthly bins. In panels B to D, the red curve is the counterfactual
distribution estimated as a 7th-order polynomial. Vertical red lines indicate the location of the round age where bunching is
estimated. b is the excess mass and l is the implied parameter capturing the strength of reference dependence in labor supply
estimated according to equation (2.23). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parantheses.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 2.7: Structural Parameter Estimates from Statutory Retirement Ages
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Note: This gure shows a range of estimated combinations of the parameters sc and 
s
l for each statutory age type. The
solid line in each panel shows the full range of possible combinations obtained from a simulation moving the share of bunching
from the left at each discontinuity from 0 to its maximum in one-percentage point steps as described in appendix 2.A.5.2. The
labeled dots mark parameter combinations corresponding to the estimated bunching shares based on the dierent methods and
estimation windows shown in appendix table 2.A1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 2.8: Empirical Density around Statutory Retirement Ages
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Note: The connected black dots show the pooled density around all Early Retirement Ages (panel A), Full Retirement Ages
(panel B), and Normal Retirement Ages (panel C), each excluding the threshold +/- 1 month.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 2.9: Counterfactual Simulations
Panel A: Workers only respond to nancial incentives
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Note: The black connected dots show the actual distribution of job exit ages for all workers born between 1933 and 1948. The
red connected dots show the distribution of job exits among the same workers, simulated under a counterfactual scenario with
no reference point eects (sc = 
s
l = 0 8s) and the central elasticity estimate " = 0:15. Bunching at each discontinuity is
simulated based on equation (2.25) and the remaining bunching mass is distributed over the remaining density according to
the estimated bunching shares from the two sides.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Figure 2.8: Counterfactual Simulations (continued)
Panel B: Policy counterfactuals
Policy 1: NRA increase to 66
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Policy 2: Increase in late retirement rewards
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Note: The black connected dots show the actual distribution of job exit ages for all workers born in 1946. The dotted vertical
line indicates the actual NRA of 65. The red connected dots show the distribution of job exits among the same workers,
simulated under a counterfactual scenario with an increase in the NRA from 65 to 66 (panel A), and an increase in nancial
rewards for late retirement (panel B).
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 2.1: Parameter Estimates at Round Retirement Ages
(1) (2) (3)
61 years 62 years 64 years
b 0.61*** 0.89*** 1.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
l 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.067***
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001)
Equivalent 1  0.11 0.15 0.17
Observations 1,472,040 1,049,232 890,454
Note: This table shows estimates from round-number bunching at retirement ages 61, 62 and 64, corresponding to the bunching
graphs in gure 2.6. The rst row shows the excess mass b at each round age. In the second row, l is the implied kink in
disutility from work estimated according to equation (2.23). The third row shows the size of the budget kink that would induce
the same response as the estimated reference point. The latter relies on the equivalence between a kink in disutility from work
and a budget set kink discussed in section 2.2.3.2. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. \Observations" refers to
the number of individuals included in the bunching estimation sample at each threshold.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 2.2: Parameter Estimates at Statutory Ages and Some Implications
Panel A: Parameter estimates
Elasticity " 0.15*** [0.13,0.17]
(1) (2) (3)
ERA FRA NRA
c 3.15*** 4.48*** 0.48***
[1.87,6.34] [2.27,10.00] [0.12,1.00]
l 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.38***
[0.049,0.12] [0.0035,0.079] [0.38,0.45]
Panel B: Implied bunching responses
(1) (2) (3)
ERA FRA NRA
Left bunching share  0.64 0.47 0.058
R+ (months) -4.74 -10.94 -29.46
R  (months) 9.02 9.67 2.32
C+ (Euros) -4,932 -10,983 -36,662
C+
C -0.53% -1.04% -3.58%
C  (Euros) 13,916 12,468 1,879
C 
C 1.31% 1.25% 0.17%
Discontinuities 117 257 93
Note: Panel A of this table shows parameter estimates resulting from a non-linear least squares estimation of the structural
equation (2.25), using the bunching sample. The estimates shown here are from the preferred specication using gradient-
corrected density shares. Appendix table 2.A2 presents full results from the structural estimation. Panel B shows metrics
related to bunching responses, based on results from the structural estimation. Left bunching share is the estimated fraction of
bunching originating from the left. R+ and R  is the change in the retirement of the right marginal buncher and the left
marginal buncher, respectively. C+ and C  is the change in consumption implied by the right marginal bunching response
and the left marginal bunching response, respectively, calculated in 2012 Euros. C
+
C
and C
 
C
is the change in consumption
implied by the right marginal bunching response and the left marginal bunching response, as a fraction of estimated total
lifetime consumption. All gures calculated at each statutory age discontinuity, the table shows weighted averages across
discontinuities.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 2.3: Counterfactual Simulations
Panel A: Workers respond only to incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
actual counterfactuals
" = 0:15 " = 0:09 "g = 0:29
Percentage of job exits at statutory ages 29.0 6.04 4.92 10.1
% explained (of actual) 20.8% 17.0% 34.8%
Average excess mass
at all discontinuities 19.2 0.99 0.48 2.00
% explained (of actual) 5.16% 2.50% 10.43%
at all statutory age kinks 21.8 0.65 0.27 1.81
% explained (of actual) 2.98% 1.24% 8.29%
Average job exit age 60.84 60.77
change (months) -0.9
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Table 2.3 continued
Panel B: Policy counterfactuals
(1) (2) (3)
actual counterfactuals
Policy NRA increase increase in rewards
from 65 to 66 for late retirement
from 6% to 10.5%
Average job exit age (65 and above) 65.0 65.9 65.9
change +11 +11
Average job exit age (60 and above) 62.8 63.1 63.0
change (months) +4 +3
Excess mass at NRA 28.5 23.1 12.4
change -5.4 -16.1
Net scal eect (NPV) +e731m -e206m
contributions collected +e301m +e301m
benets paid -e433m +e504m
Worker consumption (NPV) +e630m +e1567m
Worker welfare (NPV equivalent)
! = 1 +e66m +e804m
! = 0 +e62m +e1262m
Total welfare (NPV equivalent)
! = 1 +e797m +e598m
! = 0 +e793m +e1056m
Note: This table shows results from a simulation of bunching at budget constraint discontinuities in the absence of statutory
age eects. Panel A assumes that the only source of bunching at statutory ages are nancial incentives for workers. Column
(1) shows the actually observed percentage of job exits at statutory ages and average excess mass. Columns (2) and (3) show
gures from simulating bunching, using the elasticity estimates from columns (2) and (3) of table (1.7), respectively. Panel B
shows results from a simulation of two counterfactual policies: an increase in the NRA from 65 to 66 (column 1) and an increase
in rewards for late retirement (column 2). The size of rewards in column (2) is calibrated to match the eect on the average
job exit age in column (1). All excess mass statistics weighted by group size.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Appendix Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.A1: Bunching when Utility Notches Coincide with Economic Incentives
Left Panel: Right Panel:
One-Sided Utility Notch Two-Sided Utility Notch
zz^z  z+
c
type n+
type n 
slope 1  
slope 1    
zz^z  z+ z+
C
type n 
type n+
slope 1  
slope 1    
zz^z  z+
h(z)
bunching mass
hole
pre
post
bunching
zz^z  z+ z+
h(z)
bunching mass
hole
pre
post
bunching
Note: This gure shows bunching at a one-sided utility notch (left panel) and at a two-sided utility notch (right panel) in
combination with a budget set kink. In both top diagrams, the blue line is the kinked budget set, whereas the dashed grey line
is the initial budget set. The solid red curves are the pre-notch indierence curves of the lower marginal buncher with ability
n  and the upper marginal buncher with ability n

+. Post-notch, the red dots become parts of the indierence sets to which
they are connected with the dashed lines. The lower marginal buncher is indierent between z  and z^ with the reference point
and the budget set kink. The upper marginal buncher is tangent at z+ in the absence of the budget set kink, and tangent at
z+ with the budget set kink, where she is indierent between this point and z^ due to the reference point eect. In the top right
diagram, the solid red curves are the pre-notch indierence curves of the lower marginal buncher with ability n  and the upper
marginal buncher with ability n+. Post-notch, the red dots become parts of the indierence sets to which they are connected
with the dashed lines. The lower marginal buncher is indierent between z  and z^ with the reference point and the budget set
kink. The upper marginal buncher is tangent at z+ in the absence of the budget set kink, and tangent at z+ with the budget
set kink, where she is indierent between this point and z^ due to the reference point eect. In the bottom diagrams, the solid
blue line denotes the pre density, whereas the dotted line denotes the post density. In the bottom left, the red shaded is the
initial mass of workers bunching from below, and the blue area is the initial mass bunching from above. In the bottom right,
the red shaded is the origin of bunching from below, and the red and blue area is the origin of bunching from above.
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Figure 2.A2: Theoretical Bunching at a Statutory Retirement Age
RR^R
  R+
C
C(R^)
type n+
type n 
slope w(1  )
slope w(1    )
RR^R
  R+
h(R)
bunching mass
pre-ref./kink
post-ref./kink
bunching
Note: This gure shows bunching responses to a threshold combining a budget set kink, a kink in utility from consumption and
a kink in disutility from work in an indierence curve diagram (upper panel) and a density diagram (lower panel). In the upper
panel, the blue line is the kinked budget set, whereas the dashed grey line is the initial budget set. The dashed grey curves
to the left of R^ are the initial indierence curves of the lower marginal buncher with ability n  without the reference point,
whereas the solid red curves are her indierence curves with the reference point. The lower marginal buncher is tangent at R 
in the absence of the reference point and the budget set kink, and tangent at R^ with the reference point and the budget set
kink. The dashed grey curves to the right of R^ are the initial indierence curves of the upper marginal buncher with ability n+,
whereas the solid red curves are her indierence curves with the budget set kink and the reference point. The upper marginal
buncher is tangent at R+ in the absence of the reference point and the budget set kink, and tangent at R^ with the reference
point and the budget set kink. In the lower panel, the solid blue line denotes the post-ref./kink density, whereas the dotted
line denotes the pre-ref./kink density. The red shaded area is the initial location of the mass of workers bunching from the left
in response to the kink in utility from consumption, while the blue and red shaded area is the initial location of the mass of
workers bunching from the right in response to the budget set kink and the kink in disutility from work.
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Table 2.A1: Estimated Bunching Shares from the Left vs. Right at Statutory Ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Basic Estimation Gradient-Corrected Estimation
Window 12 months 24 months 36 months 12 months 24 months 36 months
mERA  0.71 0.81 0.87 0.64 0.75 0.81
(0.21) (0.26) (0.27) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32)
mFRA  0.38 0.33 0.32 0.47 0.45 0.44
(0.25) (0.34) (0.37) (0.41) (0.44) (0.46)
mNRA  0.20 0.054 0.0085 0.058 0.024 0.015
(0.12) (0.078) (0.036) (0.16) (0.13) (0.10)
Discont. 386 386 386 386 386 386
Note: This table shows bunching shares from the left vs. the right of statutory age thresholds based estimated based on the
relative density on both sides. mstat  denotes the share of missing density from the left out of total bunching at statutory type
stat. Missing density is computed as described in appendix 2.A.5.2. Each column shows averages across all discontinuities of
the respective type, with standard deviations in parantheses. All statistics weighted by group size.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 2.A2: Full Set of Structural Estimates from Statutory Ages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
parameter upper bounds upper bounds ad-hoc comb. basic gradient-corrected
on c on l of upper bounds density shares density shares
" 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
[0.14,0.17] [0.14,0.17] [0.14,0.17] [0.13,0.17] [0.13,0.17]
cERA 4.75*** 4.79*** 4.36*** 3.15***
[3.18,7.49] [3.19,7.73] [2.82,7.69] [1.87,6.34]
cFRA 57.16*** 41.72*** 2.28*** 4.48***
[18.99,216.58] [12.47,125.76] [1.56,3.54] [2.27,10.00]
cNRA 437,346*** 3.28*** 0.48***
[7649,7.76e+09] [1.94,5.76] [0.12,1.00]
lERA 0.15*** 0.099*** 0.083***
[0.14,0.16] [0.062,0.13] [0.049,0.12]
lFRA 0.077*** 0.068* 0.077***
[0.0035,0.079] [-0.0036,0.073] [0.0035,0.079]
lNRA 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38***
[0.38,0.45] [0.38,0.45] [0.38,0.45] [0.38,0.45]
Obs. (discontinuities) 644 644 644 644 644
Note: This table shows results from a non-linear least squares estimation of the structural equation (2.25). The estimation
proceeds in two steps: First, estimation is run on the subsample of pure nancial incentive discontinuities, thus obtaining
an estimate of ". Second, the remaining coecients are estimated using the full sample. Appendix 2.A.5 provides further
details on estimation equations. The specication in column (1) estimates upper bounds on sc by assuming that all 
s
l = 0.
Conversely, column (2) estimates upper bounds on sl by assuming that 
s
c = 0. Columns (3) estimates an ad-hoc combination
by assuming that NRAc = 0 and 
ERA
l = 
FRA
l = 0. Estimates in columns (4) and (5) are based on observed density shares
on both sides of the threshold as described in appendix 2.A.5.2. Bootstrapped 95% condence intervals are shown in square
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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Table 2.A3: Counterfactual Bunching Simulations: Robustness
Allowing for some mandatory retirement
(1) (2) (3)
actual counterfactual
NRAl = 
FRA
l all NRA due
to mandatory
Percentage of job exits at statutory ages 29.0 7.41 16.6
% explained (of actual) 25.6% 57.2%
Average excess mass
at all discontinuities 19.2 1.73 12.7
% explained (of actual) 9.01% 66.1%
at all statutory age kinks 21.8 1.51 14.3
% explained (of actual) 6.93% 65.6%
at convex statutory age kinks 14.7 1.83 2.24
% explained (of actual) 12.4% 15.2%
Note: This table shows results from an analogous exercise to panel A of table 2.3, assuming that the only sources of bunching
at statutory ages are nancial incentives for workers and rms using the NRA to lay o some workers. Column (2) is based on
a restricted specication where NRAl = 
FRA
l and the remaining eect of the NRA is attributed to rm responses. In column
(3), the entire eect of the NRA is attributed to rm responses. All statistics weighted by group size.
Data source: FDZ-RV - Themenle SUFRTZN1992-2014XVSBB Seibold
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2.A.2 Reference Dependence and Economic Incentives: The Case
of Utility Notches
2.A.2.1 One-Sided Utility Notch
Suppose that utility is reference-dependent according to equation (2.7). The left panels of appendix
gure 2.A1 illustrates the joint eect of the utility notch and the budget set kink. The individual
initially located to the left of the threshold at z  is now indierent between z  and z^. At the
same time, the individual initially tangent at z+ to the right of the threshold is now tangent at z^.
These two individuals are the lower and the upper marginal buncher, respectively, and all workers
initially located between z  and z+ now bunch. Individuals initially to the left of z  do not alter
their choice, but individuals initially to the right of z+ decrease their labor supply in response to
the atter budget line. Hence, bunching at the threshold occurs from both sides, but there is a
density hole only to the left of the threshold.
Analogously to equation (2.12), the indierence condition for the lower marginal buncher U^  =
UI  implies
1
1 + "
z 
z^
+
"
1 + "

z 
z^
  1
"
= 1 +

c(z^)
For the upper marginal buncher, bunching is analogous to equation (2.3). The two tangency
conditions z+ = n+(1  )" and z^ = n+(1    )" imply
z+
z^
=

1  
1    
"
Hence, bunching has two additive components in this case. All bunching due to the reference point
character of the threshold is from below, occurs independently of the size of the budget set kink,
and follows the standard utility notch bunching formula (2.12). On the other hand, all bunching
due to the budget set kink occurs from above, is independent of the strength of the reference point,
and follows the standard budget set kink bunching formula (2.3).
2.A.2.2 Two-Sided Utility Notch
Suppose nally that utility is reference-dependent according to equation (2.8). The right panels of
appendix gure 2.A1 illustrates the joint eect of the utility notch and the budget set kink. The
individual initially located to the left of the threshold at z  is now indierent between z  and z^.
This individual is the lower marginal buncher. To the right of the threshold, the individual whose
indierence curve is initially tangent to the budget set with slope 1    at z+ is now indierent
between the point of tangency to the new budget set with slope 1     at z+ and the threshold
z^. This worker is the upper marginal buncher. Thus, bunching occurs from both sides, with a hole
in the density between z  and z+.
Analogously to equation (2.12), the indierence condition for the lower marginal buncher U^  =
UI  implies
1
1 + "
z 
z^
+
"
1 + "

z 
z^
  1
"
= 1 +
2
c(z^)
The upper marginal buncher's utility at z+ = n

+(1    )" can be written as
UI+ = z +
1
1 + "
n(1    )1+"
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The indierence condition U^+ = UI+ implies
1
1 + "
z+
z^
+
"
1 + "
z+
z^
  1
"
= 1 +
2
c(z^)
1  
1     (2.29)
However, z+=z^ relates to the additional density shift due to the utility notch, given that there is a
budget set kink. In order to capture the entire density shift due to the joint eect, the tangency
condition z+ = n+(1  )" can be combined with the tangency condition at z+ to yield
z+
z+
=

1  
1    
"
and plugging this into the above indierence condition yields
1
1 + "
z+
z^

1  
1    
 "
+
"
1 + "
 
z+
z^

1  
1    
 "!  1"
= 1 +
2
c(z^)
1  
1     (2.30)
Hence, while bunching from the left occurs only due to the utility notch and is independent of the
budget set kink, bunching from the right is due to a combined eect of the two. Compared to the
standard utility notch bunching result from equation (2.12), the budget set kink has two additional
eects on bunching in equation (2.30). First, the dominated region to the right of the reference
point is extended by the budget set kink:
lim
"!0+
z+
z^
= 1 +
2
c(z^)
1  
1    
Intuitively, the lower net-of-tax rate to the right makes the reference point more attractive to
workers initially located to the right of it, since the consumption gain from any deviation to the
right is now smaller. Second, the budget set kink causes a density shift to the left, moving additional
workers into the region where they bunch due to the utility notch. This can be seen in equation
(2.30) where any occurrence of z+=z^ on the left-hand side is scaled down by the inverse kink size,
implying that z+=z^ must have a larger value to satisfy the equation.
Algebraically, there is no straightforward relationship between an upper marginal buncher de-
scribed by equation (2.3) and the one in (2.30), so quantifying the additional bunching due to the
two-sided utility notch given an existing budget set kink is less straightforward than in the previ-
ous cases. However, the following argument yields an approximation of the additional bunching:
First, denote by z the marginal buncher at a budget constraint kink of size (1  )=(1    )
described by equation (2.3). For this marginal buncher, U^ = UI and for all other bunchers U^ > UI .
Dene hk(z) the post-kink density. Now introduce a two-sided utility notch at the location of the
kink. After introducing the notch, all workers bunching previously due to the kink still bunch since
U^  UI implies U^ + 2  UI . Suppose the density shift due to the kink has a negligible eect on
the local density to the right of z^, i.e. hk(z)  h0(z^). Then the additional bunching from above due
to the utility notch is the same as bunching from above with a utility notch and a global implicit
net-of-tax rate 1     . This is the case because i) the location of the upper marginal buncher
in the left panel of gure 2.4 only depends on the net-of-tax rate to the right of the kink, and ii)
this implies the same amount of bunching when hk(z)  h0(z^) on [z^; z+].
Hence, total bunching is bunching from below plus bunching from above, where bunching from
above is approximately additive in bunching due to the budget set kink and bunching due to the
utility notch if interior responses due to the kink have a small eect on the local density.
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2.A.3 Approximate Bunching Quantities
2.A.3.1 Budget Set Kink
Bunching can be written as
B = h0(z^)z

where z = z   z^. Rearranging equation (2.3)
b
z^
=

1  
1    
"
  1
where b = B=h0(z^) is the excess mass. When  is small and hence z
 is small, such that
log(z=z^)  z=z^, and log(1    )=(1  ))   =(1  ). Take logs on equation (2.3)
log
z
z^
=  " log

1  
1  

which implies
b
z^
 " 
1   (2.31)
This corresponds to the bunching formula derived by Saez (2010) that holds regardless of the
functional form of utility.
2.A.3.2 Combining a Budget Set Kink and a Reference Point
2.A.3.2.1 Kink in Utility from Consumption
Bunching can be written as
B = h0(z^)(z

+ +z

 )
where z+ = z+   z^ and z  = z^   z+. Combining equations (2.3) and (2.9)
b
z^
=

1  
1    
"
 

1
1 + c
"
When  is small and hence z+ is small,
b
z^
 " 
1   + 1 

1
1 + c
"
(2.32)
When in addition c is small, log(1 + c))  c, and
b
z^
 " 
1   + "c (2.33)
2.A.3.2.2 Kink in Disutility from Work
Bunching can be written as
B = h0(z^)z

or
b
z^
=

1  
1       l
"
  1
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To make bunching (approximately) additively separable in the two components, consider a situation
where +l is small, such that log(z
=z^)  z=z^ where z = z  z^, and log(1 (+l)=(1 
))   ( + l)=(1  ). Then
b
z^
 " 
1   + "
l
1   (2.34)
2.A.3.2.3 One-Sided Utility Notch
Bunching is
B = h0(z^)(z

+ +z

 )
Denote by f("; c(z^)) the solution for
z 
z^ implicitly dened by equation (2.12). Combining with
equation (2.3), total bunching can be written as
b
z^
=

1  
1    
"
  1 + f("; 
c(z^)
) (2.35)
and when  is small,
b
z^
 " 
1   + f(";

c(z^)
) (2.36)
2.A.3.2.4 Two-Sided Utility Notch
Bunching is
B = h0(z^)(z

+ +z

 )
Denote by g("; 2c(z^) ;

1  ) the solution for
z+
z^ implicitly dened by equation (2.30). Combining
with equation (2.12), total bunching can be written as
b
z^
= f(";
2
c(z^)
) + g(";
2
c(z^)
;

1   ) (2.37)
Following the approximation argument made in section 3.2.2, when the density shift due to the
budget set kink is small,
g(";
2
C(z^)
;

1   ) 
z+   z+
z+
+
z+   z^
z^
Denote h("; 2c(z^)  1  ) the implicit solution for z+ z^z^ given by equation (2.29). Bunching is approx-
imately
b
z^


1  
1    
"
  1 + f("; 2
c(z^)
) + h(";
2
c(z^)
 
1   )
When  is small,
b
z^
 " 
1   + f(";
2
c(z^)
) + h(";
2
c(z^)
 
1   ) (2.38)
128
2.A.4 Dynamic vs. Static Models of Retirement
2.A.4.1 A Life-Cycle Model of Retirement
Consider a life-cycle model of consumption for an individual with a xed life span T who makes an
extensive labor supply choice selecting a retirement age R. Assume that period utility is separable
in consumption and leisure and that working at age t causes disutility t. Then lifetime utility at
age zero17 from retiring at R is
U0(R) =
R 1X
t=0
t (u(ct)  t) 
TX
t=R
tu(ct)
where  is the discount factor. The individual's lifetime budget constraint requires that lifetime
consumption equals lifetime earnings, C = Y (R) or
TX
t=0

1
1 + r
t
ct =
R 1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
wt +
TX
t=R

1
1 + r
t
B(R)
where r is the interest rate, wt is the wage at age t that reects earnings capacity at that age and
B(R) is the pension benet per period paid for retiring at age R.
2.A.4.2 Solution of the Dynamic Model
ASSUMPTION 1.1. Dynamic uncertainty in earnings capacity. The worker is subject to a shock
to earnings capacity wt at every age t.
This captures unexpected age-specic shocks such as to health or labor market opportunities
and could for example be generated by a Markov process wt+1 = wt + "t+1. Note that disutility
from work is assumed to follow a deterministic process throughout, i.e. all t are known based on
0.
18
Dynamic uncertainty forces the worker to re-evaluate the choice whether to retire at every age
based on the new information arriving. Following Stock and Wise (1990) and Manoli and Weber
(2016a), this problem can be solved by comparing the values of working and retiring at every age.
The relevant lifetime utility is now utility at age t from retiring at R
Ut(R) =
TX
s=t
s tu(ct) +
R 1X
s=t
s tt
Making the decision whether to retire at age t, the value of retirement is
V R(t; B(t)) = u(cRt (t)) + V
R(t+ 1; B(t))
and the value of employment is
V W (
t) = u(c
W
t )  t + Et [V (
t+1)]
17The starting age can be interpreted as the beginning of \old age" where retirement plays a role.
18The same retirement patterns could be generated by dynamic uncertainty in disutility from work and deterministc
earnings capacity.
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where 
t = ft; B(t); wt; 0g is the set of state variables at age t and
V (
t+1) = maxfV R(t+ 1; B(t+ 1)); V W (
t+1)g is the value of next period's decision.
The worker's optimal choice follows a reservation value rule, retiring if her earnings capacity
drops below a certain age-specic threshold wt(
t), which is implicitly dened by
V R(t; B(t)) = V W (t; B(t); wt; 0)
or
u(cWt )  u(cRt (t)) + OVt = t
where OVt = Et [V (
t+1)]   V R(t + 1; B(t)) is the option value from working one more period.
Hence, at the critical value wt(
t) the benets from working one more period, namely the gain
in current consumption plus the option value equal the cost of postponing retirement in terms of
disutility from work.
Notice that no assumption has been made so far about saving and borrowing behavior. At the
one extreme, there can be full consumption smoothing so that there is no drop in consumption
at retirement (other than an intended one due to the arrival of new information). At the other
extreme, consumption could follow a hand-to-mouth pattern without saving or borrowing such that
cWt = wt and c
R
t (t) = B(R). Either case, including intermediate cases, can be accomodated by the
dynamic model.
2.A.4.3 Derivation of the Static Model
ASSUMPTION 1.2. No dynamic uncertainty. The time path of earnings capacity wt is deter-
ministic given the initial realization w0.
ASSUMPTION 2. Full consumption smoothing. The worker is able to borrow and lend freely
to maximize lifetime utility.
Under assumption 1.2, the retirement decision can be made in period 0 as no additional infor-
mation becomes available later on. Moreover, under assumption 2 consumption at each age t can
be written as a function of lifetime wealth only. In particular, when  = 1=(1 + r), the individual
wishes to consume the same amount at each age and
ct =
Y (R)
TP
t=0

1
1+r
t = CTP
t=0

1
1+r
t 8t
Thus, the relevant lifetime utility at age 0 from retiring at R is
U0(R) = u(ct)
TX
t=0
t  
R 1X
t=0
tt = U(C)  v(R)
where U(C) := u(ct)
TP
t=0
t and v(R) :=
R 1P
t=0
tt are reduced-form utility from lifetime consumption
and disutility from working until age R, respectively. U(C) is increasing and concave in C if period
utility u(ct) is increasing and concave in ct. The properties of v(R) depend on the t's. For example,
a process t+1 = t with  > 1 yields increasing and convex disutility v(R).
130
The nonstochastic lifetime budget constraint is
C =
R 1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
wt +
TX
t=R

1
1 + r
t
B(R)
For further simplication, suppose the interest rate r is zero and the worker earns a constant period
wage w. Then the constraint becomes
C = wR+ (T  R)B(R)
The model derived in this section corresponds to the so-called \lifetime budget constraint" model of
retirement suggested by Burtless (1986). While being based on the two strong assumptions specied
above, its signicant advantage is that retirement decisions can be treated in a way analogous to
hours of work decisions in a standard labor supply model. In particular, the optimal date of
retirement is characterized by the rst-order condition19
v0(R)
U 0(C)
=
dC
dR
where dC=dR is the marginal gain in lifetime consumption from postponing retirement given by
the budget constraint.
2.A.5 Derivation of Estimation Equations
2.A.5.1 Structural Equation and Upper Bounds
The theoretical framework predicts that bunching at a pure budget set kink is given by equation
(2.19), while bunching at a combined threshold is given by equation (2.24). Allowing for the
possibility of reference dependence in utility from consumption and disutility from work at all
statutory age types stat 2 (ERA;FRA;NRA), bunching at any discontinuity can be expressed as
b
R^
=

1  
1      Ps slDs
"
  1

+

1 

1
1 +
P
s 
s
cD
s
"
The equation can be used to structurally estimate " along with the set of sc or 
s
l across disconti-
nuities.
To obtain upper bounds on sl , set all 
s
c = 0 in the above equation, resulting in
b
R^
=

1  
1    
"
  1

+

1 

1
1 +
P
s 
s
cD
s
"
Conversely, setting sl = 0 can yield upper bounds on 
s
l :
b
R^
=

1  
1      Ps slDs
"
  1

19The FOC together with the corresponding second-order condition characterizes the optimum if the budget set
is convex. However, certain features of pension schedules B(R) may cause the budget set to be nonconvex.
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2.A.5.2 Bunching from the Left vs. Right
Bunching from the right at any discontinuity is
b+
R^
=

1  
1      Ps slDs
"
  1

and bunching from the left is
b 
R^
=

1 

1
1 +
P
s 
s
cD
s
"
where b = b+i +b
 
i . Hence, when the shares of bunching from the left and from the right are known,
c and l can be separately identied. This idea is also implicitly used above, where upper bounds
on sl is obtained by setting the bunching share from the left to zero, and the upper bound on
sc is obtained by setting the bunching share from the right to its maximum. This maximum is
given the amount of bunching from the right that would be implied by the budget set kink only,
and is strictly less than 1 if there is a convex budget set kink at the threshold. The full range of
possible parameter combinations can then be estimated by varying bunching shares from the right
i between 0 and ^i in B
+
i = iBi, B
 
i = (1   i)Bi, where ^i is the maximum right bunching
share at i. ^i can be be calculated as
^i =

1 i
1 i i
"   1
bi
(2.39)
2.A.5.3 Measuring Bunching Shares from both Sides
2.A.5.3.1 Basic Approach
Bunching at the threshold must equal the total missing density from both sides:
B =
Z R^
Rmin
(h0(R)  h(R)) dR+
Z Rmax
R^
(h0(R)  h(R)) dR
where Rmin and Rmax bound the support of the density.
Measuring the true density shift over the full support is impossible in practice for two reasons.
First, the shift h0(R)   h(R) may vary across R in an unknown way so that h0(R) cannot be
measured for all R based on the observed density. Second, the full support of the counterfactual
density may not be observed. Even if the full support of the actual density could observed, this
does not necessarily correspond to the counterfactual support since some counterfactual density is
predicted to \disappear" at the bounds because all individuals shift out a certain range.20
One solution to this problem is to approximate the true density shift by a constant shift over
a certain range on each side. Denote by h+ and h  the observed density immediately to the right
and left, respectively, of the threshold R^. Furthermore, denote by h0+ and h
0  the corresponding
counterfactual density in the absence of the threshold. The approximation is
B   h0    h  (R^ R ) +  h0+   h+ (R+   R^)
where a constant density shift observed immediately to the left of the threshold over a range [R ; R^]
20Besides, although theory predicts individuals responding to the threshold along the entire density, it is unclear
in practice whether those far from the threshold perceive it in the same way as those closer.
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approximates for the true shift on the left and a constant shift observed immediately to the right
of R^ over [R^; R+] approximates for the shift on the right.
Assume also that the counterfactual density is continuous at R^ such that h0+ = h
0  = h0. Then
h0 can be recovered as
h0  B + (R^ R
 )h  + (R+   R^)h+
R+  R 
From this, the implied bunching shares from both sides can be computed as B  = (h0 h )(R^ R )
and B+ = (h0   h+)(R+   R^) since bunching from either side must be equal to the total density
shift from that side. Finally, the structural parameters ", c and l can be estimated by plugging
the implied bunching shares into the equations in section 2.A.5.2.
2.A.5.3.2 Correcting for the Density Gradient
Approximating the true density shift by an observed vertical shift extrapolated over a given range
comes with problems. To see this, consider a situation where the density is decreasing towards
the threshold. In this case, the underlying density shift towards the threshold translates into an
upward shift just beside the threshold combined with a large \disappearing" mass in the tail of
the counterfactual density. More generally, the gradient of the density on each side determines to
what extent an underlying horizontal density shift translates into an observed vertical density shift
around the threshold.
To correct for this, relative bunching from both sides can be taken as the relative horizontal
shift implied by the combination of the observed vertical shift and the gradient of the density beside
the threshold. In particular, denoting by h0  and h0+ the slope of density to the left and to the
right of threshold, the horizontal shift is given by the vertical shift multiplied with the inverse of
this gradient. The true density shift is then approximated as
B  h
0    h0+
2

1
h0 
 
h0    h 

(R^ R ) + 1 h0+
 
h0+   h+

(R+   R^)

where (h0    h0+)=2 is a rescaling factor used to transform the total horizontal shift back into the
vertical dimension related to bunching. From this, the counterfactual density h0 can be recovered
as
h0 
B +
h0  h0+
2h0 
h (R^ R ) + h
0
  h0+
 2h0+ h+(R
+   R^)
h0  h0+
2h0 
(R^ R ) + h0  h0+ 2h0+ (R
+   R^)
The implied bunching shares from both sides can then be computed as B  = h
0
  h0+
2h0 
(h0 h )(R^ 
R ) and B+ = h
0
  h0+
 2h0+ (h0   h+)(R
+   R^), and parameters can be estimated from the equations in
section 2.A.5.2.
2.A.5.4 Linking Structural and Reduced-Form Estimation Equations
Consider now a situation where  and sl are small, such that log(R

+=R^)  R+=R^ where
R+ = R+   R^, and log(1  ( +
P
s 
s
lD
s)=(1  ))   ( +Ps slDs)=(1  ). Then
R+
R^
 " 
1   +
"
1  
X
s
slD
s
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and
b
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 " 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1  
X
s
slD
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s 
s
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s
"
Thus, " can be estimated as the coecient on kink size in the linear reduced-form specication
according to equation (1.5), and the coecients s yield a reduced-form estimate of the combined
additional reference point bunching from both sides. More concretely,
s  "
1   
s
l +

1 

1
1 + sc
"
If in addition sc are small, log(1 +
P
s 
s
cD
s)) Ps scDs, and
b
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"
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s
In this case, the statutory age coecients simplify to
s  "
1   
s
l + "
s
c
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Chapter 3
Dual Tax Systems and Firms:
Evidence from Brazil
3.1 Introduction
Presumptive tax regimes are prevalent in many countries (Bird et al. 2003). In such schemes,
"regular" taxes are replaced by a simplied regime that somewhat approximates the regular tax
liability. A common form of presumptive taxation are tax regimes tailored to small and medium
enterprises (SME) due to compliance costs, and administrative constraints that make it costly for
tax authorities to observe the tax base for enforcement (Slemrod and Gillitzer 2013). As a result,
modern systems of rm taxation { characterized by some combination of payroll, valued-added,
and corporate income taxes whose statutory incidence falls on rms { often exist alongside special
tax regimes that rely on presumptive tax bases (e.g. a single turnover tax). This chapter uses novel
administrative data on inter-rm trade linked to labor inputs from S~ao Paulo, Brazil, to shed light
on implications of such dual systems for rm growth, market competition and production decisions.
The precise way in which taxpayers are partitioned into dierent systems { turnover thresholds
for value-added taxes (e.g, Keen and Mintz 2004) or payroll tax exemptions (e.g. Hsieh and Olken
2014) { also varies across countries (Kanbur and Keen 2014). In developing countries, particularly
in Latin America and West Africa, rms below a turnover thresholds can often opt into a simplied
regime where a single tax replaces a number of dierent taxes (Shome 2004). The case we focus
on is a special tax regime in Brazil in which rms below a revenue threshold can choose between
being part a presumptive turnover tax system (SIMPLES) or be taxed in the \regular" tax system.1
They key dierence between the SIMPLES system and the regular system is that turnover becomes
a surrogate tax base for both the value-added tax (VAT) and payroll taxes for rms that opt into
SIMPLES.
Conceptually, the eects of such dual tax systems on rms matter in at least four ways. First,
1Henceforth, we will refer to the non-presumptive system as the \regular" system. However, given the usual shape
of rm size distributions with a large mass of small rms, rms in the \regular" systems are actually less numerous
than rms in the presumptive system. See section 3.3 for descriptive statistics.
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they could generate production ineciencies through mis-allocation: a taxpayer may not choose
the cheapest or best supplier as its choice may be aected by tax incentives. For instance, rms
in the regular system can take VAT credit from suppliers in the regular system, but not from
suppliers in the SIMPLES system. Thus, they may prefer to trade with rms that are also in the
regular system. As a result, such a dual system may create partial segmentation of trade between
rms in the regular tax regime and rms in the presumptive regime (De Paula and Scheinkman,
2010). Second, a size-based tax system generates notches that aect the rm size distribution
(Dharmapala et al. 2011) by reducing incentives for rms to grow. Such distortions in taxpayers'
behavior to ensure eligibility for the presumptive system may spill over to their trade partners
(De Paula and Scheinkman, 2010). Third, the co-existence of taxpayers facing dierent tax burdens
can also create an unleveled playing eld for market competition. Finally, rms may change their
input composition between intermediate inputs and labor inputs depending on whether inputs are
deductible and whether payroll is taxed.
In this chapter, we systematically analyze the eects of dual tax systems on rms using
anonymized administrative data from the tax authority of the state of S~ao Paulo. The data in-
cludes yearly trade ows between rms from electronic invoices. One of the key advantages of the
Brazilian electronic invoice data over other newly available datasets on rm-to-rm transactions is
that all rms must use electronic invoicing irrespective of the tax regime they choose.2 As a result,
the data allows us to map the trade network of regular rms and SIMPLES rms in our sample,
including when rms switch tax regimes. Moreover, the data is linked to administrative records
containing the total number of employees and payroll. We exploit this data using a rich set of
research designs, including a reform that changed the location of the revenue-based VAT threshold
within the period of analysis.
We begin by showing a number of stylized facts on the rm size distribution, the composition
of rms' inputs across the distribution, and the tax regime of rms top suppliers. We nd clear
bunching at the eligibility threshold for the presumptive tax system. Also, consistent with the tax
incentives rms face, we nd that rms in the presumptive tax system use relatively more labor
input and source relatively more of their intermediate input from other rms in the presumptive
tax system, which are not subject to the VAT. This leads to partial segmentation of the market
between rms in the two systems.
Next, we use variation arising from rms' tax regime switches in order to show that there
is a causal link between tax regimes and trade networks. This rules out an explanation of pure
selection, where for example rms characteristics such as sector of activity that could determine
both registration and trade networks. We implement an event study exploiting rms switching
2Usually, such data is available through VAT declarations where rms itemize inputs and outputs (e.g. in India
and Uganda). Therefore, only transactions for which a VAT-registered rm is either a buyer or a supplier can be
observed, and transactions between non-VAT rms are not covered by the data. In addition, because rms declare
their inputs and outputs, the declaration of the same transaction is subject to mistakes and misreporting by the two
parties. In the case of Brazil, the electronic invoicing covers all business-to-business transactions and each invoice
has a unique key such that the same transaction cannot be reported dierently by suppliers and buyers. The data
thus mitigates both concerns of data censoring and misreporting.
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into the SIMPLES regime and out of the SIMPLES regime to show how the VAT intensity of their
inputs changes. This research design exploits the panel feature of our data, which allows us to
control for xed characteristics of rms through xed eects. Our main nding is that rms start
trading relatively more with rms in their new tax regime as soon as they switch regime.
In the second part of the chapter, we exploit a reform that increased the SIMPLES threshold
from R$2.4M to R$3.6M. to study rm growth and market competition. First, we document how
the rm size distribution shifts with the reform, including a clear movement of the location of
bunching to the new threshold. Then, we provide evidence for the adverse eect of the coexistence
of presumptive and regular tax regimes, and the preferential tax treatment given to SMEs (the
option to choose the presumptive tax regime) on ineligible (larger) rms competing in the same
market as eligible rms. We show that ineligible rms in sectors with more competition from
SIMPLES rms before the reform grew relatively less after the reform compared to ineligible rms
in sectors with less competition from SIMPLES rms.
Then we study the relationship between tax systems and production choices. To get at the
causal eect from rms' tax regime to trade networks, we employ two research designs. First,
we exploit the reform through a dierences-in-dierences strategy. Second, we study the impact
of a supplier's change of tax regime on a rm's decision to purchase inputs from that supplier
through an event analysis. For the second research design we restrict attention to rms that are
a \small economy" to their supplier such that they do not inuence the decision of their supplier
to switch tax regimes. The results provide evidence that the respective tax regime of (potential)
trade partners has a causal eect on their trade and thus on client's input choices. This leads to
market segmentation between rms in regular and presumptive tax regimes.
Our results show that rms respond to the tax incentives they face: once labor inputs become
taxed and intermediate inputs are deductible, rms change their production decisions away from
inputs with higher eective marginal cost. Furthermore, our overall results are consistent with
production distortions: we nd (partial) segmentation in the network between regular and SIM-
PLES rms, i.e. rms trade relatively more with rms in the same tax regime. The degree of
segmentation, however, is mitigated by the fact that rms are heavily dependent on key suppliers.
In fact, most rms trade across tax regimes, and most rms have a regular rm among their main
trade partners. Moreover, these distortions should be weighted against other key motivations for
exemptions such as compliance costs that could be quite large for small rms below the threshold.
This chapter contributes to the literature by shedding new light on how tax systems interact
with taxpayers sourcing decisions in the context of presumptive taxation in a developing country.
Although the literature has emphasized the potential relevance of network eects (Liu et al. 2018;
Pomeranz 2015; De Paula and Scheinkman 2010), there is little empirical evidence of chain eects
using micro-data on rm trade ows.3 The chapter also contributes to a broader literature on
misallocation (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow 2009), size-based regulation and taxation (e.g. Garicano
3Concurrent to this chapter, there is some work in progress using data from India (Gadenne et al. 2018, Rios and
Setharam 2018).
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et al. 2016, Monteiro and Assunc~ao 2012, Boonzaaier et al. 2017, Best et al. 2015), and a growing
literature documenting rm responses to VAT thresholds through avoidance (e.g. Onji 2009),
evasion (e.g. Asatryan and Peichl 2017), and real desincentives to grow (e.g. Harju et al. 2015).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institutional
setting and data, section 3.3 presents stylized empirical facts, section 3.4 shows the eects of dual
tax systems on growth, competition and input choice, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and Data
3.2.1 Institutional Background
Brazil is a federal country and the state of S~ao Paulo, the setting of our empirical analysis, is the
largest of the 27 Brazilian states, both in terms of population and economic activity. It has about
42 million inhabitants and it accounts for about 34% of the Brazilian GDP.Firms in Brazil are
subject to taxes from federal, state and municipal governments. In particular, they are subject to a
federal-level payroll tax (INSS; the tax rate is about 20% for all rms), to a state-level value-added
tax (ICMS; see below),4 and several municipal- and federal-level turnover taxes (PIS, COFINS,
CLSS, IRPJ, ISS; implying a tax rate of at least 6% for the sale of goods and 13.3% for services).5
We denote this tax system as the \regular system" and rms subject to it as \regular rms."
Like many countries, Brazil has a special tax legislation for SME. Firms that report total revenue
below a threshold are eligible to opt into a presumptive tax system called SIMPLES. Eligible rms
must choose whether to opt for SIMPLES at the beginning of the year. SIMPLES rms are subject
to taxes in a presumptive way where the tax base is turnover and collection is unied in a single
tax return.6 The tax applies to their gross revenue during the year at an average tax rate that
increases from 4% to 12% in the tax base.7
Until 2011, rms with yearly gross revenue (across all their establishments) below R$ 2.4 million
in the previous year were eligible for SIMPLES (the exchange rate was about R$2 ' US$1 in 2012);
in 2012, the threshold increased to R$ 3.6 million. As a result, most rms can opt for a presumptive
tax regime in Brazil.8 If their yearly revenue exceeds the threshold by the end of the year, they
4Manufacturing rms are subject to an additional federal tax on value added (IPI).
5These numbers are referring to rms on the system called \Lucro Presumido". For very large rms { only about
3% of formal Brazilian rms according to Receita Federal { the federal taxes becomes value added (PIS, COFINS,
CLSS) or corporate income (IRPJ) taxes (\Lucro Real"). The municipal tax on services (ISS with a tax rate ranging
from 2% to 5% depending on the type of services) remains a turnover tax for those rms. For condentiality reasons,
our data do not allow us to study these rms.
6This type of single tax that replaces many taxes - \impuesto unico" or \monotributo" - are common in Latin
America (Shome 2004).
7The tax rate that applies to the turnover depends on their economic activity as it aims to replace the tax base
in accordance to what rms would otherwise be liable for. i.e. rms in the service sector that would be liable for the
service tax (ISS) face a dierent rate than rms in commerce that would not be liable for ISS but would be liable for
the value added tax (ICMS).
8We present the average tax rate schedule for rms in the commerce sector in the appendix. Some rms are
ineligible for SIMPLES, independently of their gross revenue. This is the case, for instance, for rms with foreign
owners or foreign capital.
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become ineligible in the following year.9
It is important to mention that there is also a sizable number of rms in the informal economy
that are exempt de facto from all taxes on their economic activity.10 Studying these rms is often
challenging due to data constraints. Because informal rms are relatively small, they would likely
be eligible for SIMPLES even if they were registered with the tax authority. For the purpose of our
study, \SIMPLES rms" are likely to be a good approximation to these informal rms in terms of
the sourcing incentives they face, since any tax on inputs cannot be recovered through deductions
and payroll is de facto not taxed.
The set of rms we focus on are in the commerce sector, so the most relevant changes { besides
modifying rms' overall tax and compliance burden { from the regular system to SIMPLES is the
replacement of the tax on value added (ICMS) and the tax on payroll (INSS) by a turnover tax.
This will likely aect the type of rms opting for the presumptive tax regime, as well as their
production choices. The eective marginal cost of a unit of labor input is lower for SIMPLES
rms, as they are not subject to the payroll tax. In contrast, the eective marginal cost of a unit of
intermediate input may be higher for SIMPLES rms depending on the tax regime of their supplier.
This is because SIMPLES rms cannot deduct any state-level VAT charged on their purchases.
Firms subject to the ICMS, which is a VAT based on the credit-invoice method, are required to
charge a tax on all their sales of taxable goods and services (\outputs"). The most common rate
is 18% in S~ao Paulo; imports are taxed; exports are exempt; and a reduced rate of 7% or a higher
rate of 25% applies in some cases.11 Firms can obtain a tax credit for the VAT charged on their
purchases (inputs) as long as they are themselves subject to the ICMS.12 As a result, the marginal
cost of a unit of intermediate input purchased from a regular rm is higher for a SIMPLES rm
than for another regular rm. This may lead to some market segmentation as SIMPLES rms have
a greater incentive to buy their intermediate inputs from other SIMPLES rms (De Paula and
Scheinkman, 2010). The inability to deduct taxes charged on intermediate inputs also incentivizes
SIMPLES rms to rely to a greater extent on own production, i.e. labor input.
Finally, and importantly for the data used in this project, all rms are required to issue elec-
tronic invoices for business-to-business transactions in S~ao Paulo, including SIMPLES rms. This
innovation is part of a nationwide eort called SPED (Sistema Publico de Escriturac~ao Digital)
9If a rm's revenue exceeds the threshold within the calendar year, they become ineligible for SIMPLES in the
following year. The tax rate applied to the amount that exceeds the threshold is 20% higher than the rate applied
to the revenue up to the threshold. If the revenue exceeds 20% of the threshold within the calendar year, the rm
has to leave the SIMPLES regime in the following month.
10The informal sector is relatively large in S~ao Paulo: an estimated 2.1 million rms are informal (SEBRAE, 2003);
over 90% of them are self-employed workers with no employees (SEBRAE, 2003).
11ICMS is often used as an industrial policy instrument. For instance, states create targeted exemptions for specic
rms or sectors.
12The reporting period is monthly; every month, rms must calculate their actual tax liabilities as the dierence
between the total VAT charged on their output invoices and on their input invoices. Note that Brazilian states
often use ICMS withholding (substituic~ao tributaria). In that case, one taxpayer withholds the ICMS for all other
taxpayers along the supply chain, but rms must le their taxes even if all payments have already been made on their
behalf. In principle, if there are dierences between what was withheld and what is due by the rm, there could be
additional payments or reimbursement.
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to modernize and integrate tax systems in the country. SPED was created in 2003 and many
innovations around tax ling and electronic invoicing were proposed since. Since 2011, electronic
invoices (NF-e) cover all business-to-business transactions in the S~ao Paulo.13 Firms are required
to use specic invoicing machines that issue standardized invoices and that are hard to temper
with. These machines prevent rms from issuing dierent invoices for a given transaction for the
selling rm (e.g. an invoice with a low value) and the buying rm (e.g. an invoice with a high
value), a common mechanism of VAT fraud in other countries. They also send the information for
each invoice to the tax authority in real time through the mobile phone network. The tax authority
thus possesses complete records of all business-to-business transactions carried out in accordance
with the legal framework. Although Brazil was an early adopter of the technology, other countries
have mandated the use of comparable electronic invoicing machines in recent years (Steenbergen,
2017).
3.2.2 Data
Our empirical analysis relies on anonymized administrative data made available for research pur-
poses by the tax authority of the state of S~ao Paulo (SEFAZ/SP).
3.2.2.1 Electronic Invoices as a Source of Inter-Firm Trade Data
A key dataset used in this chapter provides inter-rm trade data based on the universe of electronic
invoices for business-to-business transactions in S~ao Paulo. These electronic invoices present unique
advantages for our purpose compared to other sources of transaction data. First, they capture
all legal transactions between formal rms, including between SIMPLES rms. In contrast, other
countries that require rms to report their transactions with each trade partner to the tax authority
usually apply this requirement to VAT-registered rms only, as in Uganda or India (Almunia et al.
2017; Gadenne et al. 2018). Administrative transaction data based on tax withholding schemes also
only record transactions involving withholding agents, such as government institutions (Brockmeyer
and Hernandez 2018).
Second, these electronic invoices capture all legal transactions irrespective of the payment mode
or the transaction value. Transaction data based on tax withholding schemes involving credit-card
companies only record transactions paid by credit card (Brockmeyer and Hernandez 2018). In
countries where VAT-registered rms are required to report their transactions with each trade
partner to the tax authority, they are often exempt from this requirement if the total transaction
value falls below some specic amount, as in Costa Rica or India (Brockmeyer and Hernandez 2018;
Gadenne et al. 2018). Transaction data from rm surveys typically ask only about transactions
with a few top partners.
Third, because of the electronic invoicing, there is a unique key for each transaction such that
the two sides of the transaction are unable to report dierent amounts. In countries that require
13In 2015, electronic billing machines for nal consumer sales (NF-c) were also introduced in the state of S~ao
Paulo.
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rms to report transactions with each trade partner to the tax authority without such a technology,
transaction values reported separately by the supplier and the client have been shown to be plagued
by very large discrepancies (see Almunia et al. 2017 for the case of Uganda and Brockmeyer and
Hernandez 2018 for the case of Costa Rica). Such discrepancies can arise from errors due to
the manual reporting of the transactions or from the strategic unilateral misreporting of these
transactions (i.e. to minimize tax liabilities). The electronic invoices in Brazil avoid both issues.
Transaction data based on these electronic invoices thus present useful features in order to
measure, e.g. a rm's trade ow with another specic rm or its total trade ow with rms in a
specic tax regime. Yet, they also come with some limitations. First, some information on these
invoices is not yet fully harmonized, such as product codes and units. Therefore, they are not yet
suitable to measure prices and study incidence questions. Second, by construction, these invoices
do not record any transaction with informal rms. Third, they do not record any transaction that
formal rms agree to carry illegally, i.e. without using the electronic invoicing machine. Even
though the data avoid the issue of unilateral misreporting, this type of collusive misreporting
may still aect the trade actually reported by formal rms in the data. We discuss this issue in
our analysis below, as compliance incentives may aect our measurement of the degree of market
segmentation between SIMPLES rms and regular rms in the S~ao Paulo economy.
3.2.2.2 Inter-rm trade Data Made Available
Due to logistical constraints given by the sheer size of the data and in order to protect the con-
dentiality of rms' information, the specic transaction data made available for this research were
constructed as follows.
Origin Sample. Our starting point are all tax-registered rms in the state of S~ao Paulo with
at least one wholesale establishment in the state. Wholesalers are interesting to study the eect
of tax regimes on input choice decisions given their central position in supply chains. Hereafter,
these rms are denoted as \origin" rms; all their establishments located in S~ao Paulo (including
non-wholesale establishments) are denoted the \origin" establishments; and together they form the
\origin" sample.
All the electronic invoices involving origin establishments, as supplier or client, have been ex-
tracted from the universe of the electronic invoices involving at least one S~ao Paulo establishment.
Because of logistical constraints, the information is aggregated by pair of supplier and client at
the yearly level. Next, for condentiality reasons, the data are anonymized by replacing rms'
tax ID by a unique scrambled ID number. Firms that could potentially be identiable despite the
anonymization (e.g. very large rms) were aggregated into one observation without individualized
information.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the detailed transaction data available for this project using a random
sample of observations in one year. The overall dataset covers the years from 2011 to 2017. It
includes 121,202 unique origin establishments belonging to 88,359 unique origin rms; 17,609,284
input transaction-years, in which origin establishments make purchases from 631,450 unique suppli-
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ers (567,355 unique rms); and 96,689,168 output transaction-years, in which origin establishments
make sales to 4,393,038 unique clients (4,062,897 unique rms).14 For each supplier-client pair in
each year, we know the (scrambled) rm and establishment ID of the supplier and the client, the
tax regime of the supplier (i.e. SIMPLES or regular), the total value of all invoices, the value
subject to VAT, the VAT charged, and an indicator for whether the trade partner is located in
S~ao Paulo. For international transactions, we observe the total value of exports, the total value of
imports, and the VAT charged on imports.
Full Sample. A second dataset has been constructed based on the electronic invoices from 2011
to 2017 to provide aggregate trade information for all establishments in S~ao Paulo belonging to
supplier and client rms of origin establishments that are taxpayers in the state. The resulting
sample includes 1,674,363 unique rms (including those from the origin sample). Hereafter, we
refer to this sample as the \full" sample (it includes many retailers making purchases from origin
establishments). For each establishment, we know the total value of their input transactions and
the total VAT charged in each year, broken down by type of supplier: SIMPLES rms, regular
rms, and imports. Firms that could potentially be identiable despite the anonymization were
again aggregated as in the origin sample.
3.2.2.3 Other Data
Additional information on all establishments in the full sample was made available for this research.
From the state tax registry, we have rm-level information on the year of registration and the tax
regime in each year from 2008 to 2017. From the state-level VAT declarations and tax declarations
for the SIMPLES regime, we have establishment-level information on the yearly value of exports and
the yearly revenue in each year from 2008 to 2017. This allows us to capture sales to nal consumers.
Moreover, we have a variable capturing the anonymized 5-digit sector of the establishment. For
condentiality reasons, the sector of activity was scrambled such that we only observe the overall
position in the supply chain (retail, wholesale, manufacturing) and whether two establishments
are in the same 5-digit sector, but not which sector they belong to. Finally, from the Brazilian
matched employee-employer data (RAIS), we have establishment-level information on the number
of employees and the total payroll in each month from 2011 to 2016.
3.2.2.4 Data Construction
In our analysis below, we aggregate all the establishment-level information at the rm-year level;
we mostly use the origin sample given the more detailed information available for rms in this
sample; and we mostly focus on the period 2011-2016 for which we have the most complete set of
variables available.
One point to make before delving into the analysis is that the data is best suited to study input
14This number is quite large because it includes trade partners that are outside S~ao Paulo. Although we do observe
a scrambled ID for these rms, they are not part of the \full sample" we describe below because they are outside S~ao
Paulo.
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transactions as opposed to output transactions. For input transactions, we know the tax regime
of the trade partner (the supplier) from the transaction data directly. In contrast, for output
transactions, we know the tax regime of the trade partner (the client) by matching the partner's ID
in the transaction and the registry data. As a result, we only know the tax regime of a client if it
is registered as a taxpayer in the state of S~ao Paulo. Consequently, we focus on input transactions
when studying segmentation and the eect of tax systems on inter-rm trade.
3.3 Stylized Facts
As discussed in the introduction, the coexistence of presumptive and regular tax systems can have
important implications for rm growth, market competition, and production decisions. In this
section, we present descriptive statistics and key stylized facts consistent with two of these eects.
We show that there is clear bunching below the SIMPLES threshold, indicating that some rms
reduce their revenue to remain eligible for the presumptive tax system. We also show that rms
in the presumptive tax system use relatively more labor input and source relatively more of their
intermediate input from other rms in the presumptive tax system, leading to partial segmentation
of the market between rms in the two systems.
3.3.1 Bunching and Choice of Tax Regime
Figure 3.2 shows that there is large bunching in the revenue distribution below the SIMPLES
threshold, but that many rms eligible for SIMPLES do not choose this presumptive tax regime.
These patterns are presented for origin rms between 2012 and 2016, when the SIMPLES threshold
was set at R$ 3.6 million. Panel (a) displays the overall revenue distribution for all rm-year
observations with positive revenue over the period (censored at R$5 million). It shows that most
rms fall below the SIMPLES threshold (the vertical line) and are thus eligible for the presumptive
tax regime. This is the case for 83.1% of rms in the origin sample; this number is even larger in
the full sample (95.8%), as it includes many (smaller) retailers. Panel (b) displays the same revenue
distribution but we zoom in around the SIMPLES threshold. It shows that there is clear bunching
below the threshold, indicating that many rms value the option to choose the presumptive tax
regime in the following year, which distorts the revenue distribution.
Panel (c) displays the share of rm-year observations in the regular system by rms' revenue
levels in the previous year (t  1) and in the concurrent year (t), separately. The rst graph shows
that the SIMPLES threshold is binding: almost all rms above the threshold in t   1 are in the
regular system in the following year. It also shows that many rms below the threshold, and thus
eligible for SIMPLES, do not choose the presumptive tax regime in the following year.15 Overall,
this is the case for 28.8% of rms in the origin sample overall and for more than 60% in the vicinity
of the threshold. Together with panel (a), the graph shows that most rms in S~ao Paulo are in
15Liu et al. (2018) make a related point that the combination of bunching and voluntary registration in the context
of the VAT in the UK is consistent with market segmentation between VAT-registered and Non-VAT rms.
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the presumptive tax regime, namely 58.3% of the rms in the origin sample (this gure reaches
88.8% of rms in the full sample). The second graph in panel (c) shows that the share of rms in
the regular system is smaller to the right of the threshold if we consider the revenue distribution
in the concurrent year, after a rm chooses its tax regime. This is because rms crossing the
threshold only become ineligible for SIMPLES in the following year. The two graphs in panel (c)
are almost identical to the left of the threshold, as most rms choose the same tax regime from year
to year. In fact, the aggregate patterns presented below are similar whether we use the revenue
distribution in the year before or after a rm chooses its tax regime, so we present them using the
year-t distribution only.
A striking pattern in panel (c) is that the share of rms in the regular system, which is gen-
erally increasing in revenue below the threshold, drops just below the threshold before increasing
discontinuously at the threshold. This pattern suggests that the bunching in panel (b) is mostly
driven by SIMPLES rms. This is conrmed in panel (d), which displays the revenue distribu-
tion around the SIMPLES threshold by tax regime. The bunching is entirely driven by SIMPLES
rms, showing that they strongly value the option to remain in SIMPLES in the following year. In
contrast, the revenue distribution is completely smooth at the threshold among regular rms. As
the option value of choosing tax regime in the following year is likely positive (and likely strictly
positive for some rms), this suggests that switching regimes involves non-negligible xed costs, as
often argued in the literature (Harju et al., 2015).
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Input Choices of Firms in the Two Tax Regimes
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics comparing rms in the presumptive and regular tax regimes.
Column (1) considers all rm-year observations with positive revenue in the origin sample from 2012
to 2016 (the same observations as in gure 3.2). Column (2)-(4) consider rms with revenue levels
above the SIMPLES threshold, regular rms with revenue levels below the threshold, and SIMPLES
rms with revenue levels below the threshold, respectively.16 As discussed above, almost all rms
above the threshold are regular rms, but most rms are below the threshold and are SIMPLES
rms, although a sizable share of rms eligible for the presumptive tax regime opt for the regular
tax regime. SIMPLES rms account for most of the rm-year observations, but they only account
for 6% of the total revenue across all rms in the sample, as regular rms have higher revenue levels
(even below the threshold). For instance, rms above the threshold account for only 16.9% of the
rm-year observations but for 89.9% of the total revenue.
Regular rms tend to have higher input levels { the sum of intermediate input, i.e. input
purchased from other rms, and labor input, i.e. total gross wages paid to employees { than
SIMPLES rms, even taking into account their higher revenue levels. This is also shown graphically
in panel (a) of gure 3.3. It displays the mean log(input) by revenue bins for regular and SIMPLES
rms, separately. Input levels are higher for regular rms than for SIMPLES rms at all revenue
16The descriptive statistics are similar if we use revenue levels in the previous year to categorize rms in the four
groups.
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levels.
Regular and SIMPLES rms dier in the composition of their input as well. Table 3.1 and
gure 3.3 show that regular rms use relatively more intermediate input and thus relatively less
labor input, than SIMPLES rms (see panel b). Almost all rms use some intermediate input
but the share of intermediate input out of all inputs is higher among regular rms (between 80%
and 95%) than among SIMPLES rms (between 75% and 80%) at all revenue levels. Table 3.1
and gure 3.3 also show that regular rms source relatively more of their intermediate input from
suppliers subject to the VAT, namely other regular rms and foreign rms; while SIMPLES rms
source relatively more of their intermediate input from other SIMPLES rms (not subject to the
VAT; see panel c).17 The share of intermediate input subject to the VAT is higher among regular
rms (between 80% and 95%) than among SIMPLES rms (between 70% and 80%) at all revenue
levels.
This provides some rst evidence of market segmentation between rms in the two tax regimes.
Moreover, we nd similar patterns when we focus on top suppliers. This is important as inter-rm
trade is typically very concentrated, with a few trade partners playing a critical role. Panels (e)
and (f) of gure 3.3 display the average share of origin rms' intermediate inputs by the rank of
their top 10 suppliers (for rms with at least 10 suppliers) for regular rms and SIMPLES rms
below the SIMPLES threshold. The top-1 supplier accounts for about 35% of rms' intermediate
inputs in the two groups, but that share drops to 15% for the second most important supplier and
continues to fall for the following suppliers, showing the concentration of inter-rm trade. Yet,
panels (e) and (f) also show that the same degree of market segmentation between regular rms
and SIMPLES rms appear among top suppliers. The top-1 supplier of regular rms is a regular
rm in more than 90% of the observations, but that gure drops by about 11pp among SIMPLES
rms, and the dierence persists across all supplier ranks.
Finally, table 3.1 shows that that the share of rms with positive labor input is higher among
SIMPLES rms than among regular rms below the threshold. Moreover, conditional on having
some positive labor input, panel (d) of gure 3.3 shows that SIMPLES rm use more labor input
than regular rms at most revenue levels (above the very bottom of the rm size distribution), and
not only as a share of all inputs.
The dierences in the input composition between regular rms and SIMPLES rms are consis-
tent with the dierential tax treatment of inputs in the two regimes. The marginal cost of a unit
of labor input is lower for SIMPLES rms, while the marginal cost of a unit of intermediate input
from a supplier subject to the VAT is higher for SIMPLES rms, as they cannot deduct the VAT
paid on these purchases. Interestingly, there is no evidence that input choices dier for bunching
rms, as the patterns in gure 3.3 are not systematically dierent just to the left of the threshold
among SIMPLES rms.
Table 3.2 presents some multivariate regressions reiterating these correlations between tax
17We classied trades with rms that were aggregated due to condentiality concerns as being VAT since the
exclusion criterion of identiability imples that the vast majority are too large to be eligible for SIMPLES.
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regime and input choices. The sample is composed of all rm-year observations in the origin
sample with positive revenue, positive intermediate input, and revenue levels below the SIMPLES
threshold such that they are eligible for SIMPLES. In column (1), we simply regress an indicator
for opting for the regular tax system on log(revenue), controlling for year xed eects. Larger rms
are more likely to choose the regular tax system, which is consistent with the increasing average
tax rate on revenue in the presumptive tax regime. In column (2), we add controls for log(input),
the share of intermediate input (out of all inputs) and the share of intermediate input subject to
VAT. Firms with a higher input level, a higher share of intermediate input, and a higher share of
intermediate input subject to VAT are more likely to be part of the regular tax regime even when
we consider all these variables simultaneously. The correlations are similar if we include sector
xed eects (column 3) and if we restrict attention to the balanced panel of rms observed in all
years (column 4). Finally, column (5) shows that the sizes of the coecients drop but they remain
signicant even with rm xed eects, thus exploiting rms' change of tax regime over time.
3.3.3 Tax Regime and Input Choices: Event Analysis around Firms' Tax Regime
Switches
The previous subsection documented systematic relationships between rms' tax regime and input
choices. These relationships could be driven by causal links in both directions. On the one hand,
rms diering in their production functions may opt for dierent tax regimes. For instance, rms
with labor-intensive production functions have an incentive to opt for the presumptive tax regime
in order to avoid the payroll tax. Firms with many potential trade partners in the regular tax
regime may opt for the regular tax regime in order to be able to deduct the VAT charged on the
intermediate input purchased from these rms. On the other hand, tax regimes may have direct
eects on input choices. Firms opting for the presumptive tax regime have an incentive to rely more
heavily on own production using labor input. Moreover, conditional on purchasing intermediate
inputs, they have an incentive to seek suppliers in the presumptive tax regime in order to avoid
paying for the VAT.
It is important to note that some of these relationships could be driven by reporting eects,
namely by dierential compliance incentives in the two regime and the dierence between actual
input choices (e.g. actual input transactions) and reported input choices (e.g. input transactions
observed in the data). For instance, rms in the regular tax regime have an incentive to report
input transactions with other rms in the regular tax regime accurately, such that they can deduct
the VAT charged on their purchases; SIMPLES rms do not have a similar incentive. At the same
time, the observed degree of market segmentation could be an underestimate: SIMPLES rms have
limited incentives to report any input transaction accurately, while they have more incentives to
source from SIMPLES (or even informal) suppliers who may in turn want to under-report their
sales.
In this subsection, we provide a more careful analysis of tax regime changes and consider
transitions in and out of the presumptive tax regime separately. This allows us to document
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patterns that are not easily explained by reporting eects and that cannot be simply inferred from
the results in column (5) of table 3.2. In particular, we conduct an event analysis to study how
input choices compare before and after a tax regime switch. Because we use variation within rms
over time, correlations between tax regimes and trade patterns in this analysis cannot be due to
xed rm characteristics.
We nd that rms change their input choices as soon as they switch tax regime. There are
three candidate explanations for this result. First, there could be time-variant omitted variables
unrelated to a rm's potential input choices (e.g. to its potential trade network) driving both tax
regime switches and changes in input choices. The most obvious concern is that rms that switch
into (out of) the regular tax regime are growing more (less) in previous years than the average
rm. Yet, we show that controlling for pre-trends in revenue and input does not aect our results.
Although this does not remove all potential sources of omitted variable bias unrelated to a rm's
(potential) input choices, it indicates that such a bias does not seem to drive much of our results. In
that case, there remains two explanations that imply causal links between tax regimes and potential
input choices. On the one hand, rms may change tax regime because they experience or expect
changes in input choices, such as changes in the composition of their trade network. On the other
hand, rms may also change their input choices because they change tax regime. We interpret our
ndings here as rst suggestive evidence for these causal links, in any one of the two directions.
We provide evidence consistent with each of these directions separately in a later section.
Empirical strategy. We begin by selecting origin rms that switch tax regime between 2013
and 2015, such that we can follow them for two years before and after the tax regime switch (the
year of the switch is our rst \post-event" year as the tax regime choice is made on January 1st),
over the period for which we have all the variables available (2011-2016). We then keep a balanced
panel of rms with positive revenue and intermediate input for the four years around the event.
Additionally, we restrict attention to rms that are in a same tax regime in the two years before
the switch and in a same tax regime in the two years after the switch. We thus focus on the
clearer \persistent" changes in tax regime, but results are similar if we allow rms to change tax
regime again after the rst switch. This sample constitutes our \treatment" sample. We also
construct a \control" sample to create a counterfactual and to show that our results are robust
to controlling for pre-trends in revenue and intermediate input. We randomly assign a \placebo"
event year between 2013 and 2015 to all rms observed with positive revenue and intermediate
input for a 4-year window around that year in the same tax regime. We end up with four groups
of rms, two control groups and two treatment groups: (i) rms that are always in the regular tax
regime (\Stayers regular regime"; 14,270 rms), (ii) rms that are always in the presumptive tax
regime (\Stayers presumptive regime"; 18,329 rms), (iii) rms that switch out of the presumptive
tax regime into the regular tax regime (\Presumptive to Regular"; 842 rms), and (iv) rms that
switch out of the regular tax regime into the presumptive tax regime (\Regular to Presumptive";
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1042 rms).18
We present raw empirical patterns in relevant variables for these four groups graphically. We
then quantify changes in an outcome y for our treatment groups, by comparing rms in each treat-
ment group to the control group of rms that remains in their initial tax regime using dierence-
in-dierences specications:
yi;k;t = i + k + t + k  Treati +  k preRevenuei + k preInputi + "i;k;t (3.1)
yi;k;t = i + k + t +   Treati Afterk +  k preRevenuei + k preInputi + "i;k;t (3.2)
where i, k, and t are xed eects for each rm i, each event year k, and each calendar year
t = 2011; :::; 2016. Event years are normalized such that we have k =  2; :::; 1 with k = 0 as the year
of the tax regime switch. The coecients  k and k control for possible changes in the outcome
in each event year related to pre-trends (from k =  2 to k =  1) in revenue and intermediate
input (in logs), respectively. The coecients k in equation (3.1) capture dierential changes in
the treatment vs. control groups in each year relative to base year k =  1; the coecient  in
equation (3.2) summarizes the dierence-in-dierences by capturing the change in the treatment
vs. control groups after vs. before the tax regime switch. Standard errors are clustered by rm. We
run separate regressions for rms initially in the regular tax regime and initially in the presumptive
tax regime.
Results. Figure 3.4 displays raw patterns in the four groups of rms around the tax regime
switch (we only take out calendar-year eects from the raw data). Panel (a) shows that switchers
from the presumptive to the regular tax regime were growing relatively more, and switchers from
the regular to the presumptive tax regime were growing relatively less prior to the tax regime switch
compared to the two control groups. This is the dierential pre-trend mentioned above, which we
control for in the dierence-in-dierences specications. After the tax regime switch, rms in both
treatment groups seem to grow relatively more compared to rms in the control groups. Panel (b)
shows raw patterns for one variable capturing input choices, namely the share of intermediate input
subject to VAT. It increases discontinuously for switchers into the regular regime, but it decreases
discontinuously for switchers into the presumptive regime. Dierences in pre-trends are also less
severe. This is evidence that the systematic correlations between tax regime and input choices,
specically the composition of the trade network, are not due to xed rm characteristics.
Figure 3.5 displays the estimated bk with their 95% condence intervals from running separate
regressions for rms initially in the regular tax regime and rms initially in the presumptive tax
regime using the specication in equation (3.1). The estimated b from using the specication in
equation (3.2) are reported in the notes below each graph.
Panel (a) shows that, once we control for pre-trends, revenue levels increase in both treatment
groups after the tax regime switch compared to the control groups. This is consistent with the raw
patterns in gure 3.4a. Panel (b) shows that input levels increase even more than revenue levels
18This sampling strategy implies that no rm belongs to more than one group.
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for switchers into the regular regime. In contrast, revenue levels increase without an increase in
input levels for switchers into the presumptive tax regime. The increase in revenue levels without
an increase in input levels for switchers into the presumptive tax regime is consistent with the
dierential incentive to rely more on own production or informal inputs for rms in the presump-
tive tax regime. Panel (c) shows that the share of intermediate input out of all inputs increases
discontinuously after a rm switches to the regular tax regime but decreases discontinuously for
tax regime switch in the other direction. The size of the dierence-in-dierences estimates are
consistent with the estimates in column (5) of table 3.2. Together, panels (d), (h), and (i) show
that rms switching to the regular tax regime increase their intermediate input and decrease their
labor input, while rms switching to the presumptive tax regime increase their labor input without
decreasing their intermediate input.
Finally, panel (e) shows that there is no dierential pre-trend in the share of intermediate
input subject to VAT once we control for pre-trends in revenue and input. Yet, the level of this
variable still increases discontinuously after a rm switches to the regular tax regime but decreases
discontinuously for tax regime switch in the other direction. This pattern shows that the market
segmentation between rms in the regular and presumptive tax regimes is not entirely due to
xed rm characteristics. Panels (f) and (g) further investigate the patterns in panel (e), by
displaying estimates for intermediate input subject to VAT and intermediate input not subject
to VAT, separately. The levels of both types of intermediate inputs increase for switchers into
the regular tax regime, but the level of intermediate input subject to VAT increases relatively
more. This is consistent with pure reporting eects due to the dierent compliance incentives when
joining the regular tax regime, including participating in the VAT system. However, the pattern
for switchers into the presumptive tax regime is not consistent with pure reporting eects. While
the level of intermediate input subject to VAT decreases for these rms, the level of intermediate
input not subject to VAT actually increases. The change in compliance incentives when rms
switch into the presumptive tax regime would not predict a relative increase in reported inputs
from SIMPLES rms. Therefore, even though our measure of market segmentation may still be
biased by compliance incentives, we interpret the segmentation that we observe in the data as
capturing real market segmentation between rms in the regular and presumptive tax regimes.
3.4 Coexistence of presumptive and regular tax regimes: eects
on rm growth, market competition, and production decisions
We now provide evidence on the eects of the coexistence of presumptive and regular tax regimes
on rm growth, market competition, and production decisions.
3.4.1 Firm growth
We begin with the rst of these three eects. The clear bunching of rms below the SIMPLES
threshold in gure 3.2 already provides strong evidence that the option of the presumptive tax
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regime distorts rm size, at least around the threshold. In this section, we provide additional
evidence by exploiting the reform that increased the SIMPLES threshold from R$2.4M to R$3.6M
in 2012. We show the impact of the reform on the rm size distribution in gure 3.6.
Panel (a) displays the rm size distribution of origin rms around the pre- and post-reform
thresholds in 2010, 2012, and 2014. It shows clear bunching below the pre-reform threshold in
2010. This feature of the rm size distribution completely disappears by 2012, however, with an
increase in the number of rms concentrated between the pre- and post-reform thresholds.19 This
is even more visible in panel (b). It displays the number of rms in 2012 and 2014 by revenue bins
for the entire distribution (censored at R$5M) relative to the number of rms in the same revenue
bins in 2010. The relative increase in the number of rms in 2012 and 2014 is disproportionately
concentrated between the pre- and post-reform thresholds. Moreover, there is clear bunching below
the post-reform threshold corresponding to a fourfold increase in the number of rms located within
that that specic revenue bin by 2014.
Panels (c) and (d) restrict attention to a balanced panel of origin rms with positive revenue in
all years from 2008 to 2016 and revenue levels below the pre-reform threshold in 2010. They display
the median year-to-year growth rates for rms in three revenue bins (R$1.2M-R$1.6M, R$1.6M-
R$2M, R$2M-R$2.4M) in 2010 for rms that were in the presumptive tax regime (panel c) and the
regular tax regime (panel d) in 2010, separately (in the panels, we display the growth rate from
t  1 to t in year t). The growth rate of SIMPLES rms that were just below the threshold in 2010
was relatively lower in 2010 and 2011, consistent with the bunching in 2010 in panel (a). However,
these same rms experienced a relatively higher growth rate in 2012, which is consistent with the
rapid disappearance of bunching below the pre-reform threshold after the reform. In contrast, rms
in the regular tax regime in 2010 grew similarly across the three revenue bins. In sum, gure 3.6
shows that increasing the SIMPLES threshold had a substantial eect on the rm size distribution.
3.4.2 Market Competition
We now provide evidence for the adverse eect of the coexistence of presumptive and regular tax
regimes, and the preferential tax treatment given to SMEs (the option to choose the presumptive
tax regime) on ineligible rms competing in the same market as eligible rms. In particular, we
exploit again the SIMPLES reform in 2012. The reform improved the tax treatment of SMEs in
Brazil, by allowing SIMPLES rms to grow more without becoming ineligible for SIMPLES in the
following year. It also reduced the average tax rate on turnover applying to SIMPLES rms (see
appendix). We show that ineligible rms in sectors with more competition from SIMPLES rms
before the reform grew relatively less after the reform compared to ineligible rms in sectors with
less competition from SIMPLES rms before the reform.
Empirical strategy. We construct our sample of analysis as follows. We rst restrict attention
19There is already some increase in the number of rms just above the SIMPLES threshold in 2011, as rms
learned during the year that they could exceed the threshold without become ineligible for SIMPLES in the following
year.
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to the balanced panel of origin rms observed with positive revenue in all years between 2008 and
2014. We then select rms that were in the regular tax regime in 2010 and that had revenue
levels well above the post-reform threshold at the time such that they were not directly aected
by the reform (they were too far from the post-reform threshold to become eligible in later years).
In practice, we select rms with revenue levels between R$4.6M (R$1M above the post-reform
threshold) and R$20M (very large rms are unlikely to be competing with SMEs) in 2010. We then
estimate regressions for yi;s;t, the log(revenue) of rm i in sector s in year t, using specications of
the form:
yi;s;t = t +   SimplesMarketShare2010s +   SimplesMarketShare2010s  Post2012t + "i;s;t
(3.3)
yi;s;t = t +   SimplesMarketShare2010s + t  SimplesMarketShare2010s + "i;s;t (3.4)
where t are xed eects for each calendar year t (2008,..., 2014). The variable Post2012 is an
indicator for years after the reform. The variable SimplesMarketShare2010s is the market share
of SIMPLES rms in 2010 for each sector, namely the total revenue of SIMPLES rms in the
sector divided by the total revenue of all rms in the sector. It is meant to capture variation in
the intensity of competition from SIMPLES rms across sectors: in sectors with high values of
this variable, a larger share of the market beneted from the SIMPLES reform, likely intensifying
competition faced by ineligible rms in these same sectors. The coecient  in equation (3.3)
thus captures dierential changes in the log(revenue) of ineligible rms after the 2012 SIMPLES
reform by the intensity of competition from SIMPLES rms before the reform. The coecients
t in equation (3.4) capture dierential changes in each years compared to reference year 2010 in
order to show that any dierential eect actually occurred after the reform. Standard errors are
clustered at the sector level, yielding 47 clusters.
Results. Table 3.3 presents the estimated b and b from using the specication in equation
(3.3). Column (1) rst shows that the rms in our analysis sample were not directly aected by the
reform. It uses an indicator for being in the regular tax regime in each year rather than log(revenue)
as the outcome. This is to show that the market share of SIMPLES rms in 2010 is uncorrelated
with tax regime choices both before and after the reform. The results conrm that we select rms
that were too large prior to the reform in order to reduce revenue below the post-reform threshold
after the reform.
Columns (2)-(5) then use log(revenue) as the outcome. Column (2) shows that the market
share of SIMPLES rms in 2010 is negatively correlated with log(revenue) before the reform. This
indicates that the average rm in sectors with a higher market share of SIMPLES rms in 2010 was
smaller at baseline. Column (3) adds controls for rm size at baseline, namely ten indicators for
deciles of the rm size distribution in 2010 as well as those indicators interacted with the post-2012
dummy. This is to separately identify a dierential change post-reform related to the market share
of SIMPLES rms in 2010 from a possible dierential change post-reform related to rm size at
151
baseline. The correlation between log(revenue) and the market share of SIMPLES rms in 2010
is smaller and no longer signicant in this case. In contrast, the change in this correlation after
the reform remains almost unchanged with rm size controls and is signicant at the 10% level. It
implies that rms in sectors with a higher market share of SIMPLES rms in 2010 grew relatively
less after the reform. This eect is an average over rms varying widely in their pre-reform size,
and smaller rms are more likely to be competing with SMEs. Columns (4) and (5) thus presents
results from separate regressions for rms below (smaller rms) and above (larger rms) the median
rm size in the sample in 2010. The eect is concentrated among smaller rms, which reinforces
our interpretation of the results as capturing a market competition eect.
Figure 3.7 further strengthens our results. First, panels (a)-(c) present binned scatterplots
for the estimated b in the regressions presented in columns (3)-(5). It shows that the linearity
assumption in our specications is a good approximation of the relationship between rm size and
the market share of SIMPLES rms post-reform, particularly for smaller rms. Second, panel (d)
presents the estimated bt from using the specication in equation (3.4) for all rms, for smaller
rms, and for larger rms. It shows that the estimated coecients moved around 0 prior to the
reform and were very similar across the three groups. They became increasingly negative after the
reform, particularly for smaller rms. Panel (d) suggests that some of the eect may have started
in 2011 already, as rms learned during the year about the upcoming reform.20 The coecients
presented in table 3.3 may thus even underestimate the adverse eect on ineligible rms.
Finally, column (6) in table 3.3 presents the estimated b and b from using the specication in
equation (3.3) at the sector-year level. The outcome is total revenue of the sector and the size xed
eects are four indicators for quartiles of the sector size distribution in 2010. Column (6) shows
that sectors with a higher market share of SIMPLES rms in 2010 grew relatively more after the
reform, despite the adverse eect on ineligible rms. This is consistent with the positive impact on
the larger share of rms directly beneting from the reform in these sectors.
3.4.3 Tax Regime and Input Choices
In this last subsection, we provide evidence supporting causal links between tax regime and input
choices.
3.4.3.1 Eect of Input Choices on Tax Regime Choices
We rst provide evidence supporting a causal eect of rms' heterogeneity in production functions
on their choice of tax regime, i.e. of input choices on tax regime choices. We exploit again the
reform that increased the SIMPLES threshold in 2012. We restrict attention to rms that were in
the regular tax regime in both 2010 and 2011 (to avoid rms switching tax regime frequently) and
that had revenue levels above the pre-reform threshold but below the post-reform threshold (the
\reform region", between R$2.4M and R$3.6M)) in 2010. These rms became newly eligible for
20For instance, rms learned during the year that they could exceed the pre-reform threshold in 2011 without
becoming ineligible for SIMPLES in the following year.
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the presumptive tax regime in 2012. We then correlate their choice of tax regime in 2012 with their
input choices in 2011 when all of these rms were in the regular tax regime. For this analysis, we
use all rms in the full sample, thus including suppliers and clients of origin rms, given the small
number of rms in the reform region in the origin sample (see gure 3.6a).
Panel (a) of gure 3.8 rst shows that few of these rms switched to the presumptive tax regime
in 2012. The gure uses a balanced panel of rms with positive revenue in all years from 2009 to
2014 and displays the share of rms in the regular tax regime in each year. By construction, it
is equal to one in 2010 and 2011. The share dropped in 2012 to 94% and continued to drop in
following years, although it remained above 92% in 2014.
Table 3.4 displays results from regressing an indicator for being in the regular tax regime in
2012 on the same rm characteristics as in table 3.2, but using the 2011 values of these variables
when these rms were all in the regular tax regime (thus before they became eligible for SIMPLES).
Column (1) only includes the log(revenue) in 2011. Columns (2) and (3) add log(input) in 2011,
the share of intermediate input out of all input in 2011, and the share of intermediate input subject
to VAT in 2011; column (3) adds sector xed eects. Panels (b)-(d) of gure 3.8 also display
binscatter plots of the estimated coecients on log(revenue), the share of intermediate input out
of all input, and the share of intermediate input subject to VAT using the specication in column
(3). Larger rms were more likely to stay in the regular tax regime, which is consistent with the
fact that they are closer to the new threshold (and so more likely to grow above it) and pay higher
taxes in a turnover-based tax regime. The other results suggests that rms' production functions
aect their choice of tax regime: rms with a higher share of intermediate input (and thus a lower
share of labor input) and a higher share of their intermediate input subject to VAT in 2011 were
more likely to stay in the regular tax regime in 2012.
3.4.3.2 Eect of Tax Regimes on Input Choices
Finally we provide evidence of a causal eect of tax regimes on input choices. Panel (a) of gure 3.8
suggests a rst empirical design to study this question. Indeed, it present similar pattern for rms
that were also in the regular tax regime in both 2010 and 2011 but that had revenue levels above
the post-reform threshold in 2010 (between R$3.6M and R$4.8M). Some of these rms, which must
have decreased their size in later years, also opt for the presumptive tax regime after the reform.
However, more than 96% of them are still in the regular tax regime by 2014. The dierence in the
share of rms staying in the regular tax regime after the reform could form the \rst stage" of a
dierence-in-dierences analysis comparing input choices over time for the two groups of rms. We
show in the notes below the graph in panel (a) that this rst stage is statistically signicant, but
that it only reaches 4pp. We are unlikely to have the statistical power to detect change in input
choices with such a small rst stage in a relatively small sample to begin with. We are currently
investigating ways to identify subgroups of the data with a larger rst stage to carry out such an
analysis.
To make some progress, we thus rely on an alternative empirical strategy. In particular, we
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study the impact of a supplier's change of tax regime on a rm's decision to purchase intermediate
inputs from that supplier through an event analysis. Importantly, we exploit heterogeneity in the
tax regime of the client rms. When a supplier changes tax regime, it changes the marginal cost of
a unit of intermediate input from that supplier for rms in the presumptive tax regime, as the VAT
potentially charged by the supplier acts as an input tax for these rms. In contrast, a supplier's
change of tax regime does not necessarily have any implications for the marginal cost of a unit of
intermediate input from that supplier for rms in the regular tax regime, as they can deduct any
VAT potentially charged by the supplier.
Empirical strategy. We select all pairs of rms in the transaction data in which the supplier
switches tax regime at some point between 2013 and 2015, such that we can follow each pair for two
years before and after the tax regime switch, over the period for which all our variables are available
(the client rms are always origin rms). We then keep only pairs in which both the supplier and
the client are observed with positive revenue for the four years around the event; we also impose
that intermediate input should be positive in those years for the client rms. We index again event
years by k =  2; :::1 with k = 0 as the year of the tax regime switch. Finally, we restrict attention
to pairs in which the supplier changes tax regime only once over the 4-year period and the client is
observed in a same tax regime in the two years before the event. Intuitively, the idea is to compare
trade outcomes before and after the event for pairs in which the supplier switches into vs. out of
the tax regime of the client. Our causal eect of interest implies that trade would increase in the
rst group relative to the second group for client rms in the presumptive tax regime. There are
several issues to address before pursuing such an empirical strategy:
Relevance. A rm's supplier in a given year may not be a meaningful supplier in following years,
irrespective of changes in tax regime. In that case, we would not expect any eect of the partners'
respective tax regimes on their trade. In an attempt to focus on more relevant suppliers, we thus
restrict attention to pairs in which the supplier was among the top-10 suppliers of the client in the
year prior to the event (k =  1) and to pairs with positive trade in the two years before the event
(in both k =  1 and k =  2).
Reverse causality. The supplier's choice of tax regime may in theory be aected by the client's
decisions, in particular by its (expected) input decisions (e.g. whether to purchase inputs from that
supplier) and tax regime choice (e.g. whether the client also changed tax regime around the same
time). To limit such concerns of reverse causality, we restrict attention to clients that remain in the
same tax regime for the four years around the event and we apply a \small economy argument",
restricting attention to pairs in which the client is \small" for the supplier. Specically, we eliminate
pairs in which the client accounts for more than 5% of the supplier's sales in the year prior to the
event (k =  1).
Omitted variable bias. Another concern is that, in theory, common shocks could aect both the
supplier's tax regime choice and the client's input decisions. For instance, there is a general trend
towards the presumptive tax regime in the years after 2012, both in number of rms and volume of
trade. What drives this trend may cause both the supplier to switch towards the presumptive tax
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regime and the client to buy more intermediate inputs from SIMPLES rms. To control for such
trends in the data, we assign placebo switching years to comparable control pairs of trade partners
in which neither the supplier nor the client switched tax regime during the four years around the
placebo event.21
In sum, our analysis compares trade outcomes of four types of treatment pairs in which the
supplier changes tax regime in year k = 0 to control pairs in which the supplier and the client are in
the same tax regimes at baseline as the treatment pairs, but in which the supplier does not change
tax regime. Table 3.5 denes our four types of treatment pairs (T1 to T4) and their associated
control pairs (C1-C4) and displays samples sizes for each groups. One limitation is that samples
sizes are relatively small for treatment pairs.
We present raw empirical patterns of relevant variables for all these groups (T1-T4 and C1-C4),
separately. We then quantify changes in an outcome y using the following dierence-in-dierences
specications for each type of pair separately (e.g. T1 and C1 in one regression, and T2 and C2 in
a dierent regression):
yi;k;t = i + k + t + k  Treatmenti + "i;k;t (3.5)
yi;k;t = i + k + t +   Treatmenti Afterk + "i;k;t (3.6)
where i, k, and t are xed eects for each rm i, each event year k, and each calendar year
t = 2011; :::; 2016. The variable Treatmenti is an indicator equal to one for treatment pairs. The
coecients k in equation (3.5) thus capture dierential changes for treatment pairs over time
compared to a reference year. The coecient  in equation (3.6) summarizes the dierence-in-
dierences by capturing the average change in the two years after vs. before the event. Standard
errors are clustered by client rms.
Results. Figure 3.9 displays raw patterns in the data and gure 3.10 presents our estimated bk
coecients using the specication in equation (3.5). The left panels (right panels) in both gures
consider client rms that are in the presumptive tax regime (in the regular tax regime). The rst
outcome is an indicator that the pair is still trading some positive intermediate input value in
the year, capturing possible extensive margin responses. Given the sample selection criteria, this
variable is equal to one in the two years before the event. There is thus some mean reversion in
the two years after the event: the share of pairs still trading decreases over time in all treatment
and control pairs. However, we nd that client rms in the presumptive tax regime are more likely
21Control pairs are selected following the same criteria as for treatment pairs: the placebo events take place
between 2013 and 2015; the client and the supplier have positive revenue in the four years around the placebo event;
the client has positive intermediate input in these same four years; we restrict attention to pairs in which neither
the supplier nor the client changes tax regime over the 4-year period; we restrict attention to pairs in which the
supplier was among the top-10 suppliers of the client in the year prior to the placebo event and to pairs with positive
trade in the two years before the placebo event; we eliminate pairs in which the client accounts for more than 5% of
the supplier's sales in the year prior to the placebo event. Additionally, we restrict attention to pairs in which the
supplier and the client are in similar sectors as suppliers and clients in treatment pairs and in which the supplier is
eligible for the presumptive tax regime, such that it could potentially switch tax regime.
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to continue trading with their supplier if the supplier switches to their own regime, such that the
supplier does not charge them VAT anymore (see gure 3.9a). Compared to pairs in which the
supplier remains in the regular tax regime, the eect amounts to a 10pp increase in the likelihood
that the supplier continue to purchase intermediate inputs from that supplier (see gure 3.10a). In
contrast, we don't nd that client rms in the presumptive tax regime are less likely to continue to
trade with their supplier if the supplier switches to the regular tax regime, such that the supplier
starts charging them VAT (see gure 3.9a).22 Moreoever, as expected, we nd no dierential eect
for client rms in the regular tax regime.
The second outcome is the input value (log) bought from that supplier. In that case, we focus
on the subset of pairs trading some positive amount in all years. This variable thus captures
possible intensive margin responses. There is again clear mean reversion in the two years after the
event. Moreover, we nd that client rms in the presumptive tax regime are trading relatively more
with their supplier if the supplier switches to their own regime, such that the supplier does not
charge them VAT anymore (see gure 3.9c). Compared to pairs in which the supplier remains in
the regular tax regime, the eect amounts to a 20% increase in the amount of intermediate input
purchased from that supplier (see gure 3.10c). In contrast, we don't nd that client rms in the
presumptive tax regime trade less with their supplier if the supplier switches to the regular tax
regime, such that the supplier starts charging them VAT (see gure 3.9c). Furthermore, we nd no
dierential eect for client rms in the regular tax regime as expected.
In sum, the above results provide some evidence that the tax regime of (potential) trade partners
has a causal eect on client's input choices and on market segmentation between rms in regular
and presumptive tax regimes. Yet, the eects remain moderate in magnitude, such that overall
trade of a rm is not aected much by the suppliers' change of tax regime. As a result, we nd
that a client's share of intermediate input subject to VAT increases discontinuously (decreases
discontinuously) when a supplier switches to the regular tax regime (the presumptive tax regime).
This is shown in panels (e) and (f) of gures 3.9 and 3.10.23
3.5 Conclusion
Dual tax systems allow for the co-existence of rms subject to regular modern taxes and rms that
are taxed on a presumptive basis. This has implications for rm growth, input choices, and market
competition. This chapter uses novel administrative data on inter-rm trade linked to labor inputs
from S~ao Paulo, Brazil, to document a number of empirical patterns on the relationship between
tax systems and rms' sourcing choices.
In particular, we show that a tax system in which the VAT and payroll taxes are replaced
by a presumptive tax on revenue aects rms in three important ways. First, it distorts the
rm size distribution and their incentive to grow. Second, it aects market competition, hurting
22We are still trying to understand the reason behind this asymmetry.
23We nd no eect on other outcomes. We are currently increasing sample sizes by using the 2017 data and adding
events taking place in 2016.
156
rms that are ineligible for the presumptive tax. Third, it aects the composition of their inputs
since going from a presumptive system to the regular system means that labor becomes taxed and
intermediate inputs become deductible. This has implications for the supply chain, as we nd
evidence of (partial) segmentation between regular rms and rms in the presumptive system. We
show that heterogeneity in rm production choices drive part of these correlations, but that tax
regimes also causally aect input choices and market segmentation.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the Inter-Firm Trade Data
Note: The gure shows an illustration of the detailed transaction data available for this project using a small random
sample of the data in one year. It does not show all connections across the rms that are included in the picture, but
it helps illustrate the data structure. All the squares are rms in the origin sample. Circles are rms that are either
supplier or clients of origin rms. Yellow circles or squares are VAT-registered (regular) rms, while orange circles
or squares are SIMPLES rms. The white circles are rms that are not registered as taxpayers in the state of S~ao
Paulo (e.g. rms that provide services or that are located in other states).
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Figure 3.2: Bunching and Choice of Tax Regime
(a) Overall revenue distribution (origin sample)
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(b) Revenue distribution around the VAT threshold (ori-
gin sample)
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(c) Share VAT registered by revenue level (origin sam-
ple)
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(d) Revenue distribution around the VAT threshold by
tax regime (origin sample)
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Note: The vertical line indicates the location of the SIMPLES threshold: R$ 3.6 million). The graphs use revenue
bins of R$20,000. The sample is composed of all rm-year observations with positive revenue in the origin sample
between 2012 and 2016.
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Figure 3.3: Input Choices and Tax Regimes
(a) Mean log(input), including intermediate and labor
input
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(b) Mean share of intermediate input (out of all inputs)
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(c) Mean share of intermediate input subject to VAT
(out of all intermediate inputs)
Regular firms
SIMPLES firms.
7
.7
5
.8
.8
5
.9
.9
5
M
ea
n 
sh
ar
e 
of
 in
te
rm
ed
iat
e 
inp
ut
 su
bje
ct 
to
 V
AT
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Revenue in year t (in R$1000)
(Origin sample, 2012-2016)
(d) Mean log(labor input)
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(e) Top 10 suppliers of regular rms below the threshold
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(f) Top 10 suppliers of SIMPLES rms below the thresh-
old
Share of intermediate input from top supplier
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Note: The sample in panel is composed of all rm-year observations with positive revenue in the origin sample
between 2012 and 2016, conditional of having any input (panels a and b), any intermediate input (panel c), and any
labor input (panel d). The value of intermediate input is the pre-tax value of input transactions during the year.
The value of labor input is the total payroll over the year (gross wages paid to employees). Panels (e) and (f) use
samples restricted to rm-year observations with at least 10 suppliers.
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Figure 3.4: Event Analysis around a Firms' Tax Regime Switches (Raw Data)
(a) Log(revenue)
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(b) Share of intermediate input subject to VAT
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Note: The vertical line indicates the timing of the tax regime switch. The samples consists of origin rms with
positive revenue and intermediate input in the two years before and after a (placebo) tax regime switch taking place
between 2013 and 2015.
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Figure 3.5: Event Analysis around a Firms' Tax Regime Switches (DD Estimates)
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Note: The vertical line indicates the timing of the tax regime switch. The samples consists of origin rms with
positive revenue and intermediate input in the two years before and after a (placebo) tax regime switch taking place
between 2013 and 2015. The patterns for log(intermediate input subject to VAT), log(intermediate input not subject
to VAT), and log(labor input) are similar if we restrict attention to rms with non-missing values for these variables
in all years.
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Figure 3.6: The Eect of Increasing the SIMPLES Threshold on the Firm Size Dis-
tribution
(a) Number of rms by revenue level around the SIM-
PLES thresholds
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(c) Median growth rate around SIMPLES extension
(rms grouped by revenue level in 2010) { SIMPLES
rms in 2010
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(d) Median growth rate around SIMPLES extension
(rms grouped by revenue level in 2010) { SIMPLES
rms in 2010
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Note: The samples consist of origin rms only. The vertical lines in panels (a) and (b) indicate the location of the
SIMPLES threshold before (R$ 2.4M) and after (R$ 3.6M) the 2012 reform. The graphs use revenue bins of R$20,000.
The sample is composed of all rm-year observations with positive revenue in the origin sample in 2010, 2012, and
2014. The samples in panels (c) and (d) are restricted to a balanced panel of rms with positive revenue in all years
from 2008 to 2016. Panel (c) considers rms in the SIMPLES regime in 2010 with revenue levels between R$1.2M
and R$2.4M in 2010. Panel (d) considers rms in the regular tax regime in 2010 with revenue levels between R$1.2M
and R$2.4M in 2010. The vertical line indicates the timing of the reform location of the SIMPLES threshold: R$
3.6 million). The graphs use revenue bins of R$20,000. The sample is composed of all rm-year observations with
positive revenue in the origin sample between 2012 and 2016.
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Figure 3.7: The Eect of the 2012 SIMPLES Reform on Ineligible Firms
(a) Dierential impact on ineligible rms, all rms
Slope: -.754* (.442)
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(b) Dierential impact on ineligible rms, smaller rms
Slope: -1.081** (.513)
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(c) Dierential impact on ineligible rms, larger rms
Slope: -.444 (.639)
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(d) Dierential impact on ineligible rms over time
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Note: Panels (a)-(c) present binscatter plots for the estimated b in the regressions presented in columns (3)-(5) of
table 3.3, respectively. Panel (d) presents the estimated bt from using the specication in equation (3.4) for all rms,
for smaller rms, and for larger rms, separately.
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Figure 3.8: Tax Regime Choice among rms Newly Eligible for SIMPLES
(a) Share of rms in the regular tax regime over time
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(b) Binscatter of tax regime choice in 2012 by 2011
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(c) Binscatter of tax regime choice in 2012 by 2011 share
of intermediate input out of all input
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(d) Binscatter of tax regime choice in 2012 by 2011 share
of intermediate input subject to VAT
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Note: The samples consist of a balanced panel of rms in the full sample with positive revenue in all years from
2009 to 2014, restricting attention to rms that were in the regular tax regime in both 2010 and 2011 (to avoid rms
switching tax regime frequently) and that had revenue levels above the pre-reform threshold but below the post-
reform threshold (the \reform region", between R$2.4M and R$3.6M)) in 2010. These rms became newly eligible
for the presumptive tax regime in 2012. For comparison purposes, panel (a) also uses a sample of rms selected
similarly but that had revenue levels above the post-reform threshold in 2010 (between R$3.6M and R$4.8M). Panel
(a) display the share of rms in the regular tax regime in each year. Panels (b)-(d) displays binscatter plots for the
correlations in table 3.4.
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Figure 3.9: Event Analysis around a Supplier's Change of Tax Regime (Raw Data)
(a) Pair still trading (client presumptive regime)
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(b) Pair still trading (client regular regime)
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Figure 3.10: Event Analysis around a Supplier's Change of Tax Regime (DD estimates)
(a) Pair still trading (client presumptive regime)
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(b) Pair still trading (client regular regime)
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Regular firms SIMPLES firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group-level share of the sample 1 0.169 0.240 0.591
Share of SIMPLES firms 0.595 0.020 0 1
Mean log(revenue) 13.045 16.504 12.741 12.182
Group-level share of total revenue across all firms in the year 1 0.899 0.041 0.060
Share of firms with any (intermediate or labor) input 0.972 0.999 0.981 0.960
Mean log(input) 12.721 16.009 12.662 11.770
Share of firms with any intermediate input if any input 0.989 1.000 0.995 0.983
Share of firms with any labor input if any input 0.707 0.925 0.620 0.678
Firm-level share of intermediate input out of all inputs [1- share of labor input] 0.839 0.915 0.873 0.802
Mean log(intermediate input) 12.473 15.916 12.459 11.439
Group-level share of total intermediate input across all firms in the year 1 0.890 0.061 0.049
Number of suppliers (p10-p50-p90) 2-15-88 2-71-255 2-13-57 2-11-50
Firm-level share of intermediate input subject to VAT out all intermediate input 0.791 0.923 0.852 0.725
Mean log(labor Input) 11.318 13.012 10.993 10.755
Mean number of employees 12.036 51.670 4.298 3.875
Mean number of establishments 1.093 1.508 1.033 1.000
Number of firm-year observations 230490 38866 55316 136308
Number of firms 66456 11502 21778 42644
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and comparison of firms in the presumptive and regular tax regimes (origin sample, 2012-2016)
All firms
Firms above 
SIMPLES 
threshold
Below SIMPLES threshold
Note: The sample is composed of all rm-year observations with positive revenue in the origin sample between 2012
and 2016. The value of intermediate input is the pre-tax value of input transactions during the year. The value of
labor input is the total payroll over the year (gross wages paid to employees).
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Table 3.2: Correlates of Tax Regime Choice
Regular tax 
regime
Regular tax 
regime
Regular tax 
regime
Regular tax 
regime
Regular tax 
regime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(revenue) 0.0331*** -0.0124*** -0.0118*** -0.00117 -0.0232***
(0.000990) (0.00129) (0.00126) (0.00296) (0.00214)
Log(input) 0.0533*** 0.0547*** 0.0389*** 0.0132***
(0.00120) (0.00119) (0.00275) (0.00180)
Share of intermediate input out of all inputs 0.224*** 0.214*** 0.248*** 0.0582***
(0.00616) (0.00630) (0.0102) (0.00813)
Share of intermediate inputs subject to VAT 0.211*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.0233***
(0.00611) (0.00590) (0.00774) (0.00489)
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Sector fixed effects X X
Balanced panel X X
Firm fixed effects X
R-squared 0.019 0.085 0.124 0.115 0.893
Number of observations 182,619 182,619 182,619 98,040 98,040
Number of clusters 58018 58018 58018 19608 19608
Table 2: Correlates of tax regime choice (firms below the SIMPLES threshold, 2012-2016)
Note: The sample is composed of all rm-year observations in the origin sample with positive revenue, positive
intermediate input, and revenue levels below the SIMPLES threshold.
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Table 3.3: Impact of the 2012 SIMPLES Reform on Ineligible Firms
Smaller firms Larger firms
Sector-level 
analysis
Regular tax 
regime
Log(revenue) Log(revenue) Log(revenue) Log(revenue) Log(revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market share of SIMPLES firms in 2010 -0.0284 -0.418* -0.172 -0.163 -0.170 -0.883
(0.0332) (0.243) (0.126) (0.157) (0.157) (0.859)
Market share of SIMPLES firms in 2010 x Post2012 -0.0160 -0.713* -0.754* -1.081** -0.444 0.567**
(0.0419) (0.423) (0.442) (0.513) (0.639) (0.259)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size fixed effects interacted with Post2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.022 0.069 0.277 0.149 0.139 0.876
Number of observations 16,604 16,604 16,604 8,302 8,302 336
Number of sectors (clusters) 47 47 47 46 45 48
All firms
Table 3: Impact of 2012 SIMPLES reform on ineligible firms
Note: The sample of analysis in columns (1)-(5) is composed of a balanced panel of origin rms with positive revenue
in all years from 2008 to 2014 that were in the regular tax regime in 2010 and had revenue levels between R$4.6M
and R$20M in 2010. The table displays coecient estimates from using the specication in equation (3.3). The
outcome in column (1) is an indicator for being in the regular tax regime. The outcome in columns (2)-(5) is the
log(revenue). Columns (4) and (5) restrict attention to smaller and larger rms in the sample, respectively, namely
those below and above the median revenue level in 2010. Column (6) displays coecient estimates from using the
same specication but with sector-year observations; the outcome is the total revenue of the sectors in each year in
this case. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level in all columns.
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Table 3.4: Tax Regime Choice in 2012 and 2011 Firm Characteristics
Regular tax 
regime in 
2012
Regular tax 
regime in 
2012
Regular tax 
regime in 
2012
(1) (2) (3)
Log(revenue) in 2011 0.0723*** 0.0708*** 0.0742***
(0.00914) (0.0103) (0.00969)
Log(input) in 2011 -0.00521 0.00131
(0.00324) (0.00352)
Share of intermediate input out of all inputs  in 2011 0.0913*** 0.123***
(0.0220) (0.0253)
Share of intermediate inputs subject to VAT in 2011 0.0881** 0.0877**
(0.0347) (0.0374)
Sector fixed effects X
R-squared 0.018 0.025 0.115
Number of observations 4,879 4,878 4,878
Number of clusters 4,879 4,878 4,878
Table 4: Tax regime choice in 2012 and 2011 firm characteristics 
Note: The sample is composed of a balanced panel of rms in the full sample with positive revenue in all years
from 2009 to 2014, restricting attention to rms that were in the regular tax regime in both 2010 and 2011 (to
avoid rms switching tax regime frequently) and that had revenue levels above the pre-reform threshold but below
the post-reform threshold (the \reform region", between R$2.4M and R$3.6M)) in 2010. These rms became newly
eligible for the presumptive tax regime in 2012. The columns display the results from regressing an indicator for
being in the regular tax regime in 2012 on various rm characteristics in 2011 (prior to the reform, when all rms
where in the regular tax regime).
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Table 3.5: Treatment and Control Group for To Supplier Switching Event Analysis
Client tax regime
Supplier tax 
regime before the 
(placebo) event
Supplier tax 
regime after the 
(placebo) event
Number of 
pairs
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Treatment group 1 (T1) Presumptive Presumptive Regular 710                
Control group 1 (C1) Presumptive Presumptive Presumptive 17,460          
Treatment group 2 (T2) Presumptive Regular Presumptive 612                
Control group 2 (C2) Presumptive Regular Regular 6,237             
Treatment group 3 (T3) Regular Regular Presumptive 250                
Control group 3 (C3) Regular Regular Regular 3,996             
Treatment group 4 (T4) Regular Presumptive Regular 278                
Control group 4 (C4) Regular Presumptive Presumptive 6,584             
Table 5: Treatment and control groups for event analysis around top suppliers' tax regime switch
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3.A Appendix
Average tax rate in SIMPLES regime
Figure 3.A1 displays the average tax rate on yearly gross revenue applying to rms opting for
SIMPLES, the presumptive tax system in Brazil. Yearly gross revenue is both the tax base and
the running variable in Figure 3.A1. The eligibility threshold was increased by 50% in 2012, from
R$2.4 million to R$ 3.6 million. The tax rate schedule also changed at the time; the blue and red
lines correspond to the pre-reform and the post-reform schedules, respectively.
Figure 3.A1: Average tax rate in SIMPLES Regime
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